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I. STRATEGY AND INFLUENCE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore influence strategy and theory to identify 
what the key components of an effective influence strategy are and how to modify these 
components, when necessary, to increase strategic effectiveness.  “In a basic sense, 
strategy is the methodical art of relating ends and means to deal with other actors” 
(Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001, p. 348).  The “QDR acknowledges that victory…depends on 
information, perception, and how and what we communicate as much as application of 
kinetic effects” (United States, 2006b, pp. A-4–A-5).  Yet, the U.S. strategy in the current 
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as with al-Qaeda globally has focused 
predominantly on heavy U.S. military involvement (with a high proportion of kinetic 
operations), while using influence components (media, public diplomacy, CA, MISO, 
and PA), for the most part, in a reactive manner.  There seems to be no grand influence 
strategy by the U.S. to inform U.S. policy and current military operations.   
In this thesis, we will begin by examining the relationship of influence strategy 
with grand strategy, then progress to examining several key influence theories as 
proposed by Cialdini, Ellul, Pratkanis and Aronson, Tugwell, McLuhan, and Reilly.  
From our review, it appears that there are multiple descriptive formulations of the 
components of influence, but no specific formulations on how to develop an effective 
influence strategy using these principles.  There is also a lack of systematic studies 
analyzing the impact and effectiveness of influence strategy in conflicts.  Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt (2001) proposed five levels of analysis (or practice) to assess the design and 
performance of networks.  In Chapter III, we propose to expand this concept to apply to 
any organization (whether network, nation-state, or non-state actor) in conflict with 
another organization.  In Chapter IV, we propose key variables that need to be present in 
an influence strategy as well as the relative importance of each to determine the level of 
effort or changes that would be more likely to help achieve the desired political end-state.   
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For our methodology, we will use comparative studies and adopt a comparative 
case methodology with standard focus questions to apply to each case study in order to 
provide structure and focus to the design.  To choose the case studies for structured 
comparison, we selected the five major strategic conflicts since the beginning of the 20th 
century that have had a major impact on how influence operations are conducted, namely: 
the Boer War, WWI, WWII, the Cold War, and the current conflict of U.S. versus trans-
national Jihadi terrorists. 
B. STRATEGY AND INFLUENCE 
B.H. Liddell Hart (1975) stated that “nations do not wage war for war’s sake, but 
in pursuance of policy.  The military objective is only the means to a political end” 
(Lykke, 1989, p. 351).  Thus, military strategy in all cases is the “art and science of 
employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the 
application of force or the threat of force” (JCS Pub 1, 1987, p. 232).  Now if “[s]trategy 
equals ends (objectives toward which one strives) plus ways (courses of action plus 
means (instruments by which some end can be achieved)” then what are the optimal 
military ways and means for achieving political ends (Lykke, 1989, p. 9)?  In the past, 
military strategy often focused on the destruction of forces; however, this was required 
only as a necessary step to ultimately reach the decision maker to achieve the political 
concession of those who controlled the military.  The “QDR acknowledges that 
victory…depends on information, perception, and how and what we communicate as 
much as application of kinetic effects” (United States, 2006b, p. 230).  This end is the 
same for the full spectrum of war, from potential conflict with nuclear powers to low-
intensity conflicts: “Countering the ideological appeal of the terrorist network of 
networks is an important means to stem the flow of recruits into the ranks of terrorist 
organizations.  As in the Cold War, victory will come only when the ideological 
motivation for the terrorists’ activities has been discredited and no longer holds the power 
to motivate streams of individuals” (United States, 2005, p. 244).   
Many believe that the goal is always the opposing political leader, the adversary’s 
decision-making network, or war-making network; hence the debate during the birth of 
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airpower over the concept of strategic paralysis.  Strategic paralysis was conceived of as 
a third type of warfare which did not seek the destruction of enemy armed forces in battle 
via annihilation or attrition, but rather sought a strategy of bypassing battle with enemy 
forces in favor of attack upon the sustainment and control of those armed forces (c.f. 
Giulio Douhet, J.F.C. Fuller, Hans Delbruck, B.H. Liddell Hart, Lord Trenchard, & Billy 
Mitchell for more details both for and against this concept).  This ultimately gave rise to 
the concept of strategic attack or strategic strike which is used to destroy the enemy’s 
center of gravity.  Colonel John Warden proposed the existence of five rings or centers of 
gravity, with the most important one being leadership, followed by organic essentials, 
infrastructure, population, and finally the warfighting capability itself (Carlino, 2002).  
However, the true strategic center of gravity is the support (explicit or implicit) of any 
movement or political entity by the domestic population: “in the final analysis, the 
exercise of political power depends on the tacit or explicit agreement of the population 
or, at worst, on its submissiveness” (Galula, 1964, p. 7–8 as cited by Gregg, 2009, p. 19).   
The support of the people is not only physical but ideological; the population 
either believes that the movement or political entity is the best choice to provide a safe, 
secure, stable environment or is the best choice to help them achieve their goals.  
Sometimes, however, it is merely the absence of a competing movement, or political 
entity that engenders their reluctant support for the current situation.  This can be seen in 
the modern conflict where “Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism attacks the 
enemy’s strategic center of gravity—extremist ideology” (United States, 2006a, p. 289).  
Although there may not be a single, identifiable physical center of gravity (i.e., a person, 
leader, or nodes in a network); the “glue” that holds the adversary together is the 
narrative that binds that organization.  So, the “way we conduct operations…can affect 
ideological support for terrorism.  The conduct of military operations should avoid 
cutting the credibility and legitimacy of moderate authorities…Key to this is Muslims 
populations’ belief that terrorism is not a legitimate means to pursue political goals”  





terrorism is a legitimate means if it is not consistent with their religion, the population 
may still support an insurgency; but, as argued above, only implicitly if there is no valid 
alternative.   
If we assume that the strategic end is to achieve political concession via influence 
over the populace, what are the best means to achieve this end?  The “erosion of 
traditional boundaries between foreign and domestic, civilian and combatant, state and 
non-state actors, and war and peace is but one indication of” a “rapidly changing strategic 
initiative…In response, the President has heightened U.S. Government strategic emphasis 
on countering violent extremism through effective strategic communication (SC) and 
information operations [IO]” (United States, 2011, p. 1).  Accordingly, the government 
and military services have continued to invest in multiple studies and assessments, and 
have recently realigned responsibilities for IO and individual capabilities, as well as 
proposed a new definition for IO.  The new definition will be “the integrated 
employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert 
with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making 
of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own” (United States, 2011, 
p. 2).  The key change between the previous definition and the proposed current 
definition is the elimination to any explicit references to key capabilities such as OPSEC, 
MILDEC, MISO, EW, and CNO.  The reason for this change is to eliminate the 
distinction between the capabilities and IO as an integrating function.  “Successful IO 
requires the identification of information-related capabilities most likely to achieve 
desired effects and not simply the employment of a capability” (United States, 2011, p. 
2).  It is clear that IO and SC are important to achieve strategic military and political ends 
in ideological conflicts in the information age, but the hardest concept is how to employ 
these means in the appropriate ways.  “In addition to military information operations, this 
strategic communication plan ensures unity of themes and messages, emphasizes success, 
…and reinforces the legitimacy of US goals”  (United States, 2004, p. 280).  As stated 
above, the ultimate goal of IO is to influence the decision maker, often via influence over 
the masses or public along the way, which implies the need for a theory of influence.  
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C. INFLUENCE: MEDIA OR MESSAGE  
Within influence theory, there is a debate as to whether the means should focus 
more on the content of the message or on the media used to deliver the message.  
Marshall McLuhan (1965), a proponent of the latter view, states that the “‘hot’ wars of 
the past used weapons that knocked off the enemy, one by one.  Even ideological warfare 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries proceeded by persuading individuals to accept 
new points of view, one at a time.  Electric persuasion…works, instead, by dunking entire 
populations in new imagery” (p. 339).  He also argues that too much focus has been put 
into the “content” of the media.  McLuhan states that the “medium is the message”; 
therefore, we need to pay attention to the media in contrast to the traditional focus on the 
“content.”  “Political scientists have been quite unaware of the effects of media anywhere 
at any time, simply because nobody has been willing to study the personal and social 
effects of media apart from their ‘content’” (p. 323).  We are completely immersed in 
media everyday which alters our viewpoints.  For McLuhan, media does not stop at radio, 
T.V., movies, and print; but also includes money, clothing, architecture, telephone, 
telegraph, etc.  In other words, “‘the medium is the message’ because it is the medium 
that shapes and controls the scale and form of human association and action…the 
‘content’ of any medium blinds us to the character of the medium” (p. 9).  Therefore, “the 
use of technology, conforms men to them...It is this continuous embrace of our own 
technology in daily use that…is why we must, to use them at all, serve these objects” (pp. 
45–46).   
However, McLuhan also admits that each “mother tongue teaches its users a way 
of seeing and feeling the world, and of acting in the world, that is quite unique” (p. 80).  
Although he believes that the medium is the key factor, McLuhan is still forced to argue 
that different cultures approach different media in different ways, which may make a 
difference in how things are perceived as seen in the following sets of quotes: 
“technological media are staples or natural resources…this pervasive fact creates the 
unique cultural flavor of any society” (p. 21).  “The meaning of a message is the change 
which it produces in the image” (p. 26).  “As we move out of the Gutenberg era of our 
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own culture, we can more readily discern its primary features of homogeneity, 
uniformity, and continuity” (p. 87).  In other words, despite his focus on the power of the 
media, ultimately we can conclude that the underlying content itself is unchanging, but 
simply perceived differently based on culture and the type of media used which he 
inadvertently admits when he states that the “current assumption that content or 
programming is the factor that influences outlook and action is derived from the book 
medium, with its sharp cleavage between form and content” (p. 314).  If there is a sharp 
cleavage between the content (message) and the form (medium); then the message is not 
the medium but alters the way the content is formed and received.  In other words, if 
radio “changed the form of the news story as much as it altered the film image” (p. 53), 
then there was content present that was modified by changing media.  This does not 
discount the effect that media have on the message.  Although ultimately, it is the 
message content that is important, the persuasion practitioner must take into account how 
that message will be changed and perceived by other cultures based upon the media used 
and the presence of countervailing media in the society.  
While McLuhan (1965) focused on the media, Robert Reilly (2009) focuses more 
on the message itself.  Reilly makes the case that the proper job for U.S. public 
diplomacy is to explain, promote, and defend American principles to audiences abroad.  
However he states that since 9/11, “U.S. public diplomacy is generally acknowledged as 
a failure” and that those whose job it is to influence “will not even admit that it is their 
mission” (p. 9).  Reilly points out the main reasons for failure stem from confusion 
regarding what it is we are defending, and against whom we are defending it.  The 
problem is one of message content.  Reilly criticizes the heavy use of advertising models 
in the promotion of democracy.  He argues that promoting, practicing, and defending 
democracy requires the primacy of reason over passion but advertising is a form of 
manipulation that does not appeal to reason and relies on emotional impulse.  While the 
US tends to focus on technology over content, our adversaries have been able to 
overcome technological disadvantage through the content of their message by staking a 
claim on ultimate legitimacy (p. 10).  Reilly describes it as the most powerful form of 
narrative.  The heart of the problem is that the U.S. has failed to address the war of ideas 
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“in order to fight a war of ideas, one has to have an idea” (p. 14).  However, this “is not 
as simple as it may sound.  A war of ideas is a struggle over the very nature of reality for 
which people are willing to die. Therefore, the first thing one must do is formulate the 
ideas that are so central to one’s life that one is not willing to live without them.  For a 
nation to successfully project such ideas, there must be a broad consensus within it as to 
what those ideas are” (p. 14).  So what are the key principles of influence (how we should 
formulate and transmit these critical ideas) that inform our strategy?  In Chapter 2, we 
will further explore influence strategy and theory to identify the key components of an 
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II. PRINCIPLES OF INFLUENCE  
So, what principles are most important in order to influence people to join specific 
social movements?  There is a large literature on influence, its various characteristics, 
tactics, and components.  Below we will briefly summarize some of the schools of 
thought as exposited by Ellul, Cialdini, Tugwell, and Pratkanis and Aronson to see if 
there is any commonality about how best to craft an influence strategy. 
In Propaganda, Jacques Ellul (1965) defined five external and five internal 
characteristics of propaganda (or the messages that influence people).  The external 
characteristics determine how propaganda relates to the outside world and how to best set 
up its use to achieve its goals.  Meanwhile, the internal characteristics determine what 
should be known about the target and environment for propaganda to be most effective.  
We’ll summarize the external characteristics first.  The first is that propaganda is 
targeting both the individual and the masses at the same time.  “The most favourable 
moment to seize a man and influence him is when he is alone in the mass: it is at this 
point that propaganda can be most effective” (p. 9).  The second characteristic is that 
propaganda must be total, to include “the press, radio, TV, movies, posters, meetings, 
door-to-door canvassing.  Modern propaganda must utilize all of these media” (p. 9).  It is 
at this point that Ellul differentiates between propaganda and pre-propaganda.  “Direct 
propaganda, aimed at modifying opinions and attitudes, must be preceded by propaganda 
that is sociological in character, slow, general, seeking to create a climate, an atmosphere 
of favorable preliminary attitudes.  No direct propaganda can be effective without pre-
propaganda” (p. 15).  Additionally, “[o]ral or written propaganda, which plays on 
opinions or sentiments, must be reinforced by propaganda of action, which produces new 
attitudes and thus joins the individual firmly to a certain movement” (p. 15).    
The third characteristic is that propaganda must be continuous and long in 
duration ”continuous in that it must not leave any gaps…lasting in that it must function 
over a very long period of time” (p. 17).  The fourth characteristic is that an organization 
is required that controls the mass media, uses them correctly, and calculates the effects of 
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one slogan or campaign over another as well as the interaction between them.  “We can 
hardly expect great results from a simple dissemination of words unless we prepare for it 
by education (pre-propaganda) and sustain it by organization and action” (p. 22).  
Additionally, the “manipulation of symbols is necessary for three reasons…it persuades 
the individual to enter the framework of an organization…it furnishes him with reasons, 
justifications, motivations for action…it obtains his total allegiance” (p. 23).  The fifth 
external characteristic of propaganda is orthopraxy (from thought to action), which states 
that “the aim of modern propaganda is no longer to modify ideas, but to provoke 
action…its aim is to precipitate an individual’s action, with maximum effectiveness and 
economy” (p. 25).  The “action exactly suited to its ends must be obtained…orthopraxy-
an action that in itself, and not because of the value judgments of the person who is 
acting, leads directly to a goal…[this]…action makes propaganda’s effect 
irreversible…he is now obliged to believe in that propaganda because of his past action” 
(pp. 27–29). 
Ellul (1965) also defined five internal characteristics of propaganda, the first of 
which is knowledge of the psychological terrain.  Propaganda must be tailored to fit the 
terrain and never make a direct attack on an established, reasoned opinion or an accepted 
cliché.  “We frequently find that psychological manipulations do not appreciably change 
an individual’s firmly established opinion, a Communist or a Christian with strong beliefs 
is very little, if at all, shaken by adverse propaganda” (p. 33).  “Attacking an established 
opinion or stereotype head on would make the propagandee aware of basic 
inconsistencies and would produce unexpected results.  The skillful propagandist will 
seek to obtain action without demanding consistency, without fighting prejudices and 
image, by taking his stance deliberately on inconsistencies” (p. 35).  Additionally, 
“propaganda is confined to utilizing existing material…above all…the needs of those he 
wishes to reach.  All propaganda must respond to a need, whether it be a concrete need 





The second characteristic covers the fundamental currents in society.  
“Propaganda must be familiar with collective sociological presuppositions, spontaneous 
myths, and broad ideologies.  By this we do not mean political currents or temporary 
opinions that will change in a few months, but the fundamental psycho-social bases on 
which a whole society rest” (p. 38).  The third internal characteristic is timeliness.  Man 
will be “moved to action only if the propaganda pushes him toward a timely action” (p. 
43).  Additionally, propaganda “can succeed only when man feels challenged.  It can 
have no influence when the individual is stabilized, relaxing in his slippers in the midst of 
total security” (p. 44).   
The fourth characteristic is the effect of propaganda on the undecided, “those 
people whose opinions are vague, who form the great mass of citizens, and who 
constitute the most fertile public for the propagandist” (p. 48).  The final internal 
characteristic is the relationship between propaganda and truth.  Propaganda must be 
based on truth and facts, while the falsehoods are the moral elements in the realm of 
intentions and interpretations.  Facts must remain facts (or else the public can discover 
and be dissatisfied with the inconsistencies), but they can be hidden or presented out of 
context.  However, intentions cannot be definitively disproven.  “The propagandist must 
insist on the purity of his own intentions and, at the same time, hurl accusations at his 
enemy…the mechanism used here is to slip from the facts…to moral terrain and to 
ethical judgment” (p. 58).   
A couple of other key points by Ellul (1965) include the idea that people in 
society need propaganda, especially so in the modern era, when a person is cast out of the 
microgroups of the past (family, church, village) and plunged into mass society (thereby 
highlighting his own inadequate resources, his isolation, his loneliness, and his 
ineffectuality).  Propaganda hands him what he needs: a raison d’être, personal 
involvement and participation in important events.  Ellul also states that mass media, an 
average standard of living, education, and information are required for propaganda and 
manipulation.   
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The next major influence theorist is Robert Cialdini (1993), who presents six 
different categories of fundamental psychological principles that encompass virtually all 
of the different tactics that compliance professionals (primarily in the marketing world) 
use to influence people.  The principles are consistency, reciprocation, social proof, 
authority, liking, and scarcity.  These principles are necessary, fixed-action patterns that 
are required to allow humans and civilization to advance by extending the amount of 
information and the number of things we can do without thinking about them, cognitive 
shortcuts.  The first principle is reciprocation, which states that “we should try to repay, 
in kind, what another person has provided us” (p. 17).  Human society derives a 
significant competitive advantage from the reciprocity rule, so societies ensure members 
are trained to comply with and believe in it.  The second principle is commitment and 
consistency.  Cialdini states that “consistency is valued and adaptive.  Inconsistency is 
commonly thought to be an undesirable personality trait.  The person whose beliefs, 
words, and deed don’t match may be seen as indecisive, confused, two-faced, or even 
mentally ill” (p. 60).  The underlying key to consistency is commitment.  “If I can get you 
to make a commitment…I will have set the stage for your automatic and ill-considered 
consistency with that earlier commitment.  Once a stand is taken, there is a natural 
tendency to behave in ways that are stubbornly consistent with the stand” (p. 67).  
Consistency to this commitment can be increased if the commitment is active, public, and 
effortful.   
The third principle is social proof where we determine what is correct or 
acceptable by finding out what other people think and observing how they act.  The 
fourth principle is liking where we automatically assign positive traits to people whom 
we like, who are attractive in some way, who flatter us, or who we have become 
accustomed to due to familiarity, similarity, or conditioning.  The fifth principle is 
authority.  We are trained that obedience to proper authority is right and disobedience is 
wrong.  Information from a recognized authority can provide us a valuable shortcut for 





seem more valuable to us when their availability is limited.  We must rely on these six 
principles (and associated cognitive biases) more and more since modern society gives us 
an avalanche of information and choices.   
Cialdini devised his six principles on the basis of his immersion in the culture of 
the salesman.  His work is very reminiscent of a similar book, The Hidden Persuaders, by 
Vance Packard (1957) who interviewed many top salesmen, advertisers, and practitioners 
of motivational methods.  Motivational research is the study began by psychologists and 
sociologists into the second and third level of consciousness.  “The second and lower 
level is called, variously, preconscious and subconscious but involves that area where a 
person may know in a vague way what is going on with his own feelings, sensations, and 
attitudes but would not be willing to tell why.  This is the level of prejudices, 
assumptions, fears, emotional promptings, and so on.  Finally, the third level is where we 
not only are not aware of our true attitudes and feelings but would not discuss them if we 
could” (p. 25).  The ad agencies used this understanding of our psychological processes 
sell billions of dollars’ worth of products based upon successfully manipulating peoples’ 
guilt feelings, fears, anxieties, hostilities, loneliness feelings, and inner tensions in order 
to provide “‘the illusion of rationality’ that the buyer needs” (p. 79).  Packard, unlike 
Cialdini, ventures past the realm of capitalism and consumers to consider “the 
potentialities from the public’s viewpoint…for here the goal is mind-molding itself…The 
aim now is nothing less than to influence the state of our mind and to channel our 
behavior as citizens” (p. 178).  Although extremely enlightening as to the state of 
psychological research into advertising, politics, and public relations at the time, Packard 
does not provide any overarching principles or theories of influence to incorporate into 
our search for a strategy, but rather stays on the level of “tactical application.” 
The next influence theory we will discuss is the concept of the mobilizing trinity 
by Maurice Tugwell (1990), which rests on the proposal that governments and their 
peoples, or revolutionaries and their followers, fight or resist so long as three essential 
beliefs are held. This trinity of convictions consists of: first, a belief in something good to 
be promoted or defended; second, a belief in something evil to be destroyed or resisted; 
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and third, a belief in the ultimate victory of the good cause.  If one of these three 
convictions is changed or damaged it leads to the process of the asset-to-liability shift. 
Over and over, the asset-to-liability shift proved to be the turning point across a range of 
conflicts.  For instance, in Mandatory Palestine, the British resisted Zionist demands for a 
Jewish state because Palestine, as a valuable military base, was viewed as an asset. 
However, pro-Zionist militant terrorist groups conducted a series of terrorist attacks that 
the authorities could not defeat.  The actions of the militant group made British rule seem 
illegitimate to international audiences and expensive to the British public. “Lacking an 
intellectual argument. Britain weighed its options on a profit-loss basis. The Zionist 
campaign had robbed Palestine of its value as a base; human and financial costs were 
rising; the world was watching. By February 1947, Palestine was seen in London as a 
liability. The government handed the problem to the United Nations and the way was 
clear for a Zionist victory. The utility of terrorism as a means to change minds had been 
proven” (Tugwell, 1990, p. 4).  In another example, Islamists and violent trans-national 
jihadi terrorists groups define the trinity as depicted in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.   Example of Islamist belief structure (From Tugwell, 1990) 
Whatever their content, such triads provide today's terrorists with certainty. They are 
doing what is right; their victims deserve to die; it is not a waste of lives and effort 
because their cause is bound to triumph in the end. For their enemies, the psychological 
situation is rather different.   
During the past two decades, the nature of international terrorism has changed 
considerably; the shift is away from publicity-seeking dramas, from lengthy hostage 
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situations designed to force governments to make concessions such as the release of 
political prisoners, and towards low-intensity wars of attrition apparently intended to 
have strategic rather than tactical consequences. They operate from strong beliefs in their 
own righteousness, in the evil of their enemies, and in eventual victory.  
Finally, Anthony Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson (2001) provide an overview of 
what social psychologists and other investigators have discovered about how we are 
persuaded.  For instance, humans conserve energy by taking cognitive shortcuts (as noted 
earlier, Cialdini’s framework is also based upon this assumption).  Additionally, no 
matter how irrationally people may behave, they attempt to appear reasonable to 
themselves and others.  There are two routes to persuasion peripheral (weak arguments 
taking little cognitive effort to process) and central (strong arguments taking much 
cognitive effort to process).  The personal relevance of the issue determines which route 
is persuasive.   Thus, Pratkanis and Aronson discuss the Law of Cognitive Response 
where the “successful persuasion tactic is one that directs and channels thoughts so that 
the target thinks in a manner agreeable to the communicator’s point of view; the 
successful tactic disrupts any negative thoughts and promotes positive thoughts about the 
proposed course of action” (p. 31).   
The authors then discuss four stratagems of influence (rooted in Aristotle’s 
atechnoi, ethos, logos, and pathos).  The first stratagem is pre-persuasion which consists 
of establishing how an issue is defined and discussed (similar to SMT framing narrative).  
With this stratagem, we can define an event in such a way that the recipient of our 
message accepts our definition of the situation and is pre-persuaded before argument 
begins.  The second stratagem is source credibility meaning that the 
communicator/medium must appear to possess attributes that facilitate positive reception 
of the message.  The third stratagem is the message; the intent is to focus the audiences’ 
attention and thoughts on exactly what the communicator wants.  The fourth stratagem is 
emotion where the focus is on arousing emotion and offer a way of responding that just 
happens to be the desired behavior (again similar to the action frame in SMT).  Pratkanis 
and Aronson continue to discuss what factors determine when we will be influenced, how 
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we respond in general to a persuasion attempt, and finally, what may possibly be done to 
limit the effectiveness said campaign (which essentially consists of 24 items in a 
checklist that basically sum the techniques of persuasion so one is aware of them and 
understands them so that you can be on guard against them). 
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III. INFLUENCE: LEVELS OF ANALYSIS  
This is just a small taste of the many important aspects of influence strategy and 
operations, but even at this basic strategic level we are left with 6 principles by Cialdini, 
10 characteristics by Ellul, 4 stratagems with multiple tactics or techniques for influence 
by Pratkanis and Aronson, and the mobilizing trinity by Tugwell (Table 1).   
Ellul Cialdini Tugwell Pratkanis & Aronson 
The Individual and the Masses Consistency Belief in Good Pre-Persuasion 
Total Propaganda Reciprocation Belief in Evil Source Credibility 
Continuity and Duration Social Proof Belief in Ultimate Victory Message 
Organization Authority  Emotion 
Orthopraxy Liking   
Knowledge of Psychological 
Terrain Scarcity   
Fundamental Currents in Society    
Timeliness    
Propaganda and the Undecided    
Propaganda and Truth    
Table 1.   Summary of key influence principles by theorist 
Is there any overarching theme that the common influence practitioner can use?  
How are we able to combine these diverse elements into one cohesive framework?  
Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) discussed the lack of a standard methodology for analyzing 
network forms of organization.  Based upon their familiarity with the theoretical 
literature, Arquilla and Ronfeldt proposed a framework consisting of five levels of 
analysis in order to best determine what makes a network effective, which include the 
organizational level, the narrative level, the social level, the doctrinal level, and the 
technological level. 
The organizational level examines the organizational design and specifies the 
extent to which an actor, or set of actors is actually organized as a network and the 
topology of the network (i.e., chain, hub, or all-channel network).  Arquilla (2009) further 
explains that “networks typically manifest a mix of some or all of these archetypal forms.  
 18 
 
The mixtures may vary, but the three forms will undoubtedly appear” (p. 3).  Fighting 
networks must also be assessed in terms of factors that unite their adherents, namely the 
narrative and social levels.  In line with social movement theory, Arquilla (2009) 
describes the narrative dimension as the story that organization members tell each other 
about the origins and purpose of their coming together as well as a rough guide to action, 
mobilize and guide masses, and spark recruitment.  Narratives express a sense of identity 
and belonging; differentiates the organization from the masses; communicates a sense of 
cause, purpose, and mission.  The social level continues to tighten the bonds of the 
organization and “helps both to convey ‘staying power’ to members and to foster deep 
levels of trust and cooperation” (p. 5).  In Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001), the doctrinal 
level is described as very “important for explaining what enables the members to operate 
strategically and tactically, without necessarily having to resort to a central command or 
leader” whether via a ‘leaderless’ network (otherwise described later as ‘panarchy’) or 
via swarming (p. 333).  Finally, the technological level discusses the information and 
communications technologies which are crucial for empowering the organization.  These 
five levels of analysis are proposed primarily for evaluating the effectiveness of 
networks, but are they as applicable to the more ‘traditional’ forms of organizations and 
how do they relate to the principles of influence discussed above? 
We propose that these five levels of analysis are equally valid in evaluating the 
effectiveness of the more ‘traditional’ forms of organizations and that the principles of 




Table 2.   Principles of influence by level of analysis 
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IV. FROM PRINCIPLES AND LEVELS OF ANALYSIS TO 
HYPOTHESIS 
A. NARRATIVE 
The first level of analysis we will discuss is the narrative.  As we have seen 
above, in the modern version of warfare the battle or war has become less of a force-on-
force conflict and less kinetic.  Instead, the battle has become more immersed in the 
context of information, ideology and non-kinetic actions.  The objective is no longer to 
grind down the enemy army until you are able to reach the strategic center of gravity, 
whether it is the decision maker of the nation state or the national will of the populace.  
Rather, the fight is more diverse and set within an ideological context where 
“commanders and staffs analyze the culture of the society as a whole and that of each 
relevant group in the society.  They identify who holds formal and informal power and 
attempt to understand why.  They then consider ways to reduce support for adversaries 
and gain support for allies” (Jackson, 2009, p. 1).  It is possible to induce individuals to 
modify their behavior to achieve your objectives through multiple methods including 
force.  However, coercion through force can only be maintained as long as that force is 
present and will, more often than not, cause increased resentment towards the occupying 
force such that the occupying force often ends up doing more harm than good.  An 
alternative method is to engage in the battle of the “narrative” and present stories that 
resonate with the various populations, otherwise known as target audiences, in an attempt 
to convince them to pursue an alternative course of action, which will help you achieve 
your objectives.  In all warfare, including Irregular Warfare as demonstrated in the 
current war against terrorists, crafting a credible narrative is a central requirement to 
countering irregular threats.  As such, a major focus of the Department of Defense (DoD) 
and special operations is on researching how to win the battle of the narrative while 
conducting irregular warfare.  In other words, what narratives and counter-narratives 
should be developed to undermine and discredit those of our enemies?   
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To better answer this question, we first need to understand what a narrative really 
is.  According to Jackson (2009), 
a narrative is a story relating a causally linked set of events that explains 
some aspect of a group’s history and expresses the group’s values, 
character, or self-identity…Each individual belongs to multiple groups 
through birth, assimilation, or achievement. Each of these groups provides 
some component of the individual’s identity and influences his beliefs, 
values, attitudes, and behaviors. (p. 1) 
Beliefs are concepts and ideas accepted as true, values are enduring beliefs which assert 
that a specific mode of conduct or end state of existence is preferable to alternatives, 
while attitudes are affinities for and aversions to groups, persons, and objects based upon 
underlying beliefs and values which affect how an individual selects, evaluates, and 
organizes available information (Jackson, 2009).  The goal for commanders and staff is to 
understand the population’s interests and then convince them either logically (winning 
their minds) that one alternative behavior is better than another, regardless of the 
underlying values or beliefs, or convince them that they must change their underlying 
attitudes and beliefs (winning their hearts) which influence their subsequent behaviors.  
Either change within the target audience, be it hearts (attitudes and beliefs) or minds 
(logic) will cause a positive and long-lasting change in the target audience’s behavior.  It 
is in this battle of the narrative, best achieved through Military Information Support 
Operations (MISO), where trans-national jihadi terrorists groups are currently perceived 
to have the edge.  These groups are able to exploit their knowledge of local history, 
culture, and religion to affect perceptions by framing their actions positively, thus gaining 
support from the local population.  As stated by Liddell Hart (1991), “the prospects and 
progress of a guerrilla movement depend on the attitude of the people in the area where 
the struggle takes place—on their willingness to aid it by providing information and 
supplies to the guerrillas by withholding information from the occupying force while 
helping to hide the guerrillas” (p. 378).  The U.S. must increase its capabilities to counter 
the narrative presented by these trans-national jihadi terrorists groups, while presenting 




Within the social sciences, a current theory on the formation of social movements 
(social movement theory or SMT) has tried to describe why social movements form (to 
include terrorist networks and insurgent networks).  Social movement theory as a whole 
seeks to explain why social mobilization occurs, the forms under which it manifests, as 
well as potential social, cultural, and political consequences.  Many different explanations 
have been given as to why social mobilization occurs including: collective behavior, 
relative depravation, rational choice, and resource mobilization.  In his book, Doug 
McAdam (1999) discusses several models of social movement theory including the 
classical theory, mass society, collective behavior, status inconsistency, rising 
expectations, relative deprivation, and Davies J-curve theory of revolution.  McAdam 
readily admits that these models are not interchangeable; however, each of them 
consistently follows a three-part general causal sequence to account for the emergence of 
social movements.  “This sequence moves from the specification of some underlying 
structural weakness in society to a discussion of the disruptive psychological effect that 
this structural ‘strain’ has on society.  The sequence is held to be complete when the 
attendant psychological disturbance reaches the aggregate threshold required to produce a 
social movement” (p. 7).  This causal sequence is depicted in Figure 2: 
 
Figure 2.   McAdam's causal sequence (From McAdam, 1999) 
Regardless of what the individual components in the overall sequential model are, 
McAdam (1999) states that there are three general weaknesses with the overall model.  
The first is that many structural strains exist and are endemic to society; however, he also 
states that relatively few social movements have produced great social upheavals.  Thus, 
social grievances are necessary, but not sufficient.  McAdam’s second critique is that any 
attempts to identify the underlying psychological components that predispose certain 
individuals to join social movements have again generally failed to identify a sufficient 
cause for social movements.  Additionally, any focus on personal psychological 
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explanations for social movements do not adequately explain why group movements 
occur.  Wiktorowicz (2004) agrees that studies and scholars have produced “almost 
inexhaustible lists of precipitating factors, including the failure of secular modernization 
projects, blocked social mobility, economic malaise,…the legacy of colonialism and 
cultural imperialism, and political alienation” to understand the rise of multiple 
movements to include extremist movements (including Islamic extremism); but have 
been unable to discriminate among them and simple agree that “individuals join groups 
and movements in response to crisis” (p. 3).  McAdam’s final critique is that social 
movements are represented as psychological movements rather than political movements.  
In other words, he believes classical social movement theorists deny a link between 
problem and action.  
Although we agree with McAdam (1999) that the underlying social discontent is 
necessary, but not sufficient, we also believe that he misses another critical factor, 
namely: the existence of a viable alternative movement and the ability of that movement 
to recruit participants.  There are thousands of social movements that help individuals 
deal with any number of underlying social and individual discontents to include social 
friends, clubs, church groups, political groups, etc.  Not all social movements that help 
people with discontent need be massive political social movements that can lead to 
violent actions. For the purposes of our research, we will focus on another key 
explanation, namely the process of framing (Goffman, 1974).  In framing, a movement 
must first express the three key frames: the diagnostic frame (meaning “what went 
wrong”), the prognostic frame (where the movement attempts to explain “what is to be 
done”), and the motivational frame (this is the final call to arms that propels the people to 
action).  In this framework, there is the explicit understanding that there is an underlying 
social or individual grievance (which is expressed in the diagnostic frame) as well as a 
social movement that explains how best to deal with the social grievance (the prognostic 
frame).  If there is no alternative social movement, then discontent individuals have no 
recourse but to live in the society as it exists until a valid social movement arises.  Or the 
prognostic frame may simply be to go to clubs with friends, pray more, or vote for 
another political party.  However, the key part of framing is that these frames must be 
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articulated and elaborated in a specific fashion that resonates with the target audience 
because “groups often diverge in terms of diagnosis, prognostication, the best way to 
mobilize support, and identity.  These struggles are contests to influence the direction of 
the movement; how resources should be used…in short, a struggle to assert authority” 
(Wiktorowicz, 2004, p. 163).  It is this process of articulating and elaborating the frames 
that we believe best corresponds to the problem of building an effective influence 
strategy.  It is also in the framing process that opposing social movements are most easily 
diminished.  By either addressing the underlying social grievance or by showing that 
there is an alternative movement, and thus an alternative frame, it is possible to minimize 
social support for other social movements.   
It is thus critical to focus on the “content, the prime weaponry of the struggle for 
influence” (Arquilla, 2009, p. 49).  Therefore, our main hypothesis is that the most 
important level of practice in determining the effectiveness of an organization is the 
narrative (an effective narrative is necessary, but not sufficient).  However, how should 
we best formulate this content?  We propose that to successfully articulate and elaborate 
frames which resonate with the target audience, the narrative requires two main 
components each which will be discussed separately.  We will show how these two 
components are expressed in each of the prominent theories above. 
1. Consistency 
The first key component we propose is consistency.  Although this component 
appears intuitively self-evident, as seen above; it is only explicitly identified as a key 
principle by Cialdini (1993).  We have already covered commitment and consistency by 
Cialdini in the previous section; however, it is interesting to note that all of Cialdini’s 
principles work because they are necessary fixed-action patterns that are required to 
allow humans and civilization to advance by extending the amount of information and the 
number of things we can do without thinking about them.  All of the principles work 
because we must stay consistent with these biases to help us process an overabundance of 
information.  Additionally, once we have committed to certain ideals, norms, and beliefs; 
we are compelled to stay consistent with our previous commitments.  
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Consistency is also a key factor in the principles by the other key theorists 
(including McLuhan and Reilly).  Packard (1957) gives an example of the power of 
consistency in future Presidential elections (based upon practices emerging in the 1956 
Presidential election) where there will be a “‘scientific selection of appeals; planned 
repetition…Radio spot announcements and ads will repeat phrases with a planned 
intensity.  Billboards will push slogans of proven power’” (p. 187).  Even though 
McLuhan (1965) focused on media over content, he also understood that the “the lineal 
structuring of rational life by phonetic literacy has involved us in an interlocking set of 
consistencies” (p. 85).  The constant presence of media has created a perception of logic 
and consistency such that all “organizations, but especially biological ones, struggle to 
remain constant in their inner condition amidst the variations of outer shock and change” 
(p. 98).  Additionally, McLuhan states that the increase in speed and distribution of media 
and technology “produces division of function, and of social classes, and of knowledge” 
(p. 103).  This increase of information is a centrifugal force that leads to division and 
specialization in our lives that people struggle against.  The counterforce to this is 
homeostasis or consistency.  Reilly (2009) also makes the case for consistency of 
message when he states, “[p]olicies and administrations change; principles do not” and 
that the main failure in U.S. public diplomacy since 9/11 stems from confusion regarding 
what it is we are defending, and against whom we are defending it (p. 9).  Therefore, a 
nation must formulate the ideas that are so central to one’s life that one is not willing to 
live without them and there must be a broad consensus within it as to what those ideas 
are.  Implicit in this statement is the acknowledgement that central ideas that form the 
foundation of a nation are consistent over time.   
At first, Ellul (1965) seems to disagree with the principle of consistency when he 
states that “propaganda can indulge in sudden twists and turns…the propagandist does 
not necessarily have to worry about coherence and unity in his claims.  Claims can be 
varied and even contradictory” (p. 18).  However, the reason that propaganda does not 
necessarily need to be consistent is because it is merely the wave on the ocean that can 
move and vary, but it must always follow the larger current on which it rides.  Thus 
“[d]irect propaganda, aimed at modifying opinions and attitudes, must be preceded by 
 27 
 
propaganda that is sociological in character, slow, general, seeking to create a climate, an 
atmosphere of favorable preliminary attitudes.   No direct propaganda can be effective 
without pre-propaganda” (p. 15). Only after having established total, direct, and 
continuous control over the propaganda, can the propagandist attempt to engage in 
sudden twists and turns.  Also, Ellul argues that the “skillful propagandist will seek to 
obtain action without demanding consistency, without fighting prejudices and image, by 
taking his stance deliberately on inconsistencies” (p. 35).  In other words, Ellul proposes 
indirect attacks on a person’s beliefs.  If you try to directly attack a consistent view, then 
the pre-existing cognitive bias will reject the propaganda.   Pratkanis and Aronson (2001) 
agree with this latter argument by Ellul.  In their book, they discuss that people will seek 
to eliminate cognitive dissonance.  Creating dissonance, i.e. being inconsistent, is a good 
way to get a message rejected.  However, exposing dissonance in their pre-existing 
beliefs can change behaviors.  
This principle of consistency is also expressed in other reviews of influence 
specifically addressing military use of the information environment as well as the 
principle of war itself.  Cone, Rayfield, and Stach (2006) state that “[i]nformation exists 
in a continuum, from the tactical to the strategic, that must remain synchronized and 
coordinated to ensure ‘unity of effort’ or ‘unity of message’ at all levels. In order to be 
truly effective, all contributions to the informational component of national power (both 
military and diplomatic) must speak with the same voice and carry the same message” (p. 
13).  They further state that a second benefit provided by “unity of effort” is the ability to 
control the discussion, set the agenda, and maintain the desired idea in the minds of the 
target audience. Unity of effort is a principle of war taught in all U.S. military institutions 
of higher learning and provides reinforcing fires to the message, giving it greater impact, 
meaning, and importance. Finally, Dunlap (2006) proposed modifying the principles of 
war to account for changes in warfare in the modern age.  One such principle is the 
concept of “Strategic Anchoring—consciously anchoring every action in a strategic 
context…In the information age, few objectives are exclusively tactical or operational, or 




Simon (1957) introduced the concept of bounded rationality, which states that the 
“capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very small 
compared with the size of the problems whose solution is required for objectively rational 
behavior in the real world—or even for a reasonable approximation to such objective 
rationality” (p. 198).  Because of these limits, man must construct simplified models of 
reality and then work within this mental model.  Heuer (1979) states that Simon’s theory 
was based on an understanding of psychological research on perception, memory, 
attention span, and reasoning capacity that documents human limitations in perception 
and cognition that cause us to employ simplifying strategies when processing 
information.  Many of these biases are based on an inherent psychological need for 
consistency based upon prior commitments.  For example, motivational biases (what we 
want to see) result from the need to perceive our past behavior as consistent.  There are 
perceptual biases that indicate that we have a set of assumptions and biases about the 
motivations of people and that events that are consistent with these expectations are 
perceived and processed easily while contradictory evidence is ignored or distorted.  
Heuer continues to explain that these perceptual biases are often reinforced by 
organizational pressures favoring consistent interpretations.  Heuer also discusses 
important cognitive biases (what we expect to see) including an oversensitivity to 
consistency when evaluating evidence.  With this bias, people tend to “have more 
confidence in conclusions drawn from a very small body of consistent information than 
from a larger body of less consistent data” (p. 50).  Heuer continues to use these 
perceptual and cognitive biases based upon Simon’s concept of bounded rationality to 
discuss their impact on one component of influence strategy (deception and 
counterdeception), but it is enough for the purposes of this paper to indicate the 
psychological basis and need for consistency 
We not only propose that consistency is a main component of an effective 
influence strategy.  We also propose a new construct (based upon statistical principles) of 
further subdividing the component of consistency into three sub-components.  We 
propose the following construct, internal consistency, external consistency and construct 
consistency.  Internal consistency implies that the argument is logical internally.  
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“Although some social movements might question issues of logic and reason, most value 
rational thought and argument.  Popular intellectuals who are inconsistent might appear 
wavering, ill-informed, or hypocritical” (Wiktorowicz, 2004, p. 168).  Internal 
consistency should also ensure the messages are consistent with each other.  External 
consistency implies consistency of words and deeds.  An effective narrative must be the 
primary consideration over actions (not equal or subordinate) and the actions must flow 
from and be consistent with the information strategy.  As Ellul’s (1965) concept of 
orthopraxy indicates, “Oral or written propaganda, which plays on opinions or 
sentiments, must be reinforced by propaganda of action, which produces new attitudes 
and thus joins the individual firmly to a certain movement” (p. 15).  This “action makes 
propaganda’s effect irreversible…[man]…is now obliged to believe in that propaganda 
because of his past action” (p. 29).  Arquilla (2009) states that the most important aspect 
in engaging the enemy at the level of ideas “will lie in improving our use of strategic 
communications and public diplomacy…[which necessitates that]…there should be 
special attention given to the role that physical actions play in message sending.  
Unambiguously clear actions…make it harder for the enemy’s propaganda to take hold, 
and make it more likely that our own intended message will come though the clutter” (p. 
8).  Construct consistency implies that the major theories and underlying assumptions and 
terms, as well as the messages themselves, are consistent over time.     Otherwise, any 
inconsistency may call into question the basis and process of judgment which then may 
call into doubts the veracity of the frame in question (Wiktorowicz, 2004). 
2. Legitimacy 
The second principle, legitimacy, also appears intuitive.  Unlike consistency, it is 
more prevalent in the above principles; however, like consistency, legitimacy can occur 
in many forms.  At its most basic level, legitimacy is derived from the pure Manichean 
distinction between good and evil.  This moral justification is important in framing social 
movements since movement groups must “distinguish themselves from other 
groups…[and]...justify its ráison d’être…[by drawing]…sharp in-group/out-group 
distinctions.  This often generates stark bifurcations…the world is divided into two 
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camps in Manichean fashion” (Wiktorowicz, 2004, pp. 164-165).  This provides both 
sides with “a sword as well as armour” (Liddell Hart, 1991, p. 336).  The trick is trying to 
justify why one side is good and one side is bad.  “The propagandist must insist on the 
purity of his own intentions and, at the same time, hurl accusations at his enemy…the 
mechanism used here is to slip from the facts…to moral terrain and to ethical judgment” 
(Ellul, 1965, p. 58). Moral legitimacy can be justified through religion where one group is 
defined as truly devoted to God (and into the best interests of the group) as opposed to 
selfish (morally corrupt) purposes.  Moral legitimacy can also be justified by 
philosophical or rational appeal to universal principles.  Sometimes moral legitimacy is 
simply assumed simply due to in-group/out-group distinctions, an implied connection to 
something that is believed to be inherently good or evil, or by positions of authority or 
status. 
Although Cialdini (1993) does not directly label moral legitimacy as a key 
principle, three out of six of his principles are directly relevant to this component.  With 
the principle of reciprocity, people are morally defined as good or bad depending on if 
they choose to follow this societal principle.  Similarly, his principles of liking and 
authority are based on the concept that we unconsciously assign good, positive traits to 
some people based either on cognitive bias, perceived beauty, or inherent legitimacy 
based upon a positive social role.  For this reason, we are more likely to be persuaded by 
them.  Moral legitimacy is the primary basis behind Tugwell’s (1990) mobilizing trinity.  
The entire process is based upon labeling one side as good and the other side as evil.  One 
side operates from strong beliefs in their own righteousness, in the evil of their enemies, 
and in eventual victory. Since these beliefs are essential to continued operations, Tugwell 
specifies that attempts to delegitimize or neutralize hostile trinities are the number one 
priority in any conflict.  Interestingly, Simon (1957) is most direct about the relationship 
about influence and legitimacy: “It is clear from the definition that authority is a form of 
influence: when A exercises authority over B, he exercises influence over B…authority 
denotes power based on legitimacy” (p. 75).   
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One of the strategies proposed by Pratkanis and Aronson (2001) is to focus on 
source credibility (a key part of legitimacy) since the communicator must appear to 
possess attributes (such as authority) that facilitate positive reception of the message.  
Therefore, much of their tactics concern ways of building credibility or trying to associate 
concepts with other items that are inherently good or bad.  Finally, Reilly (2009) again 
argues that by using pop culture the U.S. actually undermined it own justness and is 
perceived as deliberately trying to corrupt youth (evil), thereby undermining credibility as 
a serious superpower.  Further, U.S. attempts to establish the moral legitimacy of 
“multiculturalism” as a common value or to divert attention away from the difference 
between the western world and the Muslim world actually serve to further fan the flames 
since Muslims are likely to be insulted further by attempts to devalue the importance of 
religion or distract believers from it primacy in their everyday lives.  To fight and win a 
war of ideas, you have to understand and articulate the justness of your cause.  Arquilla 
(2009) stated that “it is the perceived justice of our cause that will determine ‘whose story 
wins’…This is the key to success at the narrative level…All the rest is commentary” (p. 
58).  Ellul, Pratkanis, and Cialdini’s work may illuminate the methods and techniques 
available to establish the ultimate moral legitimacy of our cause in the minds of our 
adversaries.   
From a strategic perspective, almost any conflict can be simplified to a 
disagreement over political goals.  When such conflicts, whether purely diplomatic, low-
intensity, terrorist, insurgent, or full-scale war, exist; there is an automatic assigning of 
one side versus another side.  However the two sides try to justify it (referring to religious 
beliefs, philosophical beliefs, or implied value beliefs), one side is considered good and 
the other side is evil.  In order to maintain support, each side must then frame their 
argument to show what the problem is and how they propose to fix the problem.  
Depending on how the issue is framed, people will choose to support one side or another.  
Directly attacking their property, lives, or deeply held convictions only serves to 
galvanize their position and create additional moral justification.  In any case, the only 
key to victory is to either remove the underlying conflict or to undermine the support of 
the opposing side by forcing them to question the moral legitimacy of the group or the 
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inconsistency between the group’s goals and other potential solutions to the problem.  
Any kinetic solution must be regarded only as a holding action until longer-term 
strategies are able to work.  Therefore, we posit our first sub-hypothesis 1: that to be most 
effective, the narrative must be both consistent and morally legitimate.  (A narrative may 
be modestly effective if it is either consistent or morally legitimate, but will not be 
effective if it is neither consistent nor morally legitimate).   
B. SOCIAL 
The next level of analysis is the social level.  Everton (2009) lays out two 
interrelated but analytically distinct topographical dimensions of networks that appear to 
affect network performance: the (1) provincial-cosmopolitan and (2) heterarchical-
hierarchical dimensions.  The first topographical dimension is based upon Granovetter’s 
study (1973, 1974) which found that people were far more likely to have used personal 
contacts than other means in finding their current job; but the more critical factor was that 
most jobs were found though weak ties (i.e., acquaintances) rather than strong ones (i.e., 
close friends).   As Everton (2009) cites “weak ties often connected otherwise 
disconnected groups.  Thus, whatever is to be spread (e.g., information, influence, and 
other types of resources), it will reach a greater number of people when it passes through 
weak ties rather than strong ones” (p. 3).  Stark (2007) defines provincial ties as 
consisting primarily of strong, redundant ties with very few weak ties as contrasted with 
cosmopolitan ties as consisting of numerous weak ties and very few strong ties.  Everton 
(2009) cites several examples, which indicate that social network density has a 
curvilinear (or inverted U) relationship such that individuals who are embedded in very 
sparse (i.e., cosmopolitan) and very dense (i.e., provincial) social networks are far more 
likely to commit suicide, engage in deviant behavior, fail in organizational goals 
(marketing or writing musicals) than are people who are embedded in moderately dense 
networks.  Everton’s second dimension, heterarchical versus hierarchical identifies two 
ideal types of organizational form on either end of a spectrum: networks, which are 
decentralized, informal and/or organic, versus hierarchies, which are centralized, formal 
and/or bureaucratic.   Everton proposes that “networks that are too provincial (i.e., dense, 
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high levels of clustering, an overabundance of strong ties) too cosmopolitan (i.e., sparse, 
low levels of clustering, an overabundance of weak ties), too hierarchical (i.e., 
centralized, low levels of variance) and/or too heterarchical (i.e., decentralized, high 
levels of variance) tend not to perform as well as networks that maintain a balance 










Figure 3.   Hypothesized relationship between network topography and effectiveness 
(From Everton, 2009) 
Everton (2009) lists several ways of using social network analysis tools and 
calculations to determine the network topography and proposes that strategy ought to be 
based on an understanding of the network topography more than simply identifying and 
taking action on key nodes within the network itself.  The network topology can been 
seen as the interaction between the informal, emergent properties based upon the social 
ties (trust, kinship) which is mediated by the level of properties by a specific organization 
as espoused in its doctrine.  Sub-hypothesis 2: organizations are more effective when the 
organization topography (as measured by the density of connections and organizational 




Obviously, there is some overlap between the network topology of a social group 
and the level of organizational design, the heterarchical versus hierarchical distinction.  
The term ‘network’ itself is often difficult to define.  Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) 
highlight the proliferation and confusion over the concept of network highlighting at least 
three distinct usages.  The first one the authors discuss defines networks in terms of the 
communications grids and circuits which form the technological backbone for the 
organization enabling information sharing and flow (a very limited view).  The two other 
prominent usages refer “either to social networks or to organizational networks (or to a 
conflation of both).  But social and organizational networks are somewhat different 
organisms” (p. 315).  The social level of analysis focuses on networks as sets of actors 
(nodes) and the links or ties between them, which form a patterned structure of the social 
relationship of its members.  This is an informal and highly fluid structural pattern that 
shifts based upon changes in the relationship among its members.  A social network 
simply consists of a finite set or sets of actors that share ties with one another 
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994, p. 21).  However, Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) distinguish 
between social networks that consider any set of actors that have any kind of tie (trust, 
familial, etc.) as a network versus a distinct form of organization (as different from other 
organizational designs such as hierarchies or matrices) where individuals recognize that 
they are operating in a specific network and are committed to operating as a network.  
The network form of organization is often viewed by organizational network analysts as 
having “advantages over other (e.g., hierarchical) forms, such as flexibility, adaptability, 
and speed of response” (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001, p. 319).  
Using this latter definition of network for the organizational level of analysis, 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) then define three major typologies of networks: chains, 
hubs, and all-channel meshes.  The authors also acknowledge that there are also complex 
combinations and hybrids of networks as well as organizational designs that are hybrids 
of networks and hierarchies, which in fact cover the predominant majority of 
organizations vice the “pure” types listed above.  Terrorists and other violent netwar 
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actors often operate as dark networks since these covert networks “must have a very 
flexible structure that enables them to react quickly to changing pressures from nation-
states and other opponents in order to survive”; the network form is an optimizing 
function based upon their need for stealth and secrecy (Raab & Milward, 2003, p. 431).  
Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) “often posit that it may take networks to fight networks.  
Yet, government interagency design…will have to be built around hybrids of hierarchies 
and networks” (p. 327).  Thus we posit sub-hypothesis 3: that organizations that are 
hybrids of networks and hierarchies are more effective at influencing others than either 
pure networks or pure hierarchies. 
D. DOCTRINAL 
As discussed above, this level of analysis is critical for understanding how 
members of an organization are enabled to operate both strategically and tactically.  
Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) highlight two key doctrinal practices that are particularly 
useful for covert networks.  The first is to organize and present as “leaderless” a network 
as much as possible.  The lack of central leadership prevents opponents from being able 
to cut the head off the snake making the organization defunct.  However, “leadership 
remains important, even though the protagonists may make every effort to have a 
leaderless design” (p. 327).  The second principle is the importance of swarming 
strategies and tactics.  Swarms are small, distributed, semi-autonomous groups that are 
capable of converging simultaneously on a target (swarming) or multiple targets, 
attacking the target(s) from multiple angles, and then quickly dispersing after an attack to 
prepare for the next attack.  One such example of swarming techniques included the 
simultaneous suicide attacks in February 2009 of three Afghan government ministries in 
Kabul by a total of just eight terrorists following a “new “Mumbai model” of swarming, 
smaller-scale terrorist violence…[where]…hitting several targets at once, even with just a 
few fighters at each site, can cause fits for elite counterterrorist forces that are often 
manpower-heavy, far away and organized to deal with only one crisis at a time…[similar 
to]… Mumbai, India, last November, where five two-man teams of Lashkar-e-Taiba 
operatives held the city hostage for two days, killing 179 people” (Arquilla, 2009). This 
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generates our fourth sub-hypothesis: organizations where participants are able to self-
mobilize into small groups to perform actions independently (swarms) are more effective 
than organizations that are completely leaderless or that have a central command.  
Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) continue to state that the key to the performance of 
networks depends “on the existence of shared principles and practices that span all nodes 
and to which the members subscribe in a deep way” (p. 333).  It is the strength of the 
narrative that keeps individuals bound and committed to the organization.  Therefore, we 
propose sub-hypothesis 5:  Swarms are more effective when there is a strong narrative, 
while centralized organizations are more effective when the narrative is weak. 
E. TECHNOLOGICAL 
The final level of analysis is the technological level which covers the pattern and 
capacity of information flow using technology.  Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) state that 
the new information and communications technologies have been crucial for enabling 
network forms of organization and doctrine.  The most recent and prominent example of 
the technological importance is the rise in the use of cyberspace by covert networks.  
Arquilla (2009) highlights the “tremendous capacity of cyberspace to act as a spreading 
device for narrative” (p. 41).  As noted above, McLuhan considers the medium of the 
message as more important than the content of the message itself.  Many other analysts, 
politicians, and military strategists stress the importance of technology especially the 
need to continuously strive for newer and better technologies as the key for waging future 
warfare.  Yet, “netwar can be waged without necessarily having access to the internet and 
other advanced technologies…Human couriers and face-to-face meetings may still 
remain essential, especially for secretive actors like terrorists and criminals” (Arquilla & 
Ronfeldt, 2001, p. 339).    Often, covert networks may find that they gain an asymmetric 
advantage over their enemy by relying on low-tech or no technology especially when 
their opponent is heavily invested in technology.  Therefore, we posit sub-hypothesis 6: 





V. HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY 
A. HYPOTHESES 
From our preliminary literature review, we propose to test one main hypothesis 
and several additional sub-hypotheses grouped by the five levels of analysis (as discussed 
above). 
H1: The most important level of practice in determining the effectiveness of an 
organization is the narrative (an effective narrative is necessary, but not sufficient). 
1. Narrative 
Sub-hypothesis 1: To be most effective, the narrative must be both consistent and 
morally legitimate.  (A narrative may be modestly effective if it is either consistent or 
morally legitimate, but will not be effective if it is neither consistent nor morally 
legitimate).   
2. Social 
Sub-hypothesis 2: Organizations are more effective when the organizational 
density (as measured by tight coupling of connections, levels of clustering, and ratio of 
strong vs. weak ties) is medium (versus low or high). 
3. Organization 
Sub-hypothesis 3: Organizations that are hybrids of networks and hierarchies are 
more effective at influencing others than either pure networks or pure hierarchies 
4. Doctrinal 
Sub-hypothesis 4: Organizations where participants are able to self-mobilize into 
small groups to perform actions independently (swarms) are more effective than 
organizations that are completely leaderless or that have a central command. 
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Sub-hypothesis 5:  Swarms are more effective when there is a strong narrative, 
while centralized organizations are more effective when the narrative is weak. 
5. Technological 
Sub-hypothesis 6:  Technology is important, but is the least determining factor in 
organization effectiveness.  
B. DESIGN FRAMEWORK/METHODS 
By using a comparative study, we are able to identify patterns that would be 
difficult to identify through just single-case phenomena.  As stated by Levite, Jentleson, 
and Berman, “single-case studies…have considerable virtues, notable depth and richness 
of detail; but for purposes of theory building single-case studies also suffer from 
profound limitations, most prominently in overemphasizing the unique features of each 
case” (p. 15).  By adapting a similar comparative case methodology, there is a structure 
and focus to the design of the study.   
1. Choosing Representative Case Studies 
To choose the case studies for structured comparison, we selected five major 
strategic conflicts over the past century that have had major impacts on how influence 
operations are conducted, namely: the Boer War, WWI, WWII, the Cold War, and the 
current conflict of U.S. and allies versus trans-national Jihadi terrorists. 
As stated earlier, to help structure the case studies, we will use a 
structured/focused comparison approach by asking the following questions: 
1) Is the narrative consistent over time (construct)? 
2) Is the narrative logically consistent (internal)? 
3) Is the narrative consistent between words and deeds (external)? 
4) Is the narrative morally legitimate? 




6) Is the organization (overall) a network, hierarchy, or a hybrid of the two? 
7) Is the part of the organization responsible for achieving influence a 
network, hierarchy, or hybrid? 
8) Is the organization (overall) speaking with a single, overarching voice or 
with many small voices? 
9) Is the part of the organization responsible for influence speaking with a 
single, overarching voice or with many small voices? 
10)  Is the overall density of the organization high, low, or medium? 
11) What was the political goal (end)?  Was it achieved? 
12) What other capabilities (means) were used?  Relative importance of the 
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VI. COMPARATIVE STUDY 1: THE BOER WAR 
A. BACKGROUND 
First, it is important to note that the Boer War actually has many synonymous 
names: the Anglo-Boer War, the Great Anglo-Boer War, the Second War of 
Independence, etc. which may all be used interchangeably in this chapter.  The war was 
fought in the southernmost part of Africa (see map below) and consisted mainly of the 
British (Anglos, or Khakis) against the Boers (Afrikaners).  The Boers (the word means 
“farmers”) were a distinct people created by the merger of Dutch colonists in the 1650’s, 
French Huguenot refugees in 1688, and German immigrants soon after.  For reasons 
which will be discussed below, the Boers declared war on 11 October 1899.  The “British 
public expected it to be over by Christmas [but] it proved to be the longest (two and three 
quarter years), the costliest (over £200 million), the bloodiest (at least twenty-two 
thousand British [out of approximately 450,000 troops], twenty-five thousand Boer [out 
of approximately 87,000] and twelve thousand African lives)…for Britain between 1815 
and 1914” (Pakenham, 1979, p. xix).      
The Boer War is often overshadowed in historical analysis due to the fact that it 
was followed quickly by both World War I and World War II.  However, it is important 
to analyze this war from an influence strategy perspective “because it was the first major 
British War since the advent of mass literacy after the 1870 Forster Education Act 
[therefore] There was a mass readership anxious to read the popular press, while 
technical advances in telegraphy and news gathering had transformed the methods and 
scope of the British newspaper industry” (Morgan, 2002, p. 2).  Badsey (1999) continues 
to note that by “the revolution in communications technology…allowed…the transfer of 
information on scales, at speeds, and over distances that were unprecedented in human 
history” (p. 2).  This communication technology included the electric telegraph, the cine-
camera, and the widespread use of lightweight still cameras which allowed dramatic 
images to be sent back to England for popular consumption “making it possible for the 
first time for events on a distant battlefield to be reported to the metropolis, by methods 
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other than those under government and military control, with sufficient speed to have 
direct political consequences” (Badsey, 1999, p. 2). 
  
 
Figure 4.   Map of South Africa, 1899–1902 (From Farwell, 1976) 
However, the “developments of most importance before the war were the 
introduction 1896 by Alfred Harmsworth of the London Daily Mail as the first popular 
circulation newspaper, and the establishment in 1898 of the Imperial Penny Post which 
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made it possible for letters to be sent virtually anywhere in the Empire.  This, together 
with the telegraph, meant that the Boer War could be reported in a manner and on a scale 
not seen before in history” (Badsey, 1999, p. 2).  And reported it was, there were 
probably over 200 individuals involved in the media process at the height of the war and 
included reports by such prominent people as Rudyard Kipling, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, 
Winston Churchill, and the first woman war reporter, Lady Sarah Wilson (Badsey, 1999; 
Morgan, 2002).  The scale and availability of communication and media also allowed for 
pro-Boer or anti-British sentiments such as the graphic reports of concentration camps by 
Emily Hobhouse as well as pro-Boer newspapers in England such as the Daily News.  As 
Morgan notes: “the Boer War was a seminal and crucial period in the evolution of the 
British press.  It launched a new phase in Britain’s self-definition and self-image” (p. 8). 
B. HISTORICAL PRELUDE 
The Boers were rugged people who disliked any government control (which was 
originally Dutch under the Dutch East Africa Company, before transferring to the British 
in 1795).  The British government took permanent possession of Cape Colony in 1806.  
In 1834, England ordered slaves to be emancipated throughout all of its colonies.  This 
led to the Great Trek of 1835–1837 where about 5,000 voortrekkers (Boer pioneers) 
pushed Northeast into the frontiers and established two new Boer republics: Transvaal 
and the Orange Free State. As can be inferred from one of the names, what is now called 
the Boer War is actually the second war that occurred between the British (in Cape 
Colony and Natal, a second Boer colony which England annexed in 1843) and the Boers 
(in Transvaal and the Orange Free State).  In 1877, England annexed Transvaal in an 
attempt to federate South Africa.  The first war began as a rebellion in December 1880 
and lasted until August 1881 when British forces were ordered to arrange an armistice 
following the last battle of the war at Majuba where British forces were completely 
overrun: “never before in its long history had British arms suffered such a humiliating 
defeat: a group of unsoldierly farm boys had completely routed a British force 
containing…some of the most famous regiments in the British army, and a force, 
moreover, that was six times larger than that of the Boers and in what ought to have been 
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an impregnable position” (Farwell, 1976, p. 19).  During the armistice, Transvaal 
regained its independence under Paul Kruger, later elected President of Transvaal.   
In 1870, there was a diamond-rush to Kimberly (a town in Cape Colony).  Then in 
1886, there was a gold rush to the Witwatersrand, or the Rand, in Transvaal, which made 
it the richest nation in South Africa with a powerful military.  Most of the new 
immigrants, Uitlanders (or outlanders), to the Transvaal were British.  Yet Transvaal had 
very strict franchise laws which prevented the immigrants from gaining any political 
rights even though the immigrants now outnumbered the Boers.  “In 1895 two multi-
millionaires, Cecil Rhodes and Alfred Beit, conspired to take over the Transvaal for 
themselves and the Empire” by seizing upon the political hunger of the Uitlanders 
(Pakenham, 1979, p. xiv).   The resulting Jameson Raid ended up being a complete 
fiasco.  Four hundred Rhodesian police (Rhodesia was a new British Colony established 
and administered by Rhodes and Beit) plus one hundred and twenty five volunteers from 
Cape Colony rode to Johannesburg in Transvaal to ostensibly support a planned uprising 
by the Uitlanders in Transvaal for political rights.  However, when the Jameson group 
reached the outskirts of Johannesburg, their Uitlander friends did not revolt as planned, 
but had made peace with the Boers.  In the resulting skirmish, the Jameson group had 
sixteen dead and forty-nine wounded compared to one dead Boer.  “The Jameson Raid 
was the real declaration of war in the Great Anglo-Boer conflict…in spite of the four year 
truce that followed” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 1).   
Despite the four-year truce, there were several conflicts involving the Afrikaners 
(Boers) who still lived in British-controlled Cape Colony as well as conflicts involving 
British Uitlanders who lived in Transvaal, which culminated when one drunk Uitlander 
was shot by a Boer policeman.  This led to an Uitlander protest (funded by Rhodes and 
Beit) in which the Uitlanders appealed to England for protection.  There were several 
attempts by President Kruger of Transvaal to offer reforms to avoid war with England, 
but the British representative of Cape Colony, Milner, deliberately prevented any truce 
from being signed between England and Transvaal to precipitate a war.  Transvaal 
understood that Milner was deliberately trying to incite a war and thus decided to take the 
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offensive with the assistance of their ally, the Orange Free State, and laid siege to two 
British towns: Ladysmith in Natal and Mafeking in Cape Colony thus officially starting 
the Boer War.  
C. SUMMARY OF THE WAR 
As stated earlier, the Boers declared war on 11 October 1899.  The war began as a 
traditional war with Boer sieges of two British towns.  The British tried to march relief 
forces to these two towns, but used direct frontal assaults by infantry at close-rank despite 
lethal, accurate, and rapid fire, due to the recent revolution in small arms, by the Boers.  
The Boer commandos (individual army units) also took advantage of defensive positions 
in trenches using smokeless gunpowder and supporting artillery resulting in frustration, 
delays, and massive casualties by the British at key points such as: Modder River, Riet 
River, Magersfontein, Colenso, and Spion Kop.  Despite the lack of any strategic, 
operational, or tactical brilliance by the British, they finally managed to relieve 
Ladysmith and Mafeking by the application of sheer brute force.  Following the relief of 
the two towns, British forces continued to mass and finally marched into the heart of 
Transvaal and the Orange Free State taking over the capitals: Pretoria and Bloemfontein, 
respectively.  The Boers were then forced to resort to a guerrilla campaign in their 
republics while trying to raid and inspire revolt by Afrikaners in the British colonies.  
However, the British forces continued to track down Boer forces while following a 
scorched earth policy and creating “concentration camps” in Transvaal and the Orange 
Free State, all of which eventually forced the Boers to surrender in 1902.   
D. DATA 
As stated in the methodology section, we are using a structured/focused 
comparison approach to explore the selected case studies.  Thus data is structured below 
as answers to each of our stated focus questions. 
1. Is the Narrative Consistent Over Time (Construct)? 
Morgan (2002) states that the British newspapers focused [primarily] on home 
readers” (p. 13).  From our quick review of the history leading up to the war, we can see 
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that England was very inconsistent with its narrative towards the Boers and the two Boer 
republics beginning with the emancipation of the slaves in 1835: for “the next sixty years 
the British government blew hot and cold in its dealings with the Boers” (Pakenham, 
1979, p. xiii).  “Wavering British attitudes were reflected in wavering British policies 
over a long period” (p. 10).  In fact, during “most of the century British policy was weak 
and vacillating…On three occasions a positive attempt was made to solve the Boer 
question by adopting an active ‘forward’ (that is, expansionist) policy.  On each 
occasion…impatience and the see-saw of party politics” led to disaster (Pakenham, 1979, 
p. 7).  The most important example was the first Anglo-Boer conflict after the British 
tried to enact their expansionist policy by annexing Transvaal.  After a relatively brief 
conflict with a minor skirmish (especially compared with those that would occur later, the 
“British wanted peace.  The Transvaal did not seem important enough to shed blood 
over” (Farwell, 1976, p. 19). Several years later, after the Jameson Raid fiasco, England 
still did not attempt to exert its influence over Transvaal.  Pakenham (1979) refers to 
England’s “bigger blunders: years of drift and compromise” (p. 7).  So when the British 
reversed their policy again in 1899 and decided to support the petition by the Uitlanders 
for protection, many within the Boer leadership again felt that if there was a war with 
England where she suffered any major setback; England would once again change its 
position and leave Transvaal free to govern itself.  In fact, despite the petitions by the 
Uitlanders, many people within England were reluctant to go to war with the Boers again, 
but Milner was “determined to reverse Chamberlain’s ‘no-war policy’” (Pakenham, 1979, 
p. 120).   
The narrative also changed during the course of the war.  Many believed that the 
root cause of the war was a combination of imperialism and greed which we shall address 
in greater detail when discussing the legitimacy of the war.  In fact, the Boers were “often 
compared favourably with the cosmopolitan and shifting population in the goldfields of 
the Rand whom the British were supposedly defending” (Morgan, 2002, p. 5).  However, 
England also declared ‘lofty’ principles to justify its participation in the war.  The first 
being “we are bound to show that we are both willing and able to protect British subjects 
(Uitlanders] everywhere when they are made to suffer from oppression and 
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injustice…The second principle is that in the interests of the British Empire, Great Britain 
must remain the paramount Power in South Africa’” (Farwell, 1976, p. 31).  The 
protection of British subjects, Uitlanders, soon morphed into a need to provide protection 
for the natives and colored people under oppression, particularly when most of the 
Uitlanders fled the Boer republics at the beginning of the conflict.  However, as the war 
slowly progressed, “in the popular mind, the Uitlanders and there problems were already 
forgotten and the reason for fighting was reduced to the slogan: ‘Avenge Majuba!’” 
(Farwell, 1976, p. 142).  Thus, we can safely conclude that the British narrative was 
definitely not consistent over time. 
The Boer narrative consisted of three main components.  The first was their 
dislike of any form of government, especially British imperial control.  “To Africa these 
pilgrim Fathers brought a tradition of dissent and a legacy of resentment against 
Europe…the Boers of the frontier, resented imperial interference” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 
xiii); “the terms of the ultimatum…were absolutely uncompromising…It accused Britain 
of breaking the London convention of 1884 by interfering in the internal affairs of the 
Transvaal” (p. 104); “from the beginning they were discontented with the rule of the 
Dutch East India Company” (Farwell, 1976, p. 4); the “Boer complained of too much 
government and the British settlers of too little” (p. 6); and “the Boers left, carrying with 
them an abiding sense of injury and injustice, a bitter hatred of the British who had 
robbed them of their land for which they had fought and bled” (p. 9).   
The second component of their narrative was just as consistent, if not morally 
questionable: slavery.  “The voortrekkers (pioneers) quarreled among themselves, but 
shared one article of faith: to deny political rights to Africans and Coloured people of 
mixed race” (Pakenham, 1979, p. xiii) for “the Boers believed in the right of every white 
man to ‘beat his own nigger’ and that the relationship between a master and his servants 
and slaves was a private, domestic affair” (Farwell, 1976, p. 5).  Again, as we saw in the 
brief overview leading to the Boer War, it was the decree by London that all slaves 
should be emancipated in her colonies which precipitated the Great Trek. 
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The third component of the Boer narrative was the refusal to grant political rights 
to the Uitlanders until they had been franchised.  Although the basic premise of the 
narrative was expressed consistently, it was applied very inconsistently.  “The reluctance 
of the Boers to give the Uitlanders the franchise was understandable…but they were 
unsophisticated in their methods. Before 1882 only one year’s residence had been 
required…then the requirement was raised to five years.  In 1890 fear of the uitlander 
vote caused the volksraad to raise the residency requirement to fourteen years, and the 
clamour grew” (Farwell, 1976, p. 31).  The fear of the Uitlander vote was not just 
paranoia, but seemed an existential threat.  The “uitlander population increased so rapidly 
that it was frightening: they were fast outnumbering the Boers themselves, and they made 
little or no effort to settle into Boer ways; they were in fact strident in their demands for 
concession…they wanted things done the right way.  Their way” (Farwell, 1976, p. 21).  
During the negotiations leading up to the war, the Boers were willing to reduce the 
franchise to five years applied retroactively to prevent war, but by then Milner was dead 
set on war and sabotaged the negotiation process.  Overall, the Boer narrative was 
consistent over time, but morally questionable.     
2. Is the Narrative Logically Consistent (Internal)? 
Although the British narrative consisted of protecting all of its subjects, non-
colored and colored, they continued to place undue emphasis on the security of their 
white subjects.  Milner’s second principle “was to secure the loyalty of the very men—
the Uitlanders—who were determined to keep the natives oppressed.  And this second 
principle, of course, took priority…even if the ultimate solution was to see the natives 
‘justly governed’” (Pakenham, 1979, p.121).  Additionally, the Uitlanders were just as 
grievous as the Boers in their treatment of the colored population.  There “was only one 
set of laws in the Transvaal that the Uitlanders considered really ‘excellent’: the laws ‘to 
keep the niggers in their place’” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 124).  More to the point, despite 
winning the war, during the peace conference the British allowed the “‘question of 
political rights of natives to be settled by colonists themselves’…[which]…made 
mockery of Chamberlain’s claim that one of Britain’s war aims was to improve the status 
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of Africans” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 599).  Additionally, Beit and Wernher’s (the British 
financiers of the Rand goldmines) “strongest single motive for making that secret alliance 
with Milner, which had set Britain and the Transvaal on a collision course, was to reduce 
the cost of African labour on the Rand” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 270).  “It was illogical, he 
thought; for like almost all other patriotic Englishmen, Churchill refused to believe that 
this was a war fought to win control of the gold-mines” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 451). 
The Boer narrative is also logically inconsistent.  The three basic strands of the 
narrative are contradictory to each other.  The primary theme is nationalism and the 
expressed belief that they should be free to rule their country without interference from 
an external imperial power.  Yet, the Boers then denied political rights and autonomy that 
they so coveted from the majority of the population (both Uitlanders and their native 
African slaves and servants). 
3. Is the Narrative Consistent Between Words and Deeds (External)? 
Both sides claimed that this was to be a “white man’s war.”  As such, both sides 
expected the opponent to abide by certain rules of civilized war.  The First Peace 
Conference at Hague declared that dumdums (bullets created to expand on contact 
making wounds by them much more gruesome than those of standard bullets) were “too 
barbarous to use…[yet] both sides indignantly accused the other side of using them, and 
there is ample and reliable evidence that both sides did” (Farwell, 1976, p. 41).  On the 
topic of weapons not to be used in a civilized war, the Boers particularly hated the 
cavalry, “for they regarded the lance as a barbarous weapon—a long-handled assegai—
not to be used by civilized men” (Farwell, 1976, p. 73).  The assegai was a particularly 
lethal weapon used by the Zulus and other South African tribes against the Boers during 
the expansion and Great Trek.  Additionally some Boers felt that it was un-Christian to 
attack a fleeing enemy, which the cavalry excelled at.  Both sides accused the other of 
misusing and abusing the white flag during battle with reports that some soldiers would 
fly the white flag to draw the enemy out while other concealed soldiers would then shoot 
them.  Plus, despite “the twelve-foot-high Red Cross flag…shells crashed into the field 
hospitals beside the military camp.  A stampede ensued” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 146).  Yet, 
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some times the incongruity ran the other way: “‘I bayoneted him as gently as I could.  
And I gave him water, too’”; “Churchill was puzzled by the contrast between the violent 
words and the generous acts” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 381).  There are multiple other 
instances where the two sides were found to behave in a civilized manner during the war 
despite being at war, such as refusing to shell each other or fight on Sundays in some 
places, or playing cricket against each other in other places.  Interestingly, Morgan (2002) 
notes that after the war “the British media attempted to project the chivalrous, almost 
light-hearted nature of the war…the atrocities were forgotten…The Afrikaaner Deneys 
Reitz…commended English officers and men for their general humanity on the field of 
battle” (p. 14). 
The other side of the inconsistency with calling it a “white man’s war” was the 
impact of the war on the Africans: “perhaps as many as a hundred thousand were enrolled 
to serve the British and Boers…nearly ten thousand Africans were serving under arms in 
the British forces.  Many non-combatants were flogged by the Boers or shot.  In 
Mafeking alone, more than two thousand…were shot by the Boers or left by Baden-
Powell [British officer later famous for establishing the Boy Scouts] to die of starvation” 
(Pakenham, 1979, p. xxi).  “The siege pinched the Africans worst…coloured children 
died at an annual rate of 93.5 per cent…To say that Rhodes deliberately starved his 
African workers to death would be absurd…Still, the business-like principles that 
governed the running of the Kimberly compounds did not allow much room for 
sentiment” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 341).  One British officer had served at Omdurman and 
had seen fifteen thousand Dervish corpses, yet in a battle in the Boer War where 158 
British soldiers had been killed and 221 wounded, “somehow this was different.  ‘White 
corpses are…far more repulsive than black…Civilized war is awful’” (Pakenham, 1979, 
p. 288).  “Now the Africans found that their celebrations of Roberts’ victory…had been 
premature…This was one set of Transvaal laws that the conqueror’s had no intention of 
changing: the laws affecting the natives…now to be applied with an efficiency that the 
Boers had never been able to muster” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 454). 
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One final inconsistency between words and deeds was the practice of the British 
army under Lord Kitchener of sweeping the veld clean, burning farms, looting, and 
putting women and children in concentration camps to deny the guerrillas food and 
intelligence in the latter stages of the war.  Between twenty and twenty-eight thousand 
Boer civilians died in the concentration camps and these methods were often “self-
defeating…The removal of civilians added to the bitterness of the guerrillas.  It also freed 
them from trying to feed and protect their families…Kitchener’s methods…proved a 
gigantic political blunder.  The conscience of Britain was stirred by the holocaust in the 
camps” (Pakenham, 1979, p. xxii).  The key figure in this was Emily Hobhouse, whose 
“graphic description of the mass deaths in the concentration camps in 1901 was fully 
reported in the Manchester Guardian, the Speaker, and other Liberal journals and had a 
powerful impact on opinion” (Morgan, 2002, p. 11).  Morgan continues to note that with 
Hobhouse’s “horrific news (and pictures) of the mass burial of thousands of tiny children 
and their mothers, imperialism lost the moral high ground…Her devastating findings 
soon had an immense impact on the public consciousness…Henceforth imperialists like 
Joseph Chamberlain were swimming against the tide of opinion and the public 
conscience…It all reinforced the part that the media played in leading the way in 
promoting an increasingly negative, guilt-ridden view of the once-glorious war in South 
Africa” (pp. 11–12).  The increasing publicity over the concentration camps created 
moral outrage and led to significant changes in media reporting and the political process 
as typified in a speech by the Liberal Leader of the opposition, Sir Henry Campbell-
Bannerman, in 1901: “A phrase often used is ‘war is war’.  But when one comes to ask 
about it, one is told that no war is going on—that is not war.  When is a war not a war?  
When it is carried on by methods of barbarism in South Africa” (as cited by Badsey, 
1999, p. 8). 
Kitchener’s legacy in South Africa “is the camp—‘concentration camp’, as it 
came to be called.  The camps have left a gigantic scar across the minds of the 
Afrikaners: a symbol of deliberate genocide” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 524).  “At least twenty 
thousand whites and twelve thousand coloured people had died in the concentration 
camps, the majority from epidemics of measles and typhoid that could have been 
 52 
 
avoided” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 549).  Despite, the horrid conditions in the camp, one of 
Kitchener’s most decisive weapons occurred by accident as a result of the political and 
moral backlash against the camps.  By the end of 1901, Kitchener reversed the 
concentration camp policy.  However, “this was perhaps the most effective of all anti-
guerrilla weapons…It was effective precisely because, contrary to the Liberals’ 
convictions, it was less humane than bringing them into the camps,” since the only other 
alternative was to leave the civilians stranded in the inhospitable veld after a scorched 
earth policy (Pakenham, 1979, p. 581).     
4. Is the Narrative Morally Legitimate? 
In line with the inconsistency of the British narrative, England itself prophetically 
implied that a war in South Africa would be immoral as seen by a quote by Joseph 
Chamberlain, Colonial Secretary, speaking to the House of Commons in 1896: “‘A war 
in South Africa would be one of the most serious wars…in the nature of a Civil War…a 
long war, a bitter war and a costly war…to go to war with President Kruger, to force 
upon him reforms in the internal affairs of his state, with which [we] have repudiated all 
right of interference—that would have been a course of action as immoral as it would 
have been unwise’,” yet it was a course England would embark on four years later 
(Pakenham, 1979, p. 18).  Chamberlain did not only prophesy the role of a moral issue in 
England’s involvement in the war, but also had knowledge of the plan by Rhodes and 
Beit to conduct the infamous Jameson Raid in 1895 leaving him and other political 
leaders in London “to tread a moral and political tightrope” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 21).  So 
what would serve as a legitimate narrative to justify war?   
Although England stated that one intent of the war was to end the “ill-treatment of 
coloured British subjects, [their] plight would hardly wring the heart of everyone in 
England” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 39).  Meanwhile, Milner was intent on increasing the 
imperial power of England while Rhodes and Beit wanted unfettered access to the 
goldmines of the Rand.  Between their maneuvering and scheming, they propped up the 
issue of the Uitlanders who “were treated like ‘an inferior race, little better than Kaffirs or 
Indians whose oppression has formed the subject of many complaints’” (Pakenham, 
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1979, p. 91).  Yet England realized that Milner, the Uitlanders, and Beit “had 
outmanoevred Chamberlain and the Cabinet. ‘His [Milner’s] view is too heated…But it 
recks little to think of that now.  What he has done cannot be effaced.  We have to act 
upon a moral field prepared for us by him and his jingo supporters’” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 
93).   
From the Boer standpoint, “morally the most powerful and the most 
unyielding...was to keep alight, in its purest form, the fierce flame of Afrikaner 
nationalism” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 197).  The key point of the Boer narrative as expressed 
in the quote above was nationalism, freedom from the dictates of an over-bearing 
imperial government, and the inherent right to set their own policies.  Analyzing just this 
part of the narrative, many would undoubtedly claim that the Boer narrative is morally 
legitimate.  When viewed retrospectively, the question becomes morally ambiguous (and 
inconsistent) when one factors in the methods by which the Boers sought to maintain 
their national control (by denying franchise and ultimately any political rights to the 
Uitlanders) as well as one of their main points of contention (that the Boers should be 
allowed to have slaves and treat them in any manner they deem fit).  However, in all 
three strands of their narrative, the Boers themselves viewed their narrative as morally 
legitimate while the British reluctantly may have considered only nationalism as morally 
legitimate as seen above.  Interestingly, the Boers tried to avoid war by giving in to 
British demands, such as reducing the time for British subjects, Uitlanders, to franchise 
all while trying to preserve only the most basic part of their narrative, their right to self-
rule; but the British by this time continued to push for war while fearing the lack of any 
moral standing.  Chamberlain once told Milner: “‘I dread above all the whittling away of 
differences until we have no casus belli left’” (Farwell, 1976, p. 36). 
5. Is the Narrative Deriving Legitimacy from Religion, Philosophy, or 
Some Other Source? 
The British viewed the source of their moral legitimacy as purely philosophical 
and it consisted of two parts.  The first part consisted of “British concepts of justice and 
humanity [which] conflicted with those of Britain’s truculent white South African 
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subjects” with which many people would agree with today (Farwell, 1976, p. 5).  The 
second part of their philosophy was the English belief at the time that they had an 
imperial duty and right as a superior race to protect, rule, and administer over any inferior 
race or country (see Kipling’s “White Man’s Burden” published in 1899 as an example).  
The Boers “were often described in animal terms as ‘herds’ or ‘flocks’, whose defeat by 
the superior civilization of the British was an inevitable result of social Darwinism and 
the influence of the scientific principle of natural selection” (Morgan, 2002, p. 5).  As 
Farwell (1976) explains, the “concept of an imperial mission, of the desirability—the 
nobility even—of one nation assuming suzerainty over another, or of one nation 
arrogating itself a position of paramountcy in a part of the world containing other nations, 
is today an unpopular one.  Yet it was commonly held prior to World War I” (p. 30).  
Yet, some imperialists expanded this popular philosophical notion even further: “To 
believe, as Milner did, that other races or people of other cultures ought not to rule over 
Englishmen, that it was not right that they do so, that it was somehow morally wrong—
this was a new conception of the imperial doctrine” (Farwell, 1976, p. 28).  Based upon 
this philosophy, England was morally honor-bound to “take under its imperial wing this 
immoral, bankrupt country” (Farwell, 1976, p. 11).  
The source of moral legitimacy for the Boers had two components.  The first was 
experience-based.  During the early periods of colonization, expansion, and the Great 
Trek, the Boers were frequently attacked by the native Africans and forced to defend 
themselves against hordes of what they perceived as barbaric people.  Therefore, they 
viewed it as morally legitimate to kill Africans and keep them subjugated as slaves in 
defense (without consideration for the fact that they were encroaching on their lands).  
Based upon this belief, several British government practices were clearly immoral.  “To 
them it appeared monstrous that the government would send Hottentots [Africans] to 
arrest a white man.  Even more monstrous that the government would sanction Hottentots 
killing a white man—and this over a mere matter of a man’s treatment of his 
servant…The executions were, from the British point of view, a simple act of justice; 
they underestimated or failed to understand their significance for the Boers” (Farwell, 
1976, p. 6).     
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The second and more powerful source of their legitimacy sprang from religion.  
As “a people the Boers faced the war with confidence and determination; their morale 
was high, their cause was just, and surely God would help them, provide miracles, and 
give them ultimate victory” (Farwell, 1976, p. 51); and “it was ever characteristic of the 
Boers to be disdainful of numerically superior enemies and to put their faith in their own 
fighting capabilities and in God…they expected His active cooperation and support.  No 
Christian people in modern times have so firmly and wholeheartedly believed in the 
righteousness of their causes and so confidently relied on God’s support” (Farwell, 1976, 
p. 9). This perceived religious legitimacy was quite clearly understood by even the 
opposing British forces as one remarked that he “had heard a sound…which was worse, 
even, than the sound of shells: the sound of Boers singing psalms.  ‘It struck the fear of 
God into me.  What sort of men are we fighting?  They have the better cause—and the 
cause is everything—at least, I mean to them it is the better cause’” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 
291).   
6. Is the Organization (Overall) a Network, Hierarchy, or a Hybrid of 
the Two? 
The Boer army was extremely heterarchical and “consisted simply of every able-
bodied male between the ages of sixteen and sixty…without uniforms, medals, bands, 
insignia of rank, or pay: there were none of the trappings usually considered 
necessary…and there were none of the rules and regulations” (Farwell, 1976, p. 42).  
“The men of each district formed a commando of indeterminate size under a 
commandant, also elected…Mobilization was a simple matter: the field cornet…called up 
the local burghers…they assembled on a convenient farm, each man with his horse, 
bridle, saddle, rifle, thirty or more cartridges, and eight days’ provisions.  They were then 
ready to move and to fight” (Farwell, 1976, p. 43).  Every commando (fighting unit) was 
capable of acting independently and indeed every Boer “was capable of acting in 
emergencies without waiting for orders…the men…were highly motivated and 
trusted…Battle plans were agreed upon at krygsraads, and each man knew the plan and 
could act independently to carry it out” (Farwell, 1976, p. 44).  Additionally every Boer 
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owned a horse; therefore, the army was likened to being composed entirely of mounted 
infantry which had great mobility and could fight in “swarming” tactics: “‘Every Boer 
organization seems susceptible of immediate dissolution into its component units, each of 
independent vitality, and of subsequent reunion in some assigned place.’  The British 
found this disconcerting…Boer units were like those living organisms which can be cut 
apart without destroying the individual life of the fragments” (Farwell, 1976, p. 44) 
As seen above, at times they worked well as a network “their organizational 
structure was simpler and better suited to the type of war they would have to fight” 
(Farwell, 1976, p. 42).  But at other times there was such a lack of structure that the army 
splintered and could disintegrate without warning.  If “a man did not like his field cornet 
or commandant, he simply left his unit and joined another.  A burgher was supposed to 
obtain permission from his officers to go on leave, but frequently, when a man’s wife or 
his cow took sick, or he himself became homesick, he simply left the war and went home.  
This unauthorized leave-taking was the bane of every Boer general’s existence” (Farwell, 
1976, p. 44).  This lack of structure not only impacted the structure of the army, but 
frequently caused operational and strategic errors to be committed if the democratic 
process within the krygsraad led to a consensus decision that a minority opposed, i.e., the 
Boer decision to leave the Modder river when they had an excellent defensive position, 
had stopped the British advance to Mafeking, and had inflicted huge losses on the British 
forces with relatively little damage to their own forces.  There are several other times 
throughout the war (i.e., Spion Kop, Colenso) when the Boer forces either melted away 
prematurely or did not achieve an even greater amount of success because of the 
independence of each commando and the subsequent lack of direction, unity of purpose, 
and communication.  “They had no overall strategy, no master plan for winning the war.  
The activities of the various commandos were not coordinated, and there was not even a 
statement of policy regarding purposes or objectives” (Farwell, 1979, p. 324).  So 
although the heterarchical nature provided benefits when they acted as a cohesive 
network, the extreme lack of structure had the potential, and sometimes did, devolve to 




“The truth was that the loosely organized Boer armies, as ill-disciplined in the ranks as 
they were ill-coordinated at the higher level, had always been unsuited to large scale 
offensive strategy” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 508). 
By contrast, the British army began the war as the prototypical hierarchical 
institution which could be a blessing, but most of the time ended up being a curse.  There 
were two main pitfalls to the British organizational structure.  First, British forces were 
heavily constrained by the logistical requirements incumbent upon a hierarchical army 
which severely hampered their mobility and strategy.  There are multiple instances during 
the war where British forces were unable to keep up with the more mobile Boer forces to 
take advantage of their own numerically superior forces.  Additionally, it tied their lines 
of advance to the railroad lines which allowed the Boer army to predict their movement 
and pick the points of engagements to ensure they had the better strategic defensive 
position to spring devastating ambushes (i.e., Modder River, Riet River, and Colenso).  
Compounding the issue for the British was their inability to perform any flanking 
maneuvers thereby forcing the British to perform massed frontal assaults.  Such tactics 
were “tragically anachronistic.  The days of stand-up, shoulder-to-shoulder attacks were 
past.  Casualties were almost 50 percent” for British forces at Modder River (Farwell, 
1976, p. 95) 
The second problem with their hierarchical organization, consisted of the strategic 
errors that were made because the person-in-charge was either personally engaged in a 
fight and unable to keep a strategic view of the battlefield, or was so disengaged from the 
battles that they refused to follow the advice or countermanded the orders of their men, 
vice letting people who had a better grasp of the situation on the ground take the 
initiative.  Again, compounding the issue was the fact that most British generals were 
severely deficient “in planning a battle, in the deployment of troops, in the coordination 
of the available arms and services, in overall strategy, in the organization of proper staffs 
and their best employment, in the use of the increasing technology which was available to 
them” (Farwell, 1976, p. 87). 
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Later in the war, several leaders within the British army understood the pitfalls of 
the hierarchical structure and tried to move (slightly) towards a more networked 
structure.  One example included the recognition that forces spread out from each other 
needed more autonomy in their action vice being forced to report to one individual.  A 
second example was the need to become more mobile, which both allowed British forces 
to cut their reliance on the railroads for logistical support as well as to track down and 
swarm roving bands of Boer commandos and guerrilla forces.  A final example was the 
development of the blockhouse system by Lord Kitchener, which Pakenham (1979) cites 
as the turning point of the guerrilla war leading to the final, successful phase by the 
British.  Kitchener had originally asked for more troops from England to be able to track 
down the guerrilla forces, but the government was looking to cut costs in the war, 
especially given the decreasing public support now that the war was essentially over 
since the British had captured the Boer capitals as well as the backlash from the 
concentration camps.    
The blockhouse system consisted of lines of barbed wire fences, guarded at 
intervals by blockhouses (small, fortified posts made of earth and iron manned by a few 
infantrymen).  The blockhouses had originally developed as ways of protecting the rail 
lines, then morphed into a defensive system to protect inner areas of the country which 
had been cleared of guerrilla forces.  Finally, Kitchener turned the network into an 
offensive weapon, “as cages in which to trap [the enemy], a guerrilla-catching net 
stretched across South Africa…[with]…over eight thousand blockhouses, covering 3,700 
miles, guarded by at least fifty thousand white troops and sixteen thousand African 
scouts” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 569).  Overall, the British army stayed completely 
hierarchical and still conducted sweeps with columns, but they had made some minor 




7. Is the Part of the Organization Responsible for Achieving Influence a 
Network, Hierarchy, or Hybrid? 
During the war itself, there were little to no attempts by either side to influence 
the opposing army on the battlefield itself.  “The most common and most fruitful form of 
military battlefield propaganda this century has been the humble leaflet distributed to 
enemy troops.  This did not feature in any significant manner in the Boer War, except 
perhaps in the form of the safe-conduct pass” (Badsey, 1999, p. 1).  Badsey continues to 
note that each sides’ influence campaigns were designed primarily to gain and maintain 
public opinion for the war within their own constituencies or for other neutral countries: 
“Apparently without exception, each side in the increasing conflict aimed its propaganda 
at its own supporters and treated the other side as a lost cause…there was no real attempt 
by the British to close down or regulate Afrikaans-language newspapers in Cape Colony 
and Natal…the Transvaal and the Orange Free State made little to no effort in creating a 
co-ordinated media strategy” (p. 4).  Ultimately, both “sides neglected one of the most 
valuable, perhaps the most valuable, guerrilla warfare weapon…Kitchener had all the 
printing presses in his hands, but he failed to make full use of them…and was ignorant of 
the power of propaganda” (Farwell, 1976, p. 350). 
However, the influence campaigns that did exist to enlist support for the war were 
extremely significant.  For example, Milner had to create and justify a casus belli, gain 
the support of the British population at home, and downplay the negative effects of the 
concentration camps as reported by Emily Hobhouse.  To begin the war, Milner 
encouraged contacts in Transvaal to “keep the pot boiling on the Rand and keep it well 
publicized,” which his contacts achieved via mass meetings at mines all along the Rand 
(Pakenham, 1979, p. 53).  His biggest issue was that it was hard to stir up British public 
opinion for the plight of people half a world away.  During a trip to England, Milner 
attended parties and meetings incessantly trying to drum up support for the Uitlander 
cause while maintaining pressure on the British cabinet.  He even wrote several letters for 
publication including one particularly fiery one known as the ‘Helot Despatch’ to alert 
the British press and public about the plight of the Uitlanders.  In the beginning, “the 
British public, even the Cabinet, had shown little interest in South Africa, but the 
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dramatic dispatch created a sensation…there were anti-Boer demonstrations, public 
meetings, petitions, and incidents of all kinds…Chamberlain had now thrown down the 
gauntlet…They [his party and the Cabinet] had either to go along with him or disown 
him.  Since he was too powerful a political figure to be dismissed, the Cabinet reluctantly 
supported him” (Farwell, 1976, p. 35).  Milner relied on his network on school friends 
(from Balliol) to push his points in the Cabinet, and to keep the issue in the press in 
England “‘The Press are ready and under complete control.  I can switch on an agitation 
at your direction’” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 85) until such a time that “Chamberlain thought 
that the British public had now been sufficiently propagandized to accept the war” 
(Farwell, 1976, p. 46).  Although he was the driving force behind the influence campaign, 
Milner utilized an informal network of friends and school ties to support him and spread 
the news. 
By contrast, the principle source of influence for the Boer was more hierarchical.  
President Kruger controlled all of the political negotiations regarding Transvaal’s stated 
agreements.  His Ambassador, Dr. Leyds, tried to persuade France, Germany, and Russia 
to support them with an attack on Britain, but all “Dr Leyds achieved was to inspire a 
couple of hundred foreign volunteers to fight on the side of the burghers” (Pakenham, 
1979, p. 267).  However, Kruger’s authority and influence within Transvaal was granted 
to him only by virtue of his personal character: “there was no one capable of imposing his 
will on the volk, now that Oom Paul’s [Kruger’s] gigantic shadow had faded from the 
scene” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 508).  Beyond him, “there was no highly organized 
machinery of administration, and the central government carried little influence or 
authority” (Pakenham, 1979, p, 398).  As the war slowly turned against the Boer, 
President Steyn, of the Orange Free State, sent a Boer diplomatic mission permanently 
abroad to serve as “a continuous source of vague hope to the burghers,” meanwhile, 
President Kruger did not believe that they should stress the possibility of foreign 
intervention, but simply “trust in themselves, and trust in the Lord” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 
410).    
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So although the Boers tried to stir up anti-British sentiments, by far the biggest 
impact in British public opinion came from within England itself.  Morgan (2002) notes 
that as the war progressed there “arose growing admiration for the social and moral 
qualities of the Boer peoples…these views were shared by many British Army officers in 
the field [who] found the Boers to be doughty enemies whose qualities, physical and 
moral, they respected” (p. 5).  In fact, when “the news of ‘black week’ was announced in 
the House of Commons, the Irish Nationalist MPs stood up and cheered: after all, they 
wanted the Boers to win” (Morgan, 2002, p. 13).   
8. Is the Organization (Overall) Speaking with a Single, Overarching 
Voice or with Many Small Voices? 
One interesting problem within the British army at this time was a division within 
the organization, “the senior generals were split into two ‘Rings’—Field-Marshal Lord 
Wolseley’s ‘Africans’, [and] Field-Marshal Lord Roberts’ ‘Indians’” (Pakenham, 1979, 
p. 71).  The ‘Africans’ were those military officers who had primarily seen service in 
Africa under Lord Wolseley and his protégés as opposed to the ‘Indians’ who had mostly 
served in India under Lord Roberts.  Although there may often be disagreements or 
factions within any army or organization, this particular division is cited as having many 
repercussions for the British in the Boer War.  “Certainly this astonishing War Office 
feud at the end of the nineteenth century explains much that would otherwise be 
inexplicable in Britain’s bungled preparations for war and her reverses during it” 
(Pakenham, 1979, p. xxi).  There are several other instances where British forces in the 
Boer War were antagonistic to each other as well as claims of which ‘Ring’ was better 
equipped (both with the right leaders and the right strategy) to have avoided or minimized 
perceived blunders with the British execution of mobilization and the war itself.  This 
feud is still perceptible in the various histories and accounts of the Boer War as some 
authors defend Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener (one of Robert’s protégés) while others 
try to defend the actions of Sir Redvers Bullers (one of Wolseley’s protégés).  “The bitter 




so many of the disasters in South Africa…the fundamental strategic mistake of the war 
consisted in sending out too few troops in September, led by the wrong commander” 
(Pakenham, 1979, p. 261). 
With the Boers, there had always been some differences of opinion between the 
two Boer republics, Transvaal and the Orange Free State.  “From the beginning of the 
war—indeed, shortly before its outbreak—relations between the two allies had been 
dangerously variable…[earlier, the] Free State had dragged its feet.  But since then, the 
Free State had been setting the pace, and had virtually accused the Transvaal of 
cowardice.  The two states were, of course, fundamentally opposite kinds of state: a 
sheep-and-cow-republic compared with a gold-republic.  Hence the divergent attitudes to 
war and peace.  There was also the cleft of personalities” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 498).  
During the guerrilla warfare part of the war, the two sides jointly developed a strategy to 
take the fight to the British colonies to prevent the problems of farm burning in their own 
republics.  “Had it been carried into effect as a joint offensive, it might possibly have 
changed the whole course of the war.  But the divisions between the two allies ran too 
deep” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 501). 
9. Is the Part of the Organization Responsible for Influence Speaking 
with a Single, Overarching Voice or with Many Small Voices? 
Early in the conflict, Milner was the main impetus behind turning British public 
opinion, but he only had to push the rock so far before it created an avalanche of public 
support so that by the end, “there was wild enthusiasm for the war.  The disgrace of 
Majuba Hill, the humiliating peace terms of the first war, the fiasco of the Jameson Raid, 
could all be put behind them…never before, nor since, had Britons swelled with such an 
intensity of imperial pride” (Farwell, 1976, p. 54).  Once public support was aroused, it 
quickly spread and went viral: “More typical was the reaction of Rudyard Kipling, who 
embraced the war with fervor.  He formed a volunteer company…then turned to raising 
money,” then wrote over two dozen poems to support the war, some of which were 
recited daily for fourteen weeks in the palace theatre by celebrated actresses to raise 
money (Farwell, 1976, p. 54).  Soldiers took a reduction in rank just to go to war, orders 
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were a cause for celebration, soldiers deploying waded through throngs of cheering men 
and women while friends showered them with gifts and anything khaki was all the rage 
including pajamas, songs titled “Khaki,” and dyeing horses a khaki color (Farwell, 1976). 
From that point on, all news on the war in South Africa stayed in the public 
consciousness and was followed religiously and reported by independent press reporters 
who traveled with the British Army (and sometimes served in the army as in the case of 
Winston Churchill).  Meanwhile, “refugees were happy to provide the Natal and Cape 
newspapers with a steady supply of atrocity stories” (Farwell, 1976, p. 56).  “To those 
living in this dim and dismal land there came daily news from the southern hemisphere 
where their soldiers were fighting…The news they received that second week in 
December [Black Week] was all bad, and it arrived in profusion…‘There were no 
outward signs of panic…all the same, the nation was more deeply stirred, more 
profoundly alarmed, than perhaps at any period since the eve of Trafalgar’” (Farwell, 
1976, p. 141).  Later as more reports of tragedy came into England, “[t]ens of thousands 
of men besieged the recruiting depots, and it was now that the most famous of the 
English volunteer units was formed…For the first time in British history social classes 
other than the highest and lowest were part of the fighting force…A popular magazine 
reported: ‘The sole fear of the soldiers who are going out late is that the war will be over 
before they arrive…many young men about town justified their existence for the first 
time” (Farwell, 1976, p. 143).  “The government found that the new Imperial Yeomanry 
caught the imagination of Press and public…people began to talk of the war as a 
‘national’ war” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 264).  The impact of the Boer War “was not 
confined to Britain.  Australians, New Zealanders, and Canadians sank their complaints 
about the mother country in a fierce pride in the empire” (Farwell, 1976, p. 144).     
However, there was a “small but literate and vocal minority opposed to the war 
from the beginning to the end” in England (Farwell, 1976, p. 144).   Farwell continues to 
note that “there was, and there remained for the duration of the war, a small but vocal 
band, damned as pro-Boers, who denounced the war” (p. 314).  One of the most vocal 
was David Lloyd George, future prime minister of England.  Farwell also notes that many 
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believed the war was prolonged by the activities of the antiwar minority in England since 
their statements gave many Boers the idea that England would drop out of the war, or that 
foreign intervention would soon appear, or merely just sustain Boer morale.  Yet, Farwell 
concludes that the antiwar movement had no real influence on the government or public 
opinion and that never “before nor since has a war been so popular” (p. 316).  Later on in 
the conflict, Emily Hobhouse became much more influential in revealing the atrocities in 
the concentration camps and helping to turn public opinion against the war as discussed 
earlier. 
From the Boer side, they had to try to sway public opinion in many of the great 
nations through their diplomatic delegations, “a violent propaganda war had broken out 
on the Continent.  Kruger’s envoy in Brussels, Dr Leyds, fanned the fervour of the 
Anglophobes.  The press of all the major European powers was rabidly anti-British” 
(Pakenham, 1979, p. 260).  There was a “flood of hatred for the British which swept 
Europe [and] was deeply felt…The Boers were encouraged by all this pro-Boer, anti-
British sentiment to hope that one or more of the European powers would intervene, 
but…as Winston Churchill later said…‘No people in the world received so much verbal 
sympathy and so little support’” (Farwell, 1976, pp. 144–145).  In fact, the “bulk of 
popular sentiment in the United States favoured the Boers, but…the American 
government was well aware of the embarrassing moral position” of the U.S. at that time 
who had just completed an imperial expansion and was actively suppressing freedom in 
the Philippines (Farwell, 1976, p. 145).  Towards the end of the war, Milner was 
concerned that “these ‘rebels’ had seized on certain ‘acts of harshness’ by British troops 
in the last few embittered months of guerrilla war and distorted them to create an 
atmosphere of ‘national hysteria’” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 514). 
10. Is the Overall Density of the Organization High, Low, or Medium? 
In analyzing British organizational density, there are actually two separate 
components.  First, as we saw earlier, one key factor in precipitating the war was 
Milner’s imperialistic position and the vast network of support he received from his 
school contacts, his “Balliol friends at ‘headquarters’…who trusted him and supported 
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him uncritically”; “backed him at every twist and turn of the crisis”; helped “him steer 
clear of rocks and sands in the CO and the Cabinet”; and “who could help swing 
parliament behind Milner’s policy” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 85).  “As regards Milner’s 
network of Liberal admirers, they had helped keep the House of Commons from a 
division” while the “second skein of Milner’s invisible network was provided by the 
English (and British South African Press)…Milner’s other cronies…were now in a 
position to show their loyalty…Such was Milner’s invisible nexus of loyalty, the old 
friends on whom he could rely…In addition, and still more active on his behalf, were his 
secret allies, the London ‘goldbugs’—especially the financiers of the largest of all the 
Rand mining houses, Wernher-Beit” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 86). 
The second component was highlighted earlier which discussed the two factions 
within the British army and the impact this had on the mobilization and conduct of the 
Boer War.  One such impact was the frequent number of selections of certain individuals 
to fill certain posts based upon their affiliation with either ‘Ring’.  This indicates a high 
level of density as leaders and officers are selected for positions based upon the contacts 
with a high level of loyalty for each other and distrust if not downright hatred for the 
other side.  Meanwhile, Lord Roberts “was the epitome of the ‘political’ general…he had 
inherited power—transmitted through the nexus of British families…He knew where the 
most decisive battles are won: in the War Office and the Cabinet room.  He knew that 
politics, for a general, is war by other means” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 253).  So the British 
army would be classified as high density (although separated into two distinct cliques). 
By contrast, we classified the Boers as medium density.  Although all commandos 
were locally formed and everyone knew each other, individual fighters were free to come 
and go as they please, there were conflicting groups and goals among the Boer senior 
military leadership.  Most importantly, as discussed earlier, the army was so heterarchical 
that they sometimes acted as completely separate units to the detriment of operational and 
strategic goals.  Sometimes, President Kruger was able to unify and solidify the various 
groups through sheer will, but often the army seemed to dissipate of its own accord.  
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11. What was the Political Goal (End)?  Was it Achieved? 
“Britain won the great Anglo-Boer War, but at the cost of its reputation.  The 
number of men, the amount of materiel, and the length of time required by mighty Britain 
to subdue a relative handful of South African farmers jolted Britain and amazed the 
world…The exact extent to which the Kaiser and his generals were influenced by the 
spectacle of the British army’s performance in South Africa cannot be determined, but 
certainly they saw little to discourage their aggressive ambitions” (Farwell, 1976, p. xii).  
Meanwhile, Morgan (2002) notes that for “97 years, from 1902 to 1999, the media 
representation of the Boer War took the form of trying to create a sanitized impression of 
a ‘gentleman’s war’, a war that led to reconciliation and in which, morally, there were no 
losers.  The fact that the outcome was the permanent riveting of white supremacy upon 
the black population…was swept aside” (p. 15).   
Even the process of the peace talks themselves were unique as “Kitchener 
provided all facilities for his rebel enemies to hold a closed, secret meeting; furthermore, 
he granted immunity to all their leaders, military and political, the very men he had been 
trying to catch and imprison…an acceptance by the British of the Boers’ contention that 
the republics still existed” (Farwell, 1976, p. 431).  In the end, “Milner’s failure to change 
the composition…to assure a predominance of Anglo-Saxons was a bitter disappointment 
to him, for in his mind this was the prime purpose of all his schemes, the justification of 
the war itself” (Farwell, 1976, p. 448).  Additionally, the determination of England to 
allow the colonies to gradually rule for themselves ultimately gave the Boers everything 
they had fought for and more when in 1910, the Union of South Africa came into being 
and the “Boers now controlled not only the Transvaal and orange River Colony but Natal 
and Cape Colony as well…Not only were they already self-governing: their leaders were 
becoming world figures…The wildest, most improbable political dreams of Kruger’s and 
Steyn’s Boers—to be free of British interference and make all South Africa a Boer 
republic—became reality for their children and grandchildren” (Farwell, 1976, pp. 453–
454).   
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12. What Other Capabilities (Means) Were Used?  Relative Importance 
of the Other Capabilities in Achieving the End? 
One striking aspect of the Boer War was the impact of technology (or lack of).  
Farwell (1976) notes that both sides used machine guns (though neither side new how to 
effectively employ them), while neither side used mortars or hand grenades.  The use of 
the telephone and telegraph was limited.  Observation balloons were used sparingly (and 
not effectively) by the British.  The British also had a photographic unit which was 
scorned in favor of sketches.  Overall, the “British officers, representing one of the most 
technologically advanced nation in the world, scorned the fruits of technology and were 
hidebound traditionalists” (Farwell, 1976, p. 45).  Overall, both sides were similarly 
equipped and technologically symmetrical forces with two key differences.  First, 
although both sides had access to railroads, the British were tied to the rail lines often to 
their detriment), while the Boers maintained their freedom of movement by using horses 
and shunning the railway.  Second, smokeless powder had a huge impact, not because the 
technology was so revolutionary; but rather because the British army retained 
anachronistic tactics ill-suited to recent developments in small arms.  By conducting 
massive, closed rank, linear frontal assaults against well-entrenched, and hidden 
defenders many British soldiers were needlessly led to slaughter: “the other 
correspondents had seen one thing that was to be the dominant theme of every battle of 
the war: invisibility…the warfare of the new, long-range, smokeless magazine rifle…The 
enemy were an army of ghosts” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 184).  Despite the military blunders, 
public opinion for the war remained high in England during the conventional phase of the 
war.  After Lord Roberts declared victory, the war shifted to a guerilla campaign and 
British support eroded sharply, partly due to the concentration camps. 
The second striking aspect of the Boer War is the vast difference in fighting 
strengths between the two opponents.  According to Pakenham (1979), roughly 365,693 
imperial and 82,742 colonial soldiers (nearly 450,000 total) fought in the war for the 
British compared to only 87,365 Boers, a ratio of over 5:1.  The willingness to continue 





England’s eventual victory (in addition to the scorched earth policy and concentration 
camps which are estimated to have caused the deaths of between 18,000 and 28,000 Boer 
civilians as opposed to only 7,000 Boer fighters). 
The final capability utilized during the war was diplomatic.  This also had a semi-
significant impact.  Because of the uncomfortable moral position of the United States, 
Transvaal was unable to enlist the aid of the U.S. in its struggle to remain free.  During 
diplomatic discussions, the Boers were able to convince the French and the Russians to 
fight the British, but only if the Boers could convince the Germans to fight as well.  
Unfortunately for them, the Boers were unable to convince the Germans to join the war 
on their behalf or else the entire course of the war (and potentially the rest of the century) 
could have been dramatically altered. 
E. RESULTS 
Based upon above evaluations, below is a short response as to how we code the 
influence strategy in the Boer War based upon our structured questions: 
1)  Is the narrative consistent over time (construct)? British – No; Boer – Yes 
(but consistent on morally questionable beliefs)  
2)  Is the narrative logically consistent (internal)? British – No; Boer – No 
3)  Is the narrative consistent between words and deeds (external)? British – No; 
Boer – No  
4)  Is the narrative morally legitimate? British – No; Boer – No (at least these are 
the values that would be assigned today, but it is interesting to note that the majority of 
each respective population found their narratives completely morally legitimate) 
5) Is the narrative deriving legitimacy from religion, philosophy, or some other 





6)  Is the organization (overall) a network, hierarchy, or a hybrid of the two?  
British – Hierarchical, but incorporating minor network-like tendencies during the 
latter stages; Boer – Heterarchical but with some capability of acting as a coherent 
network at times 
7)  Is the part of the organization responsible for achieving influence a network, 
hierarchy, or hybrid?  British – Networked with one man (Milner) at the head; Boer – 
Hierarchy/ Personality-driven 
8) Is the organization (overall) speaking with a single, overarching voice or 
with many small voices?  British – Many small voices; Boer – Many small voices 
9) Is the part of the organization responsible for influence speaking with a 
single, overarching voice or with many small voices?  British – Many small voices; 
Boer – Many small voices 
10)  Is the overall density of the organization high, low, or medium?  British – 
High; Boer – Medium 
11) What was the political goal (end)?  Was it achieved?  The political goal 
for England was ultimately to annex Transvaal.  It was achieved, but at severe cost 
to itself.  One proclaimed political goal, protection for coloured subjects was never 
achieved ultimately leading to apartheid. 
12) What other capabilities (means) were used?  Relative importance of the 
other capabilities in achieving the end?  Technology had minimal impact (except for 
the British reliance on the railway system and refusal to adopt different tactics in 
the face of technological changes in small-arms fire.  Sheer force strength and 
morale had a huge impact on the war for the benefit of the British.  Diplomacy was 
also a key factor which hindered the capability of the Boer to secure strategic allies 
against the British. 
We will analyze these findings more in depth alongside the results of the other 
case studies in Chapter XI, but how do these preliminary results relate to the six main 
hypotheses?  We will briefly analyze each hypothesis in light of the Boer War. For the 
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main hypothesis we stated that the most important level of practice in determining the 
effectiveness of an organization is the narrative.  We added a sub-hypothesis that stated: 
to be most effective, the narrative must be both consistent and morally legitimate.  In 
terms of the Boer War, the data indicates that neither side was consistent in all three 
measures (internal, external, construct) in their narrative either before the war or during 
the war.  However, the Boers were consistent over time particularly with respect to 
nationalism.  During present times, we would consider both sides as morally questionable 
even though each side considered their own position as morally defensible.  However, 
British atrocities in the concentration camps and the resulting public outrage from press 
reports (particularly those of Emily Hobhouse) resulted in undermining perceived British 
legitimacy.  Therefore, the post-war settlement was decidedly pro-Boer, although it was 
morally wrong as it led to continued white supremacy over the native African population 
throughout the majority of the 20th century.  Additionally, the Boers were gradually 
allowed to become self-governing which allowed them to gradually take political control 
over all of South Africa as a nation independent of Great Britain.  Thus despite being 
rated as nearly equal on all measures on narrative, the loss of legitimacy by the internal 
British audience resulted in a Boer advantage in this category consistent with the 
hypotheses. 
Additional sub-hypotheses discussed the effectiveness of organizations (both 
overall and in influence) based on organizational density as well as type (network versus 
hierarchy versus a hybrid of the two).  Despite significant numerical disadvantages, the 
Boers were more successful militarily when the density of the army was medium and 
more networked (but not so loosely networked based that they were more heterarchical).  
Meanwhile despite their numerical advantage, the British Army was generally 
unsuccessful at the operational and tactical level until they incorporated more network-
like tendencies (to shift closer to a hybrid) by adopting the blockhouse strategy while 
simultaneously pushing the Boer army to become less of a hybrid and more heterarchical.   
In terms of influence, pro-British sentiment was centrally directed by a few key 
proponents (Milner and his band of friends who could semi-manipulate the media) while 
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at the same time spontaneously supported and disseminated by the public at-large.    Pro-
Boer influence was not very effective when it was centrally managed by Dr. Leyds for 
although they gained many supporters, none of the supporters provided any physical 
assistance.  However, once the concentration camp atrocities were discovered by Emily 
Hobhouse, anti-British sentiment quickly spread from a central hierarchy of key political 
figures through a network quickly turning public sentiment against the war.  Again, the 
data in this case supports the hypotheses that medium density organizations that are a 
hybrid of network and hierarchy vice either type alone are more effective overall and in 
influence specifically.  Based upon the data, it appears that organizations where 
participants are able to self-mobilize into small groups to perform actions independently 
(swarms) are more effective than organizations that are completely leaderless (Boer 
Army when it is completely heterarchical) or that have a central command (British 
Army).   
Finally, in evaluating the impact of technology, both sides were similarly 
equipped and technologically symmetrical forces.  However, the British were actually 
negatively affected by either a reliance on technology (being tied to the rail lines), or a 
failure to modify anachronistic tactics ill suited to recent developments in small arms.  
Therefore, technology is important, but is the least determining factor in organization 
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VII. COMPARATIVE STUDY 2: WWI 
A. BACKGROUND 
Like the Boer War, World War I (WWI) was also known by other names 
including, The Great War, The War to End all Wars and, very early on, was thought of as 
the Third Balkan War.  Indeed, WWI was sparked in the Balkans by the assassination of 
Archduke Franz Ferdinand (who was heir apparent to the throne of Austria) on the 
morning of June 8, 1914 by a young Slav nationalist who belonged to a secret society of 
Serbian officers known as the “Black Hand.”  Austria’s own police investigation found 
no proof of the Serbian Government’s complicity in the assassination (Liddell Hart, 
1939), yet the ruling body jumped on the opportunity to defeat Serbia and destroy the 
Slav movement within its own borders since “nationalism outside the empire threatened 
the survival of the empire within” (Strachan, 2003, p. 6).  Austria, part of the dual 
monarchy of Austria-Hungary, felt compelled to finally settle issues with Serbia to insure 
its credibility both as a regional player in the Balkans as well as within Europe itself.   
The Austro-Hungarian government issued a forty-eight hour ultimatum on 23 
July, 1914, before mobilizing and declaring war on Serbia on 25 July.  Serbia mobilized 
on 25 July and appealed to the Tsar of Russia for support, prompting Russia to order 
general mobilization on 30 July.  On 31 July, Germany began mobilization in support of 
Austria-Hungary and delivered an ultimatum to Russia and France stating that 
mobilization meant war.  The Germans formally declared war on Russia on August 1 and 
on France on August 3, while demanding free passage for German troops through 
Belgium on August 2.  This threat on a neutral country drew Britain to deliver an 
ultimatum to Germany, which expired on August 4 officially drawing Britain into the 
war.  Thus the major players of WWI were set with the Central Powers of Germany and 
Austria-Hungary versus the Entente powers of Russia, France, and Britain.  Italy, though 
a treaty ally of the Germans and Austrians, stayed neutral until 1915 when it joined the 
Allies.  However, the war would not stay confined to Europe alone. 
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   Although Europe was the key battleground, in “1914 conflict spread from the 
European centre to the periphery, and it did so because the states of Europe were imperial 
powers.  War for Europe meant war for the world” (Strachan, 2003, p. 69).  From the 
beginning of the war on, there were multiple theaters as well as several countries that 
declared war or dropped out of the war on both sides.  A list of the Allies and Central 
Powers and the dates that they joined are as follows (Thinkquest.org): 
The Allies 
Belgium (August 4, 1914) Guatemala (April 23, 1918) Panama (April 7, 1917) 
Brazil (October 26, 1917) Haiti (July 12, 1918) Portugal (April 7, 1917) 
British Empire (August 4, 
1914) 
Honduras (July 19, 1918) Romania (August 27, 
1916) 
China (August 14, 1917) Italy (May 23, 1915) Russia (August 1, 1914) 
Costa Rica (May 23, 1918) Japan (August 23, 1914 San Marino (June 3, 1915) 
Cuba (April 7, 1917) Liberia (August 4, 1917) Serbia (July 28, 1914) 
France (August 3, 1914) Montenegro (August 5, 
1914) 
Siam (July 22, 1917) 
Greece (July 2, 1917) Nicaragua (May 8, 1918) United States (April 6, 
1917) 
The Central Powers 
Austria-Hungary (July 28, 1914) Germany (August 1, 1914) 
Bulgaria (October 14, 1915) Ottoman Empire (October 31, 1914) 
Table 3.   List of Allies and Central Powers in WWI (From Thinkquest.org) 
However, this list does not fully cover the nationalities of all who were involved 
most significantly the Arab tribes as well as the participants from the British and French 
colonies to include: Algeria, Australia, Canada, French Indo-China, India, Senegal South 
Africa; as well as “over a million carriers for the East African campaign, drawn from the 
Belgian Congo, Ruanda, Uganda, Kenya, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, and 





11:00 symbolizing the major hostilities of World War I were formally ended "at the 11th 
hour of the 11th day of the 11th month" of 1918 with the German signing of the 
Armistice.   
As O’Connell (1989) states: “It is a singular fact that all three major Continental 
powers, Germany, Russia, and France, entered the Great War intent on going on the 
offensive immediately, which they did with disastrous results.  Everybody attacked, and 
everybody suffered, the consequences of which set the conditions for four subsequent 
years of stalemate and misery” (p. 243).  O’Connell (1989) further states that around ten 
million men were killed in combat and that most of the victims died for nothing more 
than a few feet of rat-infested mud. 
So why is this war important when defining the importance of strategic influence?  
As Strachan (2003) states,  
This was a great war because it was a war fought over big ideas.  What 
had begun in the Balkans and had been originally driven by issues of 
ethnicity and nationalism was now clothed with principles whose force lay 
precisely in their claims to universality.  In due course these ideologies 
became the basis of propaganda, but that could only happen because they 
expressed convictions with which the belligerent populations could 
identify.  They were deemed to be so fundamental that they sustained the 
war despite both its length and its intensity.  The peoples of Europe fought 
the First World War because they believed in—or at least accepted—the 
causes for which their nations stood.  It was emphatically not a war 
without purpose. (p. 61) 
Thus the Anglo-German antagonism became the pivot of the conflict.  The 
polarity was best expressed in competing ideologies: liberalism and 
individualism against militarism and collectivism…However, the 
bitterness of the rhetoric could not be easily converted into strategy. 
(Strachan, 2003, p. 201) 
B. DATA 
As stated in the methodology section, we are using a structured/focused 
comparison approach to explore the selected case studies.  Thus data is structured below 
as answers to each of our stated focus questions.  Despite the global nature of the conflict, 
the data will focus primarily on the Central Powers of Germany and Austro-Hungary, the 
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Triple Entente (France, Britain, and Russia),  as well as the U.S. which joined the war on 
the side of the Entente in 1917 (although other theaters of war and countries will be 
referenced in key points). 
1. Is the Narrative Consistent Over Time (Construct)? 
Leading up to the war, in “1878 Austria had occupied the Turkish provinces of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina: she had never fulfilled her promise to evacuate them after 
restoring order and prosperity” (Liddell Hart, 1939, p. 11). Then, in “1912…Austria 
prepared to fight [Russia and]…Germany gave her assurances of unflinching support” 
(Liddell Hart, 1939, p. 12).  Meanwhile, the “French Third Republic…was notorious for 
the instability of its ministries, and hence for the inconsistencies of its policies.  But 
Poincare…had more than once affirmed France’s support for Russia’s position in the 
Balkans” (Strachan, 2003, p. 15).  Leading up to the war, Britain and France had been 
traditional European rivals; but they had started to work at several points on treaties to 
forge a closer relationship with each other.  Policies amongst all nations involved tended 
to be inconsistent fleeting alliances. 
Leading up to the war, the “general feeling was that the Serbs were a bloodthirsty 
and dangerous crew.  Even on 31 July: 
the British prime minister, H. H. Asquith, told the Archbishop of 
Canterbury that the Serbs deserved ‘a thorough thrashing’…[there was 
a]…widespread perception that Austria-Hungary was in the right and 
Serbia in the wrong…But…Nobody in the Triple Entente was inclined to 
see Austria-Hungary as an independent actor.  Vienna had taken a firm 
line because it was too anxious to capitalize on Germany’s backing while 
it had it…The conflict with Serbia would not be localized because by July 
1914 the experience of earlier crises had conditioned statesmen to put 
events in the broader context of European international relations” and thus 
international opinion swung in favor of Serbia.  (Strachan, 2003, p. 16) 
So public opinion shifted because Austria-Hungary was consistently viewed as intimately 
tied to and directed by Germany.   
Once the war began, the Germans were again seen as inconsistent in their 
narrative as Germany did not keep to its promises of Belgian neutrality and invaded 
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France via Belgium: the “Germans contemptuously swept aside all protests against their 
breach of Belgian neutrality by dismissing the guarantee as a ‘mere scrap of 
paper’….Here was the issue to unite the nation.  Even the doubters—with few 
exceptions—rallied to the defence of ‘brave little Belgium’” (Roetter, 1974, p. 31).  In 
fact, the Central powers and Germany in particular suffered the most in defining and 
disseminating their narrative.  As Roetter (1974) continues to explain, “Imperial 
Germany…began the war with nothing…resembling a co-ordinated propaganda effort.  
Nor, if it had had the necessary apparatus, would there have been a cause to disseminate.  
The Germans…were…so certain of the self-evident justice of their cause that they did 
not feel the need to explain…a call stressing the necessity to fight for and defend German 
Kultur scarcely had the universal appeal of a call to defend human dignity and the right of 
small nations” (p. 37).  “Socialists and trade unionists might feel beleaguered in 
Germany, but they knew that they would suffer far more under the heel of tsarist 
autocracy.  The defence of what they had gained…now required them to protect the 
nation” (Strachan, 2003, p. 131).     
 In terms of some of the other countries involved in the war, the “Kaiser was still 
not sure whether he should combat Japan as the Yellow Peril or associate with her as the 
Prussia of the East” (Roetter, 1974, p. 55).    Meanwhile Italy initially began the war as a 
neutral by cutting loose from her engagements to Germany and Austria.  The “most 
blatant in its exploitation of the opportunities which the war presented was 
Italy…[who’s] aim was simple, to gain ‘frontiers on land and sea no longer open to 
annexation, and [to raise] Italy, in reality, to the status of a great power’” (Strachan, 1974, 
p. 152).  Thus Italy was caught in a tug of war between the two sides, the Alliance versus 
the Entente while both were effectively bidding against each other to gain Italy’s support.  
“Czarist Russia had no real propaganda apparatus or message for either its own people or 
the world at large.  For the outside world it clothed itself in the mantle of protector of all 




Finally, “America was not unified when war was declared.  The necessary 
reversal of opinion was too great to be achieved overnight” (Mock & Larson, 1939, p. 4).   
Everyone wore the same patriotic buttons, put up the same window 
stickers, passed the same clichés, knew the same rumors…everyone 
assumed the stories must be true because salesmen…brought with them 
the same thrilling narrative.  Uniformity of testimony is convincing.  And 
testimony seemed nearly uniform…throughout the nation…it was 
overwhelmingly and wholeheartedly on the side of the Allies and in favor 
of our belligerence.  (Mock & Larson, 1939, p. 8) 
“When war was declared there was a sharp intensification of feeling, a speeding 
up in the process of unifying opinion, but there was not the sharp break with the past that 
we sometimes think of…The Committee [on Public Information] was no inner clique 
imposing unwanted views on the general public…[it] was representative of the articulate 
majority in American opinion” which only codified and standardized ideas already 
widely current (Mock & Larson, 1939, p. 10).   
In many respects, although there was a change “in the President’s attitude toward 
the war…we were fighting not for Europe’s war aims but for Wilson’s, and that the hope 
of a new world, of universal democracy, and of permanent peace” (Mock & Larson, 
1939, p. 18), which were ideals that were not constantly shifting but rigorously adhered 
to, not only then, but throughout American history. When viewed in this light, America’s 
standpoint on the Great War was not inconsistent over time.  The U.S. and President 
Wilson always kept to the same overarching narrative and vision of democracy and 
peace, but realized that the strategy toward the war had to change in order to secure this 
vision.  Therefore, we would rate the U.S. as consistent.   
Although there was inconsistency within each of the Entente powers and among 
them, it was the Wilsonian ideal which ultimately strengthened an underlying thread 
within the narrative of each Entente power: “British propaganda sought to convey the 
impression that for its rulers and people the War was a crusade for the whole of 
mankind…The French, too, in their propaganda stuck to themes that were of universal 
appeal…France was fighting for democracy” (Roetter, 1974, p. 41).  This was the 
consistent thread among the Entente powers and the U.S. which was the most significant 
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in garnering and maintaining worldwide global opinion, even undermining the narrative 
of the Triple Alliance as the nationalities with Austro-Hungary yearned for the right of 
democracy and self-determination. 
2. Is the Narrative Logically Consistent (Internal)? 
During the war, one piece of their narrative that was always important for the 
Germans was the justification for their submarine (U-boat) campaign against commercial 
shipping.  One primary argument used by the Germans to try to gain U.S. support was by 
highlighting the ill-effects of Britain’s naval blockade.  Germany’s Imperial Ambassador 
to Washington, Count Bernstorff “knew what the effect of stories of children deprived of 
milk, butter, bread and other essential foodstuffs would have on large sections of 
American public opinion” (Roetter, 1974, p. 15).  The Count viewed this negative effect 
of the blockade as the only way to justify a return to unrestricted U-boat operations 
without upsetting America.  Germany had begun the war using submarines to sink 
merchant ships, but had stopped following international pressure and condemnation.  
Afterwards, there was considerable debate in Germany amongst government and military 
leaders regarding the utility and risks of resuming unrestricted submarine warfare.  Count 
Bernstorff therefore organized a tour of American press and journalists in Germany to 
show the ill-effects on the children due to the blockade.  Unfortunately for him, the 
Berlin War Ministry was at the same time providing a tour to U.S. journalists trying to 
prove that Britain’s naval blockade was having no real impact on food supplies and that 
the diet of German children was as healthy as it had ever been.  The conflicting goals in 
the above example shows how a logically inconsistent narrative can cloud one’s 
information strategy. 
This inconsistency in the logic of the German narrative continued throughout the 
war: “there was no co-operation, the propaganda put out by the military and the civil 
authorities was frequently conflicting, and as the War wore on, the conflict between the 
military and the civil authorities became increasingly pronounced…And so German 
propaganda continued to speak with different voices until the end of the War” (Roetter, 
1974, p. 39).  Another example of the inconsistency of the German narrative was their 
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continuing rage at the “activities of Belgian franc-tireurs—civilian snipers who shot at 
German troops from doorways and rooftops…Americans, especially, were incapable of 
understanding what the Germans were getting at.  After all, it was Germany which had 
violated Belgian neutrality, so why complain?” (Roetter, 1974, pp. 40–41)  Additionally, 
Roetter (1974) points out that Germany tried to present itself “as the champion of the 
negro against his white oppressor, while in Europe Germany was calling the use of 
coloured soldiers by the French and British an ‘atrocity’” (p. 56).  In another example, 
Germany tried to gain the support of the immigrant German population within the U.S. 
that “‘blood calls to blood’…[and to] rally round the Kaiser…[yet] thousands of Germans 
had left for America….to get away from Germany’s growing militarism…and its 
elaborate bureaucracy…None had uprooted themselves…and become Americans to turn 
their backs now on America at a distant Kaiser’s command” (Roetter, 1974, p. 57). 
During the war, Germany gained the Ottoman Empire as an ally, partly as a result 
of inconsistencies between the Allies external consistency discussed in the next section.  
In doing so, Germany tried to rely on the dual narratives of religion and nationality “but 
in doing so they sent a message that was contradictory.  Islam was universal in its appeal, 
while nationalism was particular…the nationalism…translated into imperialism when 
carried beyond the frontiers of Anatolia.  It therefore conflicted with the message of 
genuine independence that the Germans wished to convey” (Strachan, 2003, p. 127).    
Yet, Germany was not the only belligerent with an issue of internal consistency.  
The Allied campaign was based on the premise of nationalism and self-determination of 
the many different nationalities with the Central Powers particularly in the Austro-
Hungarian Empire.  President Wilson and the Allies had assured that an independent 
Czecho-Slovak state and a separate state for Poles would be established; however, the 
stumbling block “was the Southern Slavs.  Much of their homeland had been offered to 
Italy in a secret treaty…in order to induce Italy to enter the War on the Allied side.  The 
promises in this treaty were completely incompatible with the unification of all the 
Southern Slavs in one state” (Roetter, 1974, p. 77).   Despite Britain’s claim against 
imperialism during the war, in 1917 the “Bolsheviks published the secret agreements on 
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war aims reached between the Entente powers: Britain, France and Italy stood convicted, 
it seemed, of annexationist ambitions comparable with those of the monster which they 
were pledged to extirpate, German militarism” (Strachan, 2003, p. 265).   
The biggest aspect of this logical inconsistency was “the incompatibility of 
President Wilson’s war aims with their own [Britain and France]…This anti-Wilson 
program, later made evident in the skilful [sic] maneuvering of the Wilson entourage 
before the Peace Conference, as well as in the negotiations on the Conference 
itself…Wilson realized that the Allies were with him only until the last shot was fired, 
and then they were to be against him” (Mock & Larson, 1939, pp. 284–285).  The authors 
continue to cite an example where a member of the French Embassy was reported to have 
told a prominent Spaniard, “‘President Wilson may think he is going to be the arbiter of 
this war but he is fooling himself.  When the time comes, the French and the British will 
settle it as they please’” (p. 274) as well as a report that stated “‘after using America to 
win their war [Britain] will crush all our aims and ideals at the Peace Conference’” (p. 
299). 
A second inconsistency in the Allied narrative of promoting freedom and 
democracy was evident with the existence of an authoritarian ally in Russia.  However, 
on “March 19 [1917] occurred the most significant event of the war prior to America’s 
entrance—the preliminary revolution in Russia…With the disappearance of the Czar, the 
black sheep vanished from the democratic herd and the war could now be safely said to 
be a war to save democracy” (Tuchman, 1958, p. 196).  Although, the loss of their ally in 
the east resulted in an overall material loss for the Allies, the informational gain to their 
informational strategy was significant.  A third inconsistency arose in conjunction with 
imperialism: Britain “renounced the conquest of territory…These principles proved 
mutually incompatible…Britain did not see the outbreak of the First World War as an 
opportunity to acquire German colonies; however, others on whom it relied did…‘sub-
imperialism’ flourished” (Strachan, 2003, p. 71).   
A fourth inconsistency was the incursion of the government in democratic 
countries into their own populations’ rights and civil liberties.  In Britain the Defence of 
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the Realm Act of 8 August 1914, permitted the trial of civilians by court-martial, press 
censorship, food regulations, and the right to intervene in the economy (Strachan, 2003).  
Although many would see this as a serious internal consistency that could completely 
undermine the narrative of freedom and democracy, in both Britain and France the “press 
and public grew angry more because not enough was done, than because the state had 
become the enemy of civil liberties…the popular cry was for more government direction, 
not less” (Strachan, 2003, p. 237).  At first, this issue presented a bigger issue in America.  
At one point the press was adamantly opposed to perceived censorship and opposed the 
passage of the Espionage Bill.  Interestingly, the “press itself was the most important 
agency in spreading fear of espionage, and at the same time was attempting to limit the 
provisions of the Espionage Bill…Apparent inconsistency of this sort was seized upon by 
supporters of the bill” (Mock & Larson, 1939, pp. 33–34). 
A final interesting inconsistency, particularly with respect to the U.S. narrative, 
was President Wilson’s key concept of national self-determination, yet given “that the 
United States was itself a community made up of predominantly of immigrants, Wilson’s 
presumption against multi-ethnic empires was arrogant and naïve…30 million found 
themselves on the wrong sides of frontiers…they would generate problems” (Strachan, 
2003, p. 333).  A review of this section would indicate that neither side’s narrative was 
logically consistent. 
3. Is the Narrative Consistent Between Words and Deeds (External)? 
Unlike the Boer War, which was explicitly called a “gentleman’s war” by the 
belligerents (even though this concept was not always rigorously held to, i.e. the 
concentration camps); The Great War was a total war with no such explicit expectations 
in the conduct of war.  Although certain weapons and specific atrocities committed 
during the war did not directly contradict the declared narrative of any belligerent 
country; these deeds had an enormous impact on the course of the war, the perceived 
legitimacy of the belligerents, and especially on the decision by the U.S. on whether to 
remain neutral or to enter the war.  One such inconsistency (discussed above) was the 
refusal by the Germans to honor the neutrality of Belgium by using it as a pathway to 
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invade France and having to conquer it in the process.  This single deed, the breach of 
Belgian neutrality, led directly to the involvement of the British in the war.  France’s 
western fortifications and the Schlieffen plan forced Germany to choose between 
honoring Belgium’s neutrality versus the military advantage of sacrificing their 
informational position.  Had Germany respected Belgium’s neutrality, then Britain may 
never have entered the war and history may have changed significantly.  However, 
Germany made several other important missteps with its deeds.  In Belgium, “the killing 
of civilians…was condoned and promoted from above…674 civilians were killed in 
Dinant…on the orders of their corps commander…as a pre-emptive strike against 
anticipated franc-tireur activity” (Strachan, 2003, p. 51).   
First, Professor Haber developed the idea of using gas on enemy troops.  
However, “higher command was slow to appreciate its potentialities.  It was their 
skepticism rather than their scruples which limited” their first use so the “Germans 
incurred the odium of introducing a novel and horrifying weapon without adequate 
profit” (Liddell Hart, 1939, p. 78).  Subsequently, gas became a regular weapon of 
warfare during WWI (it is important to note that WWII saw little to no use of gas) and 
was freely used by both sides; yet the burden of blame rested forever with the Germans.  
As another example, the Turks “massacred over a million Armenians in the Autumn of 
1915 and deported another few hundred thousand to the North Syrian desert where most 
of them starved” (Roetter, 1974, p. 50).  Strachan (2003) later cites the calculations 
ranging from 1.3 million to about 2.1 million (p. 114).   
In another highly publicized incident, in “August 1915 Nurse Edith Cavell, who 
had been working at a Red Cross hospital in German-occupied Brussels, was found guilty 
by a German court-martial of helping British and French soldiers to escape into neutral 
Holland.  She was sentenced to death and executed by a German firing squad” (Roetter, 
1974, p. 11).  Interestingly enough Roetter (1974) states that several weeks after the 
execution of Nurse Cavell, two German nurses working at a Red cross hospital in France 
were executed by a French firing squad for helping German prisoners of war escape; 
however, this was given very little press in France, German, or British newspapers and 
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none in the American Press.  One German officer responsible for propaganda in the U.S. 
explained that the German nurses, “like Nurse Cavell—had behaved bravely and 
patriotically and they had paid the penalty for acting outside the rules of war…there was 
no case for trying to score propaganda points out of a situation like that” (p. 13). 
The author continues to explain that ordinary Americans viewed the atrocity 
stories of the reckless looting, maiming, killing, and raping underlying the justification of 
the Allied cause with skepticism, but the execution “provoked one of the most significant 
reactions among ordinary Americans in favour of the Allies and against Germany” (pp. 
11–12).  Roetter continues to discuss other controversial German deeds such as the use of 
unrestricted submarine warfare to try to reverse the effects of the British naval blockade 
by mounting a counter-blockade, which included sinking any vessel, not just military 
ships often without firing warning shots, surfacing, or boarding.  This led to the sinking 
of the Lusitania on 7 May 1915 killing 1,198 people including 128 Americans.  The 
Germans argued, with some justification, that the “ship had been carrying arms, and 
munitions.  Furthermore, it had been armed, and even if it should prove not to have been, 
its captain and officers had instructions to use the ship’s superior speed to ram any U-
boat” (Roetter, 1974, p. 48).  The Allies did indeed carry munitions in passenger ships, 
arm merchantmen, and ram U-boats; “on 19 August 1915 the crew of the British Q-ship, 
Baralong, sailing under the American flag until she opened fire, sank the U 27 and then 
killed out of hand the boarding party the Germans had put on a captured merchant vessel.  
British attempts to justify the Baralong’s action…were somewhat specious but worked in 
the United States” (Strachan, 2003, p. 225).  However, these deeds did not compare to the 
death of innocent civilians being killed without warning. 
In short, the cumulative effect of the way Imperial Germany behaved was 
to project an image to many Americans of a country prepared to flout any 
moral and civilized mode of conduct…although they were deemed wrong 
in international law—the moment it felt them to be in its own self-interest.  
Here surely was a tragic example of inhuman and barbaric conduct.  
America had no choice but to come down on the side of righteousness!” 
(Roetter, 1974, p. 12)   
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Finally, in perhaps one of the more bizarre acts of the war, Germany’s Foreign 
Secretary, Zimmerman, sent a telegram to his ambassador in Washington to deliver to the 
President of Mexico (Tuchman, 1958).  In the telegram, Zimmerman informed the 
Mexican president that Germany would once again begin unrestricted warfare.  Fearing 
that America could enter the war, Germany was proposing an alliance with Mexico and 
promised “to assist Mexico ‘to regain by conquest her lost territory in Texas, Arizona, 
and New Mexico’” (p. 7).  Germany felt that Mexico would prove no match for the U.S., 
but wanted to cut off America’s war supplies to the Allies, shut off the supply of oil from 
Mexico to Britain, and find a strategic port for U-boats to keep the Americans out of 
Europe.   
By this time, multiple stories and evidence had surfaced showing various German 
plots to incite a war between the U.S. and Mexico including the Albert portfolio, the 
Archibald papers, and the Rintelen-Huerta conspiracy and “four-fifths of the regular 
Army was tied up inside or along the borders of Mexico.  Pershing’s twelve thousand 
troops were still vainly chasing [Pancho] Villa through the hills of Chihuahua” and 
breeding negative resentment in Mexico towards the U.S. (Tuchman, 1958, p. 105).  
However, the essential features in this episode were that Zimmerman’s proposal was not 
contingent upon America entering the war, but was asking for action while America was 
still neutral; Zimmerman acknowledged that he had sent the telegram rather than denying 
it; and the telegram had been sent over a direct line between Germany and the U.S. 
Government that had been set up for diplomatic purposes under the auspices of possible 
negotiations to end the war.  The messages were coded, but the British had managed to 
decipher the codes and gave the message to the U.S. in such a way as to protect their 
secrets as well as to intentionally draw the U.S. into the war on their side.  Tuchman 
(1958) explains the impact best when she writes:   
Zimmerman’s admission shattered the indifference with which three-
quarters of the United States had regarded the war…The nation sat up and 
gasped, “They mean us!” Nothing since the outbreak of war had so openly 
conveyed a deliberately hostile intent toward Americans…the Lusitania 
had shocked the nation, but that shock was humanitarian, not 
personal…This was Germany proposing to attack the United states, 
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conspiring with America’s neighbor to snatch American territory…This 
was a direct threat upon the body of America, which most Americans had 
never dreamed was a German intention…the Zimmerman telegram, was 
clear as a knife in the back and near as next door.  Everybody understood 
it in an instant…there could no longer be any question of neutrality.  (pp. 
184–185) 
It was shortly after the revelation of the Zimmerman telegram that the U.S. 
formally declared war on Germany alone, while Mexico chose to stay neutral.  According 
to Tuchman (1958), President Wilson never stated whether the Zimmerman telegram was 
the deciding factor that finally drove him from neutrality, but that the British viewed this 
event as quite dramatic.  She continues to cite several sources including President 
Wilson’s official biographer, Baker, “‘no single more devastating blow was delivered 
against Wilson’s resistance to entering the war’; as well as England’s lord Chancellor 
“‘The United States were in fact kicked into the war against the strong and almost 
frenzied efforts of President Wilson’” (p. 199).  In the end, Tuchman (1958) herself 
argues that the telegram was the “kick that did it, to the people whether or not to the 
President” (p. 199).  
As briefly discussed above in reference to the U-boat problem, the Germans were 
not the only country guilty of deeds that could have undermined their narrative.  Early in 
the war, Turkey was waffling between an alliance with Germany versus an alliance with 
Russia and the Entente.  However, “the British admiralty’s action in taking over two 
Turkish battleships which were being built in British shipyards produced an outburst of 
wrath which tilted the scales” in Germany’s favor who subsequently sent two warships of 
their own to Turkey (Liddell Hart, 1939, p. 82).  “Legally, the terms of the contract 
allowed the British to take over the vessels…Strategically the decision was the right one; 
politically the outcome was a gift to Young Turk propaganda, because the purchase of the 
ships had been funded by a high-profile public subscription” (Strachan, 2003, p. 107). 
Additionally, Britain was responsible for establishing a complete naval blockade 
that undoubtedly had a huge impact not only on German soldiers, but also on the innocent 
civilian populations of the Central Powers.  In fact, the “British official history attributed 
772, 736 deaths in Germany [alone] during the war to the blockade, a figure comparable 
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with the death rate for the British armed forces…the blockade breached the principle of 
non-combatant immunity” (Strachan, 2003, p. 215).  However, as discussed earlier, 
Germany was unable to capitalize on the effect due to mismanagement and contradiction 
in their efforts to tell their own narrative.  The naval blockade also caused some distress 
in America over the disruption of free trade.  Strachan (2003), however, states that “In 
this battle for the ideological high ground, Britain had a clinching if less idealistic 
argument.  America’s protest about the obstacles created by free trade were silenced by 
the profits that allied orders generated” (p. 216).  Finally, in “1917, with a disregard for 
neutrality which accorded ill with their defence of Belgium, the British blockaded Greece 
and the French landed at Piraeus” (Strachan, 2003, p. 321).  So although Britain claimed 
that the violation of Belgium’s neutrality was a just cause for war, they subsequently 
committed a similar violation of another country’s neutrality later in the war. 
In conclusion, both sides committed acts which, if not directly contradictory to 
their narrative, were extremely damaging to their cause.  In this case study, as perhaps in 
no other, it is possible to see the direct and enormous impact that these deeds had on the 
war.  In the case of World War I, deeds caused both Britain and the U.S. to enter the war 
against Germany when they may have otherwise remained neutral. 
4. Is the Narrative Morally Legitimate? 
At the very beginning of the conflict, Serbia responded to Austria’s ultimatum 
and “the Serbian Government had yielded so far that the Kaiser…admitted that ‘every 
reason for war drops away’…To overcome the aged Emperor’s doubts, [Berchtold] told 
him that the Serbians had already fired on Austrian troops: having obtained the 
Emperor’s signature to the declaration of war, in which this fictitious justification was 
inserted, he deleted this particular statement before sending out the document” (Liddell 
Hart, 1939, pp. 15–16).  Although Austria’s heir to the throne had been murdered, there 
was no direct evidence of involvement by the Serbian government as discussed earlier.  
Serbia was prepared to make concessions to Austria; however, this manipulation certainly 
calls into question the issue of Austria’s moral legitimacy. 
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Prior to the war, Germany’s Count Schlieffen believed that the military advantage 
of attacking France via Belgium “outweighed the moral stigma of violating Belgian 
neutrality, and also the practical dangers of British hostility” (Liddell Hart, 1939, p. 23).  
Additionally, Germany’s submarine campaign and the resulting deaths of noncombatant 
civilians “had borne meagre results and had done disproportionate moral damage to the 
German cause” (Liddell Hart, 1939, p. 149).  Even in their already weakened moral 
position, Germany, “which should have been alive to the importance of winning goodwill 
and support for Germany among the neutrals, seems to have made no preparations at all 
for putting over Germany’s case…the officials…appeared to feel that the rightness of 
Germany’s cause was self-evident and needed no justification” (Roetter, 1974, p. 39).  In 
this paragraph, we find that Germany was confronted with a moral decision multiple 
times in which they could choose between the moral high ground vice sacrificing this 
high ground for what was perceived as immediate operational or tactical military 
advantages.  In both instances listed above, Germany chose the military advantage to the 
detriment of their own narrative. By all evidence, Germany did not take the potential 
consequences of these decisions lightly; however, analysis after the fact seems to imply 
that more weight should be given to the moral effects over operational military advantage 
in these calculations. 
By contrast, Roetter (1974) argues that the British understood very early the 
implications of the legitimacy of entering the war.  Prior to the invasion of Belgium by 
the Germans, there was intense debate in Britain as to the justification of entering the 
war, especially on the heels of the Boer War.  “As a result Britain was compelled to 
recognize the fact—before any of the other belligerents—that it had to justify the 
righteousness of its cause, in short that propaganda was an essential part of the war 
effort” (p. 32).  “Moreover the special circumstances surrounding Britain’s entry gave 
Britain…a cause…to spread among its own people and the world at large—the cause of 
‘brave little Belgium’, of small nations at the mercy of ruthless military giants, of the 
sanctity of treaties, of people to live in freedom as they chose, of humanity, of the ideals 
of democracy and liberty” (Roetter, 1974, p. 37).   
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As mentioned earlier, the same universal theme was evident in French beliefs and 
propaganda that this was a morally just war to fight for the principle of democracy: 
“France and Belgium had been invaded, and their soldiers were fighting either to protect 
their homes and hearths or to liberate them.  The purpose of the war was clear: it was not 
a war of dubious morality but a struggle for basic freedoms” (Strachan, 2003, p. 59).  
And even if the Russians couldn’t claim democracy as its basis for moral legitimacy, it 
was still the protector of all Slavs who had been unjustly attacked.  The overarching 
moral theme was embodied in “H. G. Wells’ famous phrase that this was ‘the war to end 
war’ because it was a war to defend humanity everywhere” (Roetter, 1974, p. 40).   
This struggle to define and justify their narratives as morally legitimate was 
important in maintaining the support of their own populace, but the struggle was even 
more important with respect to the neutral countries in order to garner their support or, at 
the least, continued neutrality.  This was most evident in the propaganda efforts by each 
side in trying to gain the support of the U.S.  As Roetter (1974) explains two of the 
powers eliminated themselves from the struggle for American public opinion and played 
no significant part after that: “neither Czarist Russia nor the Hapsburg Empire…had 
popular propaganda appeal.  To most Americans they represented all that was worst 
about the old World, about Europe.  Their rule depended on dynastic claims, backed up 
by rigid bureaucracies and ruthless, cruel police forces.  Minorities were ignored, and if 
they protested at their treatment, suppressed…The main belligerent powers…therefore, 
tended to be silently discreet about two of their most important allies” (pp. 53–54).  In the 
view of the British, they were convinced that “their cause was just and right, and that the 
enemy’s was not only unjust but a menace to the fabric of society on this earth.  A cause 
so obviously right, each side argued, was bound to appeal to the people of the United 
States and the noble ideals on which their country was founded” (Roetter, 1974, p. 54).  
Yet the Allies were wary about U.S. involvement in the war.  Liddell Hart (1939) states 
that for two and a half years President Wilson was able to maintain the neutrality of the 
U.S., but was unable to establish a basis of peace between the belligerents since his 
“chances of persuading the Allied people were hindered by the fact that, carrying 
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neutrality into the realm of moral judgment, he seemed not to recognize any distinction 
between the aggressor and the victim” (p. 177). 
Regardless, both sides acknowledged that they had to hold the moral high ground 
to gain America’s support; however, as seen earlier, the British were consistent with their 
messaging while the multiple inconsistent acts by the Germans considered in the previous 
section virtually undermined their entire narrative.  This ideological battle eventually won 
America to the side of the Allies and intertwined with President Wilson’s thoughts 
forming the basis for his famous Fourteen Points.  It was “Wilson’s fourteenth and best 
known point, the formation of ‘a general association of nations’…[which] in the popular 
imagination…captured the moral high ground for the Entente” (Strachan, 2003, p. 304). 
Interestingly, in another theater of the war, Liddell Hart (1939) describes the 
campaign in the Middle East by Lawrence as similar in methods and styles to the German 
submarine campaign where “Camel-raiding parties in the one element played the same 
game as submarines in the other, the main difference being that the former were careful 
to avoid killing non-combatants” (p. 149), although atrocities were committed against the 
Turkish soldiers themselves.  Lawrence (1918) himself writes, “We ordered ‘no 
prisoners’ and the men obeyed, except that the reserve company took two hundred and 
fifty men…Later, however, they found one of our men…pinned to the ground by two 
mortal thrusts with German bayonets.  Then we turned our Hotchkiss [machine gun] on 
the prisoners and made an end of them, they saying nothing” (pp. 171–172).    
5. Is the Narrative Deriving Legitimacy from Religion, Philosophy, or 
Some Other Source? 
As evident in the preceding sections, both sides overwhelmingly derived the 
legitimacy of their narratives from philosophy and ideology, primarily democracy, 
freedom, the right of nations, nationalism, or a combination of all three, and will not be 
covered again here.  However, there was also some inter-mixing of religious legitimacy 
throughout the war.  In Britain, “a former President of the National Free Church Council 
and leader of the Pacifist opposition to the Boer War…proclaimed support for this war to 
be as much a religious duty as ever opposition to the Boer War had been” (Roetter, 1974, 
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p. 31).  Meanwhile, the Inter-Allied Commission tried to win support from the various 
nationalities of the Hapsburg Empire by appealing to both the nationalist and religious 
aspirations of the suppressed minorities.  Similarly, Germany tried to gain the support of 
Turkey and the Ottoman Empire by also appealing to nationality as well as to religious 
aspirations of Islam citing the necessity of waging jihad to establish a caliphate.  
However, these sources of legitimacy in this latter example led to greater problems and 
inconsistencies in the German narrative as discussed above. 
6. Is the Organization (Overall) a Network, Hierarchy, or a Hybrid of 
the Two? 
There is no doubt that the organization, both politically and within the armies 
themselves were extremely hierarchical in nature for all major belligerents.  In fact, the 
massive mobilization of millions actually drove the militaries to become even more 
hierarchical and unwieldy than in previous wars: “another flaw which the gospel of mass 
revealed….‘multitudes serve only to perplex and embarrass’…it was difficult to handle 
armies of millions…Their very mass stultified the dreams of Napoleonic 
manoeuvres…Their inability to control the forces…precipitated the war” (Liddell Hart, 
1939, p. 21).  To deal with this issue the staffs of all of the armies themselves became 
more hierarchical: “The custom of all the armies erected the principle that no one was fit 
to have a voice in matters of strategy unless he had nearly forty years’ practice of military 
routine.  It was certainly a novel principle, since it would have excluded nearly all the 
great commanders of history…although the principle flew in the face of historical 
experience and modern knowledge, it was rigidly maintained…throughout the four years 
of war” (Liddell Hart, 1939, pp. ix–x).     
This hierarchy led to many problems early on in the war, especially when 
combined with the myth of the power of the offensive.  The critical assumption was the 
“relative ease of offense and defense at the strategic level of war” (Lieber, 2000, p. 74) 
where “relative ease” refers to the relative costs of attacking versus defending.  At the 
time, all major powers thought that the capabilities of the offense heavily outweighed the 
capabilities of the defense and that any lapse in mobilization would be immediately 
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translated into lost territory.  This “Cult of the Offensive,” meant that “all three major 
Continental powers, Germany, Russia, and France, entered the Great War intent upon 
going on the offensive immediately…and everybody suffered…for four subsequent years 
of stalemate and misery” (O’Connell, 1989, pp. 242–243).  This became readily apparent 
to anyone on the Western Front as the war dragged into stalemate, trench warfare, and 
reckless offensives against well-fortified defenses.  Many commanders and troops desired 
a stop in fruitless offensives, yet “plans for a fresh offensive went forward—so strong is 
the binding power of the chain of command” (Liddell Hart, 1939, p. 80).  Later when 
Joffre, France’s Chief of the General Staff, was confronted by rumors regarding the 
inadequacies of the defenses at Verdun, he “indignantly denied that there was any cause 
for anxiety, and demanded the names of those who had dared to suggest it: “I cannot be a 
party to soldiers under my command bringing before the Government, by channels other 
than the hierarchic channel, complaint or protests about the execution of my orders” 
(Liddell Hart, 1939, p. 126).  Meanwhile, “Communications went up the command chain 
from battalion to brigade, from brigade to division, and at last reached corps 
headquarters…Orders had to be transmitted back down the line of command, acquiring 
more detail as they went…forward brigades were attacking but without…effective lateral 
communications between themselves” (Strachan, 2003, p. 176).   
Eventually, all the belligerents realized the limitations of strict hierarchical 
structures and had to make minor modifications at all levels of warfare to try to become 
more effective despite the limitations of hierarchy.  At the strategic level, the Allies 
decided that there needed to be more communication and coordination between the main 
powers and General Foch was given the title of Commander-in-Chief of the Allied 
Armies, but this gave him no real power of command, he could coax the three main 
Commanders (Haig, Pershing, and Petain), “but not control them.  Thus plans remained a 
compromise, sometimes with ill-effect.  Still as the fighting troops assumed that the 
united command was a reality, its effect on them was, and remained, real” (Liddell Hart, 
1939, p. 227).  One of the main strategic problems faced by the Allies was that Germany 
occupied a central position and was in a good position to shift its reserves around to 
strengthen defenses in the face of opposing attacks.  This gradually led to outline of a 
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broader Allied strategy that “‘Decisive results will only be obtained if the offensives of 
the allied armies are delivered simultaneously’” (Strachan, 2003, p. 184).  Even at the 
strategic level, the allies realized that their independent forces had to be networked to be 
more effective while simultaneously “swarming” the enemy on multiple fronts in an 
attempt to overwhelm their defenses.   Meanwhile, at the operational level, other attempts 
were made to minimize the handicaps of hierarchy, for example: “The German army paid 
deference to seniority, but it had a way of getting over the handicap of senility by placing 
the real power in the hands of picked staff officers, without regard to their rank” (Liddell 
Hart, 1939, p. 57).  Liddell Hart specifically refers to the case of Ludendorff whose 
success at Liège earlier in the war led to his nomination to lead the German army on the 
Eastern Front.  However, since “Ludendorff was comparatively junior in rank, he had to 
be provided with a titular chief, and for this function a retired general, Hindenburg, was 
chosen” (pp. 56–57).   
Similarly, at the tactical level, there was an increased focus on developing 
solutions to the hierarchically-controlled and staged attacks on well-placed and heavily 
defended enemy positions.  “It was not sufficient to say that the defensive was the 
stronger form of warfare…To win, an army had eventually to attack.  The general 
solution was for the attacking troops to approach under cover, to close by breaking into 
small groups, advancing in bounds, and then to build up fire superiority before the final 
rush” (Strachan, 2003, p 47).  “By 1918 squads or groups of seven to ten storm-troopers 
were trained to bypass strong points, maintaining the momentum of the advance by 
seeking soft spots.  Supporting formations would mop up” (Strachan, 2003, p. 295). 
There were a couple of notable exceptions to the traditional hierarchical structure 
that were present in other theaters of war.  One such example is General Lettow-Vorbeck 
who waged a guerrilla campaign in German East Africa “with a bare five thousand 
men…[yet] caused the employment of 130,000 enemy troops” at the estimated cost to 
Britain of £72 million (Liddell Hart, 1939, p. 61).  General von Lettow-Vorbeck became 
a legend because he was never defeated despite the overwhelming numerical odds and 
did not surrender until two weeks after the armistice was signed in Europe ending the 
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war.  His tactics consisted of organizing his soldiers into “independent field 
companies…Lettow’s strength lay in dispersal and in striking against weakness, forgoing 
the temptation to concentrate for battle” (Strachan, 2003, pp. 80–81).   
The second example is in the exploits of T.E. Lawrence, Lawrence of Arabia.  
Lawrence found that the “strength of the Arab forces in the field oscillated wildly, and 
the difficulty in military terms was holding the tribesmen together in any coherent body” 
(Strachan, 2003, p. 285).  As Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein (1968) 
explains, “The Arab forces were primitively armed and indisciplined [sic], their military 
virtue lying in their mobility.  Lawrence quickly saw how to use them as an independent 
irregular force…his strategy was to make tip and run raids on [Turkish] long 
communication lines, particularly against the Hejaz railway, and to spread the revolt 
northwards to Damascus by propaganda…They succeeded in diverting considerable 
Turkish forces from the front at Gaza, and at the same time they protected Allenby’s 
flank” (p. 489).  In the following sections, we shall see how organizational forms affected 
influence strategy.         
7. Is the Part of the Organization Responsible for Achieving Influence a 
Network, Hierarchy, or Hybrid? 
Britain was the first of the belligerent powers to set up an official war propaganda 
apparatus, headed by Charles Masterman who was a personal friend to the Prime 
Minister, Asquith, as well as to Grey at the Foreign Office.  “The War Office, the 
Admiralty, the Home Office, the Foreign Office and General Headquarters in France all 
had sections or at least groups of individuals who concerned themselves with some aspect 
of propaganda, and Masterman spent much of his time and energy in trying to coordinate 
these diverse efforts” (Roetter, 1974, p. 34).  So the organization appeared to be a 
hierarchy that was facilitated by networks.  However, as everyone in Britain started to 
realize how powerful propaganda was everyone tried to expand their own propaganda 
departments, which led to several attempts to reorganize Britain’s influence 
organizations.  “At the beginning of 1917 the new Prime Minister, Lloyd George, sought 
to consolidate and centralize Britain’s propaganda work by forming a Department of 
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Information…divided into four divisions” and the organization became more hierarchical 
(Roetter, 1974, p. 35).  However, there was still infighting amongst several different 
departments so in 1918, Lloyd George abolished the Department of Information and set 
up the Ministry of Information with two powerful newspaper proprietors.  “In strict 
hierarchically bureaucratic terms Lord Beaverbrook was Lord Northcliffe’s superior, but 
neither press lord was willing to make an issue of the point, and Lloyd 
George…effectively silenced his two most vociferous critics” (Roetter, 1974, p. 36).  In 
the end, Britain established a propaganda apparatus early in the war “and no matter how 
often that apparatus was tinkered with, there was throughout the war an organization 
equipped to disseminate propaganda” (Roetter, 1974, p. 37).  Again, Britain’s propaganda 
was more hierarchical but with network-like tendencies.  
By contrast, “Germany was fighting what Ludendorff in later life called a ‘total 
war’, but with the administrative structures of a small nineteenth-century state…it never 
collected its various propaganda agencies into a ministry of information” (Strachan, 
2003, p. 275).  “The only formal co-operation was a Press Conference at which 
representatives [from at least 10 different agencies] met a committee of journalists…two 
or three times a week…These Press Conferences were at best little more than channels 
for official hand-outs…certainly not instruments for a dynamic propaganda drive” 
(Roetter, 1974, p. 38).   
Meanwhile the French propaganda was put out “by their established diplomatic, 
military and naval agencies, supported by the newly created Maison de la Presse which 
had agents attached to all the French diplomatic and trade missions abroad” (Roetter, 
1974, p. 41).  As discussed earlier, Czarist Russia as well as Austria-Hungary had no real 
propaganda apparatus and were frequently silenced by their more powerful allies.  , 
Germany was actually able to capitalize on the lack of Russia’s propaganda apparatus 
when in “March 1917…Arthur Zimmerman [famous for the Zimmerman telegram 
discussed earlier] convinced the Kaiser and the army that the Bolsheviks’ leader, Lenin, 
who was living in exile in Switzerland, should be smuggled back into Russia…This was 
one revolutionary effort which reaped spectacular returns, albeit in a situation where 
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spontaneous revolution had already occurred” (Strachan, 2003, pp. 262–263).  The 
Bolshevik revolutionaries under Trotsky and Lenin then generated propaganda in Russia 
undermining and eventually replacing the Russian government. 
The U.S. established the Committee on Public Information (CPI) as soon as it 
entered the war in April 1917 to deal with propaganda at home and abroad headed by 
George Creel with the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy as the other members (Roetter, 
1974; Mock & Larson, 1939).  “Mr. Creel assembled as brilliant and talented a group…as 
America had ever seen united for a single purpose…and the breathtaking scope of its 
activities was not to be equaled until the rise of totalitarian dictatorships after the war” 
(Mock & Larson, 1939, p. 4).  The CPI lacked the authority for censorship authority, but 
Creel had official membership and personal contacts with the military intelligence 
agencies and the law enforcement agencies effectively granting them indirect legal force.  
In terms of actual structure, the CPI “defies blueprinting.  It was developed according to 
no careful plan.  It was improvised on the job…the Committee’s organization, activities, 
and personnel changed incessantly…the work itself underwent continual change of scope 
and direction” (Mock & Larson, 1939, p. 48).  The authors continue to state that it “is 
indicative of the impromptu organization and development of the Committee that no one 
can draw a definitive outline of its work…bureaus and divisions sprang up overnight and 
were modified, amalgamated, divided, extended, or entirely demobilized” (p. 65).  The 
CPI was definitely set up to run like a hierarchy and Creel was at the top of the hierarchy, 
but the fluid nature of the organization and the willingness to continually revise the 
organization to be more effective presented more network tendencies.  Overall, the U.S. 
influence organization was a hybrid of hierarchy and network.    
Overall by 1918, with “the coalescence of their war aims, the allies were able to 
coordinate their efforts in propaganda as in other spheres” (Strachan, 2003, p. 318).  
Although there was a “unified and large-scale attack on the propaganda front…in the 
opinion of Americans at least, actual unification was never achieved…American 
representatives were not at first permitted to join wholeheartedly in the work, although 
the symbols of Wilson and America were used in all Allied appeals to the peoples of 
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Germany and Austria-Hungary” (Mock & Larson, 1939, p. 248).  In one example, James 
Keeley was directed to work coordinating American propaganda with the three Inter-
Allied Propaganda Boards, but he reported that “Those boards are ghosts” (as cited by 
Mock & Larson, 1939, p. 258).  Overall, the Allies tried to form a networked 
organization to coordinate their propaganda, although it suffered from limited 
coordination.    
8. Is the Organization (Overall) Speaking with a Single, Overarching 
Voice or with Many Small Voices? 
Early in the war, the Entente powers were divided into two separate schools of 
thought.  The first was the “Eastern” school who advocated that the Allies should attack 
and defeat Germany’s allies first as opposed to the “Western” school who viewed 
Germany as the main enemy and the Western Front as the main battleground.  The 
“Eastern” school argued that “the enemy alliance should be viewed as a whole; pointing 
out that a stroke in some other theatre of war was merely the modern form of the classic 
method of attack on an enemy’s strategic flank” (Liddell Hart, 1939, pp. 83–84).  This 
division led to stagnation in the naval attack on the Dardenelles led by Ian Hamilton, 
whose forces were not reinforced in time.  Although there were other causes for failure, 
including lack of initiative after securing the initial objectives, strategic miscalculation, 
and lack of leadership; “The root cause of this fatal hesitation was the opposition, open 
and underground, of the French and British commanders on the Western Front, who 
begrudged every man diverted from the services of the main offensive there” (Liddell 
Hart, 1939, p. 95).   
Even on the Western Front, there were critical differences of opinion that 
detracted from the Entente strategy.  “Haig had an eye also for his offensive aims.  But he 
had to yield his desire for a stroke in Flanders to Joffre’s preference for one on the 
Somme…From now onwards there was to be a continual conflict between the French 
desire that the British should take over more of the front, and Haig’s desire to keep his 
strength for a decisive blow made in his own way” Liddell Hart, 1939, p. 123).  By the 
beginning of 1918, this internal strife “provided a fresh incentive to the movements for 
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unity of direction among the Allies…[and] the necessity of forming an Inter-Allied 
General Staff” (Liddell Hart, 1939, p. 213).  The position was soon established and 
although it was relatively powerless, the understood need to speak with a single, 
overarching voice gradually allowed the Allies to trend closer to cooperation and 
coordination via a series of strategic councils relative to where they stood at the 
beginning of the war. 
The Central Powers and Germany, herself, were also plagued by internal division 
and distraction.  In 1915 Falkenhayn, then Chief of the German General Staff, “was 
engaged in ceaseless struggle with the leaders on the Eastern Front, Conrad and 
Hindenburg…Their desire was to concentrate on crushing the Russian armies…The 
outcome was a conflict of wills damaging to the German Strategy” (Liddell Hart, 1939, p. 
100).  The internal conflict in Germany was not confined to the military, but resulted in a 
huge division between the military and the statesmen themselves with one of the most 
critical being the “decision to embark on ‘absolute war’ at sea…Hitherto the political 
power had been allowed to keep a hand at the helm; now it was under the hand of the 
martial helmsman” (Liddell Hart, 1939, p. 160).  In these examples, we find that the 
overall organization for the major powers on both sides of the war were speaking with 
many separate, uncoordinated and often conflicting voices vice a single, overarching 
voice with a single, coordinated strategy.       
9. Is the Part of the Organization Responsible for Influence Speaking 
with a Single, Overarching Voice or with Many Small Voices? 
As discussed previously, propaganda efforts by Britain were carried out by no 
fewer than ten different agencies.  Despite the number of agencies involved, the narrative 
was universal and Charles Masterman closely coordinated the efforts of the various 
agencies (Roetter, 1974).  Even more important was their method of dissemination in the 
U.S., Wellington House, the key component of foreign influence within the various 
reorganizations of the British propaganda organization began “compiling a list of all the 
key political, academic, industrial, social, newspaper, financial and civic personalities in 
the United States [whose] circle of personal friends and acquaintances was vast, and they 
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supplemented that list by carefully going through Who’s Who in America…[and] 
compiled a mailing list…to include almost 250,000 people…The whole elaborate 
operation was kept on a personal basis” (Roetter, 1974, p. 64).  In effect, they recruited 
the key personalities in the U.S. as their own multitude of small voices.  Wellington 
House also focused on small town and country newspapers which appreciated the 
personal attention and supplied everyone with articles from such notables as Sir Arthur 
Conan Doyle, H.G. Wells, Bernard Shaw, and Rudyard Kipling to name just a few 
(Roetter, 1974).   
In the U.S., the CPI “had the advantage of being backed by the prestige of three of 
the most important and powerful Departments in the Federal Government…And [Creel] 
was a close friend of President Wilson and had ready access to the White House—which 
made it possible to integrate the formulation of policy and propaganda very closely at 
every stage” (Roetter, 1974, p. 42).  Additionally, the CPI was able to utilize every 
known channel of communication to carry the message of Wilson’s idealism straight to 
the people to include newspapers, periodicals, speakers, circulars, press, billboards, 
posters, photographs, cartoons, exhibits, other existing social organizations, and traveling 
salesmen (Mock & Larson, 1939)  One of the most unique methods of delivery consisted 
of the Four-Minute Men where more “than 75,000 volunteer speakers gave their four-
minute talks in movie houses, theaters, and other public places from Maine to Samoa” 
(Mock & Larson, 1939, p. 72).  In the absence of commercial radio, the Four-Minute 
Men “served as America’s ‘nation-wide hookup’ during the World War.  Instead of the 
voice of a single speaker carried through the ether to distant points, there was a mighty 
chorus of 75,000 individual voices…united under CPI leadership for coordinated and 
synchronized expression of Wilsonian doctrine” (Mock & Larson, 1939, p. 113).  
Originally, the Four-Minute men spoke primarily in movie houses, but the work was 
expanded “to cover more and more kinds of meeting—churches, synagogues, Sunday 
Schools, lumber camps, lodges, labor unions, social clubs,” gatherings of Indian tribes, 
schools, and cantonments (Mock & Larson, 1939, p. 125).   
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Another unique delivery method was in recruiting the commercial travelers of 
America to carry the message and contradict the rumors, criticisms, and lies spread by the 
Kaiser’s paid agents and unpaid sympathizers (Mock & Larson, 1939, p. 176).  A third 
tactic was the encouragement “of civil discontent and the advancement of separatist 
movements in enemy lands [which] formed part of the CPI effort abroad…[through] 
Americanized foreign groups…secret agents abroad, and through financial help” (Mock 
& Larson, 1939, p. 230).  A final key point is that despite having an informal ability to 
censor the press, the CPI rarely had to resort to that measure as most businesses self-
regulated themselves and Creel “could afford to overlook unimportant details in a small 
number of papers because all the rest of the press was pounding out an anvil chorus of 
patriotism under the direction of CPI” (Mock & Larson, 1939, p. 89).  Additionally, 
through “whatever means of pressure or patriotic inspiration, publishers were induced to 
donate advertising space in such abundance that is almost impossible to pick up a 
periodical of the war years without finding one or more pages devoted to the message of 
the CPI” (Mock & Larson, 1939, p. 100).     
Meanwhile, in Germany “there was no co-operation, the propaganda put out by 
the military and the civil authorities was frequently conflicting, and became increasingly 
more pronounced…And so German propaganda continued to speak with different voices 
until the end of the War” (Roetter, 1974, p. 39).  “Moreover, reports on atrocities were 
published by German government departments; hence they carried…the stigma, of 
officialdom instead of enjoying the veneer of the prestige conferred on them by being 
written by independent scholars…they tended to be enormously bulky and unwieldy and 
virtually unreadable…And, finally—most astonishing of all—most German atrocity 
propaganda material was not translated into foreign languages.  The neutral world…was 
blithely assumed to be able to speak and read German” (Roetter, 1974, pp. 50–51).   
In answering this question, it becomes apparent that the question “Is the part of 
the organization responsible for influence speaking with a single, overarching voice or 
with many small voices?” is not a simple dichotomy and has many different layers.  A 
single, overarching voice has been shown to be beneficial in establishing and maintaining 
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the overall direction and coherency of the message (i.e., work of the CPI); but not 
beneficial if interpreted as run and constrained by the government (i.e., German 
government stigma on the propaganda or even more narrowly defined as only in one’s 
own native language).  Similarly, many small voices can be construed as negative (i.e., 
the multiple agencies in Germany that were not coordinated in their message) or as 
positive (i.e., the amplification of the message through multiple dissemination channels 
and multiple voices within each channel as exemplified by the Four-Minute Men).  The 
most effective organization appears to be one that has a strong, central, well-defined 
narrative that is broadcast and amplified on multiple channels.  In other words, the 
narrative is more effective when there is strategic centralization with a single, 
overarching voice yet tactical decentralization via many, small, but independent voices.  
10. Is the Overall Density of the Organization High, Low, or Medium? 
Based upon the answers in the previous sections, we would classify the overall 
“density” (based upon the number of inter-connections, clustering, and strength of ties 
within the organization) of the Central Powers and Germany specifically as low.  There 
was no real coordination or linkage between the countries beyond the political level and 
even these connections were tenuous at best.  Within Germany itself, there was no strong 
density of linkages between the various parts of the government, between the various 
organizations that were conducting propaganda, or within the military itself as the various 
generals were all working at furthering their own agenda to the exclusion of others. 
Within the Allied countries, we would classify the overall density as medium.  
Although there were some indications of rivalries within the various militaries, within the 
government, and within the influence organizations themselves; most of the time the 
various parts of the organization strove towards the same end goal.  In doing so, many 
individuals were able to forge personal or organizational relationships to increase the 
functionality of the various players or to leverage already existing links to increase the 
overall strategic efficiency of the influence organization, the military, the government, 
and the overall Alliance.  As just one example, take the impromptu organization within 
CPI.  “A ‘come at once’ telegram would be dispatched to some journalist, scholar, or 
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public figure; he would catch an afternoon train; and presto! the next dawn would break 
on a brand new unit of the CPI…Some of the Committee’s most useful men arrived 
unheralded, but the majority were summoned because someone already in the work knew 
their particular talents and the help that they could give” (Mock & Larson, 1939, p. 65).  
While not all aspects of the Alliance worked as well as this example, the Allies were 
much more adept at conceiving, building, or utilizing links within the network to achieve 
their objectives as compared to the Central Powers. 
11. What was the Political Goal (End)?  Was it Achieved? 
Looking at the results of the war at face value, most people would readily agree 
that the Allies achieved their political goals, namely to reclaim lost territory, establish the 
justness of their cause (democracy and freedom), and eliminate the Central Powers as 
threats to establish security for the future.  However, not all of these goals stand up under 
closer scrutiny.  “Despite its defeat, Germany manufactured its own feeling of victory out 
of the war…the German army…still stood deep in enemy territory on all fronts when it 
laid down its arms; its fronts had been neither broken through nor enveloped; thus, none 
of the feature of an operational defeat on the battlefield was present…[which] fitted in 
with the argument that the army had been stabbed in the back by the revolution at home” 
(Strachan, 2003, pp. 330–331).   
In addition, despite any actual objective facts of the settlement, “What mattered 
was the rhetoric that accompanied the settlement.  Before the peace treaty was 
signed…John Maynard Keynes, resigned in protest at the harshness of the terms…The 
allies’ failure at Versailles was a failure of resolve in implementing its terms…The reality 
was that, given the enormity of the task that confronted the victors, they drew up a 
settlement which promised far more than it proved able to deliver in practice” (Strachan, 
2003, p. 333).  Additionally, as alluded to in a previous section, the Wilsonian idea of 
national self-determination, while noble, was a difficult concept to implement: “about 30 
million found themselves on the wrong sides of frontiers…Clear ethnic divisions were 
particularly hard to draw” (Strachan, 2003, p. 333).  Italy felt aggrieved that the deal 
promised for land was not kept and Japan was angered by the refusal to accept a clause 
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on racial equality.  Initially, the Arabs did not get the nationhood they had been led to 
expect.  Although after several revolts and uprisings in the Middle East, Britain 
participated in the 1921 Cairo conference, in which Churchill and Lawrence participated 
to “sort out the unsatisfactory state of the Middle East created by the Dispositions agreed 
in Paris.  As a result…Feisal was installed on the throne of Iraq while his brother 
Abdullah became ruler of Transjordan…The settlement…allowed Lawrence…to 
conclude that he was ‘quit of our wartime Eastern adventure with clean hands’” (Brown, 
2005, p. 249). For all these reasons and more, “the First World War did not end as 
neatly…as the celebration of Armistice Day suggest” (p. 336).  “Liberalism’s 
comparative failure in the inter-war years was in large part due to its own fundamental 
decency.  It lost the determination to enforce its own standards” (p. 339).   
In the end, the “First World War broke the empires of Germany, Russia, Austria-
Hungary and Turkey…it provided a temporary but not a long-term solution to the 
ambitions of the Balkan nations.  Outside Europe it laid the seeds for the conflict in the 
Middle East” (Strachan, 2003, pp. 339–340).  “President Wilson was given the military 
victory he wanted…and it seemed that his spokesmen of the CPI had likewise triumphed.  
But in those final weeks of the Committee on Public Information the realistic members of 
the staff asked themselves if, after all, they had won their fight for the mind of 
mankind”—prophetic words in 1939 (Mock & Larson, 1939, p. 334). 
12. What Other Capabilities (Means) Were Used?  Relative Importance 
of the Other Capabilities in Achieving the End? 
Obviously, one key factor in this war was the interplay of the mobilization of 
millions with the interaction of mobility and logistics.  For instance, “Russia had more 
millions to draw upon than any, but her mobilization was slower, a large part of her 
forces were in Asia, and her eventual strength was hampered by lack of munitions” 
(Liddell Hart, 1939, p. 19).  However, reliance on manpower, technology, and mobility 
alone can be deceiving.  “The combined populations of the four Central Powers totaled 
144 million in 1914; those of the principal Entente powers of 1918 (including their 
colonies) 690 million.  However, economic potential and military capability were not the 
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same.  Turkey, despite its backwardness, had twice defeated Britain in battle, and its 
military contribution [as measured by manpower alone, not material] to the war as a 
whole was greater than that of the United States” (Strachan, 2003, p. 304).  In fact it was 
partly Turkey’s strength in manpower, but weakness in material which influenced 
Lawrence’s strategy in the Middle East: “In the Turkish army materials were scarce and 
precious, men more plentiful than equipment.  Consequently our cue should be to destroy 
not the army but the materials.” (Lawrence, 1920, p. 266).   
In terms of overall military technology, both sides were relatively comparable 
with each other in munitions available on the field with the exception of the tank 
developed late in the war.  One key technological factor was that the British severed 
Germany’s telegraph communication cables in the North Sea which had a negative 
impact on Germany’s ability to communicate in a timely fashion with outlying areas and 
neutral countries, particularly the United States.  Another important technological factor 
was Germany’s reliance on code to cover its communication signals that Britain was able 
to intercept.  Although Germany had the technological superiority to develop the code 
and could have changed the ciphers, in their arrogance they assumed the Allies could not 
break the codes.  This had a significant impact on the ability to bring the Zimmerman 
telegram to light spurring the U.S. to join the war. 
A final key factor to keep into account was the impact of the British naval 
blockade, which certainly had a huge impact on Germany’s ability to fight as well as 
influencing its decision to resume unrestricted submarine warfare.  All of these factors 
played a role in impacting the narrative as well as the dissemination of the narrative. 
C. RESULTS 
Based upon above evaluations, below is a short response as to how we code the 
influence strategy in World War I based upon our structured questions: 
1)  Is the narrative consistent over time (construct)?  Central Powers – no; 
Entente powers – no, U.S. – yes  
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2)  Is the narrative logically consistent (internal)?  Germany – no; Allied powers 
(including U.S.) – no  
3)  Is the narrative consistent between words and deeds (external)?  Germany – 
no; Allied powers (including U.S.) – no; however, Germany was comparatively worse 
on this measure than the Allies and this comparative difference was highly propagandized 
in favor of the Allies  
4)  Is the narrative morally legitimate? Germany – within Germany, yes; 
external to Germany, no; Allied powers (including U.S.) – yes  
5)  Is the narrative deriving legitimacy from religion, philosophy, or some other 
source?  Primarily philosophy (Nationalism, Freedom, Democracy) with minor 
religious strands 
6)  Is the organization (overall) a network, hierarchy, or a hybrid of the two?  
Germany – Hierarchy; Allied powers (including U.S.) – Hierarchy (note: both sides 
experimented with organizational innovations at all levels of warfare to minimize 
the problems of hierarchy and exhibit minor network-like trends 
7) Is the part of the organization responsible for achieving influence a network, 
hierarchy, or hybrid?  Germany – Heterarchical; Entente – Hierarchy; U.S. – Hybrid 
of Hierarchy and Network 
8)  Is the organization (overall) speaking with a single, overarching voice or with 
many small voices?  Central Powers (including Germany) – many small voices 
(uncoordinated, conflicted), Allies overall – many small voices (uncoordinated, 
conflicted) but working to resolve issues and tend towards single, overarching voice  
9)  Is the part of the organization responsible for influence speaking with a single, 
overarching voice or with many small voices?  Germany – many small voices 
(uncoordinated, conflicted); Allies (including U.S.) – Single, overarching voice 




10)  Is the overall density of the organization high, low, or medium?  Central 
Powers (including Germany) – Low; Allied powers (including U.S.) – Medium 
11)  What was the political goal (end)?  Was it achieved?  End war, promote 
nationalism and democracy, and eliminate Germany as future threat.  Partially 
achieved – ambitious, not-well implemented 
12)  What other capabilities (means) were used?  Relative importance of the other 
capabilities in achieving the end?  Technology both in war and specifically in relation 
to influence – moderate impact; Economic blockade – major impact, inconclusive if 
sufficient to end war by itself without other means; interesting interplay between 
technology, blockade, and narrative 
We will analyze these findings in further detail in Chapter XI along with the 
details of the other case studies; however, two preliminary findings should be highlighted 
from this particular case study.  The first is the major impact from negative deeds (such 
as unrestricted submarine warfare and violations of neutrality), regardless of whether the 
deeds directly conflicted with the stated narrative.  Any action that served to undermine 
the perceived legitimacy of the belligerent had a major impact on the course and outcome 
of the war.  Specifically, in this case study, Germany’s willingness to flaunt the neutrality 
of Belgium was the key factor in the British declaration of war and popular public 
support.  The perceived German atrocities and intent (the execution of Nurse Cavell, the 
sinking of the Lusitania, and the Zimmerman telegram) dragged the U.S. into the war 
despite the struggle by President Wilson to remain neutral.  Without either Britain or the 
U.S. entering the war against Germany, the result of the war and subsequent history may 
have been significantly different.  Additionally, we found that Germany was confronted 
with multiple decisions between the moral high ground versus an immediate operational 
or tactical military advantage.  In their decisions to violate Belgium neutrality and resume 
unrestricted submarine warfare, Germany chose the military advantage to the detriment 
of their own narrative. By doing so, Germany knowingly sacrificed its informational 
advantage for material gain when the analysis of the narrative seems to imply that more 
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weight should be given to the moral effects over operational military advantage in these 
calculations. 
The second major discussion in this case study is the need to be more specific 
when analyzing the question “Is the part of the organization responsible for influence 
speaking with a single, overarching voice or with many small voices?” This was already 
discussed above, but is important enough to bear repetition here.  The question as 
formulated is vague which is useful in allowing the exploration of all the relevant content 
here, but the analysis above shows that the choice between a single, overarching voice 
versus many, small voices should not be viewed solely as a simple dichotomy and in 
reality the answer has many different layers.  A single, overarching voice has been shown 
to be beneficial in establishing and maintaining the overall direction and coherency of the 
message (i.e., work of the CPI); but not beneficial if interpreted as run and constrained by 
the government (i.e., German government stigma on the propaganda or even more 
narrowly defined as only in one’s own native language).  Similarly, many small voices 
can be construed as negative (i.e., the multiple agencies in Germany that were not 
coordinated in their message) or as positive (i.e., the amplification of the message 
through multiple dissemination channels and multiple voices within each channel as 
exemplified by the Four-Minute Men).  The most effective organization appears to be one 
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VIII. COMPARATIVE STUDY 3: WORLD WAR II IN EUROPE 
(GERMANY/ITALY VS. U.S./U.K./U.S.S.R.) 
A. BACKGROUND 
World War II affected the policies and actions of nearly every nation in the world 
and its battles took place across a vast portion of the world’s terrain, both geographical 
and ideological.  The conflict took place between the Axis Powers (principally Germany, 
Japan, and Italy) and the nations aligned against Axis aggression (the “Big Three” were 
Britain, The United States, and the Soviet Union) known commonly as the Allies. There 
were many other minor powers aligned with the Allies, but the study will focus on the 
three major powers.  Although the Axis powers were allies having signed formal treaties, 
the goals and national interests of Japan and Germany diverged greatly and their alliance 
was based more on a common enemy rather than common objectives.  Additionally Italy, 
although more closely aligned with Germany both geographically and through fascist 
ideology, proved a minor partner in Europe and could perhaps be considered to ultimately 
be more hindrance than help to the Nazi effort.  Therefore, we will focus primarily on 
Germany and Italy for the Axis powers.   
A clear distinction can be made as well on the Allied side regarding the Soviets 
with respect to the U.S. and U.K.  Just before the war Germany and the Soviet Union 
signed a non-aggression pact designed to prevent hostilities between the two countries as 
well as providing agreement to the partitioning of Eastern Europe (Arnold-Forster, 1973, 
pp. 28–29). Another difference of note is the political/ideological chasm that lay between 
the Soviet Union and the U.S. and U.K.  Both the United States and the United Kingdom 
had adopted varying forms of liberal constitutional democracy while the Soviet Union 
had since embarked on its drive to the ideal of Soviet Communism.  Although they may 
have both possessed designs on the future control of Europe, those visions were not the 
same. It is reasonable to conclude that outside the objective of defeating Nazi Germany, 
the British and Americans shared few goals in common with the Soviets, ideologically or 
geographically, regarding the conduct of the war or their post-war vision for Europe. 
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Therefore, this comparative study will focus on the battle for influence that occurred 
between Germany and the United Kingdom/United States largely in Europe, North 
Africa, and on the Atlantic Ocean.  It is acknowledged that the effects and outcomes of 
other efforts in other locations in the larger war cannot be completely isolated from what 
occurred specifically between Germany and the U.S./U.K. The world is after all a system 
of systems.  However, in order to narrow the scope of something that can be said to be 
global in proportions, data and evidence will be primarily focused on what occurred 
between Germany and the United States/United Kingdom. The primary exception to this 
will be the inclusion of German policies and propaganda that simultaneously attacked the 
Allies as a whole; such as attempts to tie together the threat of Communism and Western 
plutocracy as well as turning points in the war that cannot be discussed without reference 
to other belligerents.  
A large amount of weight in this study is placed on propaganda for, as noted by 
Clayton Laurie,  “The struggle to influence the thoughts and behavior of friends and foes 
alike made World War II a contest of ideologies as well as of arms…In a general sense 
the ideological and political conflicts among propagandists concerning the content and 
goals of the…campaign against Germany were similar to the conflicts experienced by 
American politicians, diplomats, and soldiers…as to the shape of…policies, war aims, 
and postwar goals” (Laurie, 1996  p. 3).  The apparatus each side established to wield this 
influence reflects the social/political systems from which each emerged and therefore 
useful for illustrating their forms. 
An additional reason for a focus on propaganda is its perceived importance it 
obtained following World War I.  Balfour (1979) notes that:  
The Germans by overestimating the part which Allied propaganda had 
played [in WW I], were led to exaggerate the part which propaganda could 
play.  They determined that a skillful depiction of the partial truth of a 
situation could alter reality in order to bring it in line with that truth.  
Additionally, by overplaying the degree to which German defeat had been 
due to a failure of will rather than to being overwhelmed materially, they 
developed the conviction that greater will, brought about by more ardent 
conviction, could by itself produce a new result.  (p. 10) 
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Similar conclusions were made on the Allied side with respect to the importance of 
propaganda as well if for no other reason than a strong recognition that Nazi ideology 
must be countered and that deliberate effort would be needed to achieve this (Laurie, 
1996, p. 4). 
The words of Joseph Goebbels, Germany’s lead propagandist, describe this new 
faith in propaganda well. “You can go on shooting up the opposition with machine-guns 
until they acknowledge the superiority of the gunners. That is the simpler way. But you 
can also transform the nation by a mental revolution and thus win over the opposition 
instead of annihilating them. We National Socialists have adopted the second way and 
intend to pursue it” (Balfour, 1979, p. 48). 
This is not to ignore other elements of influence.  The government structure and 
command staffs of each side will be considered.  Additionally consideration will be given 
to other elements such as technology and industrial output. 
B. SUMMARY OF THE WAR 
This section serves as a brief history of the major events of the war.  Specific 
evidence deemed reflective of the battle for influence will be addressed in greater detail 
in the Data section. 
Germany in 1938 under Adolf Hitler was in all respects a totalitarian state.  It had 
chosen to dismiss the terms imposed by the Treaty of Versailles and rebuild its military 
power. The treaty, the embodiment of the lingering results of WW I, has been viewed by 
some as a direct precipitator of Germany’s aggression. Germans perceived the treaty as 
unfair as well as an obstacle to their post-war reconstruction (Fuller, 1949, pp. 17–23).  
As recorded by Balfour, “The Germans had been led by Wilson’s language to expect that 
they would be treated on equal footing with everybody else; instead, they were 
discriminated against” (Balfour, 1979, p. 9). 
The treaty had cost Germany some of its territory in Europe as well as all of its 
pre-war colonies. Germany also lost the majority of its pre-war Navy, half of its iron 
production, almost one fifth of its coal production, and a sixth of its population. The 
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terms of the treaty along with the devastation wrought by the war left Germany in a 
severe state that would only be exasperated by a worldwide economic depression 
(historylearningsite.co.uk/treaty_of_versailles.htm).  The resulting frustration and 
desperation would assist in creating the conditions that allowed for the rise of National 
Socialism and Hitler’s ascent to power (Fuller, 1949, p. 22).  The treaty created 
conditions that would provide a sense of legitimacy to German military aggression.  
Legitimacy at home to right previous wrongs as well as legitimacy abroad to prefer 
appeasement of Hitler as long as a nation was not directly threatened itself. 
In early March 1938 open German aggression began.  Under the guise of political 
unification German troops occupied Austria with little opposition voiced by other 
European powers.  Subsequently Germany invaded Czechoslovakia and other eastern 
territories under the pretense of protecting ethnic German populations.  Western Europe 
again took no direct action in response.  The reluctance of other European powers to 
initially oppose German aggression is attributed to, having just ended WWI, a reluctance 
to enter another war as well as an underestimation of Hitler’s intentions.  James 
Stokesbury in A Short History of World War II references A. J. P. Taylor’s argument that 
the full blame cannot be placed on Hitler.  He was merely acting as he should by 
expressing the interests of his state, while the Allies failed to firmly express their interests 
thus encouraging German aggression (Stokesbury, 1980, pp. 54–64). 
In August 1939 Germany and the Soviet Union signed the German-Soviet 
Nonaggression Pact which also secretly included plans for dividing Eastern Europe. 
Germany then invaded Poland under a ruse of self-defense and quickly occupied its 
Western half. The Wehrmacht was primarily responsible for the defeat of the Polish army 
and occupation but was quickly followed by elements of the S.S. would engage in the 
rounding up and execution of Polish citizens, particularly Jews.  Two weeks after the 
German invasion Soviet forces invaded Poland from the East to complete the defeat and 
parceling of the country. Germany’s operations in Poland are widely viewed as the first 
use of Blitzkrieg.  Stokesbury (1980) notes that at this point military intervention by 
Britain and/or France could likely have halted German aggression, but the influence of 
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war weariness from WW I combined with overestimation of German strength prevented 
action (pp. 69–76).  The treatment of Jewish Poles had negative repercussions for the 
legitimacy of German actions. 
After the fall of Poland, Britain and France declared war on Germany but took 
little direct action.  Britain did however engage in a propaganda effort against Nazism by 
delivering leaflets using its bomber fleet to little effect.  Russia invaded Finland in 
November 1939 and in April 1940 Germany invaded Denmark and Norway.  Denmark 
fell quickly. In Norway, although the capital would fall, a resistance movement supported 
by the Allies would hold out longer (Arnold-Forster, 1973, pp. 30–42). 
Germany invaded France via Belgium and the Netherlands using combined air 
and land forces on a two-pronged advance and capitalizing on lessons learned regarding 
Blitzkrieg from the Polish campaign.  The Allied attempt to defend Belgium resulted in a 
complete rout as the German advance through the Ardennes separated British and French 
forces.  British forces and 100K French narrowly escaped across the channel via Dunkirk 
thus leaving the remaining French forces on their own.  Following the evacuation of the 
British, France surrendered to Germany. Clive Ponting notes that the swift fall of France 
may be attributed as much to British unwillingness to commit a decisive force to the 
defense of the European mainland as to the swiftness of the German assault (Ponting, 
1993, pp. 78–95).  Additionally, many in England were fearful of potentially losing all of 
its aircraft thereby leaving England vulnerable to the Luftwaffe and aerial bombardment. 
In effect the British were faced with the dilemma of committing additional forces to help 
France versus preserving the combat power necessary to defend the British Isles. 
Germany’s next focus was the attempt to subdue Britain via establishing air 
dominance over the isles, to be followed by a cross-channel invasion. Britain, 
recognizing its survival hinged on preventing an amphibious invasion, focused on 
preparing itself by fortifying at home via materials provided from the United States as 
well as securing its position at sea. This included attacking the French fleet to insure that 
it could not become a resource for Germany.  This action caused enduring tension with 
the French.   
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Meanwhile, the fortification at home consisted largely of air-defense and air-
combat systems recognizing that the Germans would have great difficulty mounting a 
cross-channel invasion without air-dominance. (Ponting, 1993, pp. 120–137).  This 
fortification was not possible without material assistance from the United States which 
was not provided until the U.S. lifted an embargo against loans to belligerents that had 
been put in place after WW I (Ponting, 1993, p. 45). Had Hitler not pushed the limits of 
the legitimacy of redressing Germany’s humiliation under the terms of the Treaty of 
Versailles, the United States may not have provided the British with an external source of 
material support for defense of the British homeland. 
British resistance during the Battle of Britain owed as much to force of will as to 
force of arms.  Balfour notes that “the British had little to say to the Germans…except 
that we were not going to give in” (Balfour, 1979, p. 195).  The Royal Air Force was able 
to defeat the German air campaign through combination of skill and home field 
advantage.  German aircraft would be engaged over Britain rather than over the channel 
placing them at the limits of their operational range.  Failure to defeat the RAF or to 
crush British defenses is only one part of what convinced Hitler to postpone an attempt at 
a land invasion.  Another part was the perceived German naval defeat at Jutland, after 
which German Naval surface forces never left base again. Additionally, Hitler was not 
entirely set on the total defeat of Britain.  As long as Germany dominated Europe, the 
British Empire need not be dismantled.  Peace was acceptable on those terms.  Dealing 
with the Soviet Union was also increasingly seen as a strategic priority (Ponting, 1993, 
pp. 120–137). 
Italy declared war in June 1940 and by September was attacking Malta, which it 
would besiege for three years, and invaded British holdings in North and East Africa.  
Italian forces suffered heavy losses in material and territory to British defenders, 
prompting Germany to send its own forces under Rommel to their aid.  Italy additionally 
failed in its invasion of Greece again forcing Germany to commit forces. Germany 
invaded Yugoslavia to effect passage to Greece.  Subsequently British forces were forced 
out of Greece and Crete.  Italy’s failed efforts would plant the seeds of another of the 
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war’s major turning points which would take place in North Africa (Arnold-Forster, 
1973, pp. 95–113). By forcing the Germans to commit forces there, an additional front 
was effectively opened that tied down German resources and altered German strategy. 
In a bid to obtain more territory and resources for the German effort as well as 
neutralize the threat of Soviet Communism Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 
1941 in an operation code named Barbarossa. Hitler had long considered the Soviet 
Union the real enemy and defeating the U.S.S.R. would also eliminate another possible 
source of assistance to the British (Ponting, 1993, p. 124).  The Barbarossa plan included 
a deception scheme to portray the preparations for the invasion of Russia as preparations 
for the invasion of England (Fuller, 1949, p. 90).  This cover played well to Stalin’s 
desire to maintain peace with Germany, at least in the near term, to the point of ignoring 
British and American warnings that a German invasion was imminent.  German forces 
attacked along three separate axis of advance towards, Leningrad, Moscow, and Kiev.  
Germany expected the Soviets to collapse within months, if not weeks.  The German 
military achieved almost total surprise destroying half of the Soviet air force within the 
first week, much of it on the ground, as was achieved against British and French air 
forces previously.  The Soviet command, consisting of relatively inexperienced officers 
due to Stalin’s late 1930s purges, was paralyzed by confusion and contradictory orders.  
Soviet troops, as well as citizens, however would prove stubborn and determined in their 
resistance.   
Although the German forces advanced rapidly, each mile of advance extended 
already stretched lines of communications reaching across a three axis front of close to 
one thousand kilometers.  The United States and Britain would respond by providing 
intelligence from decoded German communications as well as shipping large amounts of 
equipment and material to the Soviets.  The Soviets would adopt a scorched earth policy 
destroying any useful resources before advancing German units.  The shifting relative 
supply advantage, stubborn resistance of the Soviets, and the onset of the Russian winter 
severely slowed the German advance in the North.  In the South however, along the 
Southern axis, the Ukraine fell to Germany.  In the center the battle for Moscow halted 
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the German advance as Hitler issued orders to shift from the offensive to the defensive.  
Two factors of influence are important to note with respect to the invasion of Russia.  
First is Hitler’s relationship with his generals. Stokesbury (1980) notes that after 
achieving success in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and France, despite the misgivings of his 
General Staff, he possessed an inflated sense of his own military infallibility.  This led 
him to overrule the generals’ recommendation that Moscow was the center of gravity, 
thus diverting forces from the center to the north and south.  Secondly is the influence of 
Nazi Ideology that regarded Slavic populations as subhuman.  German mistreatment of 
Russians who might have joined them against communism served instead to drive them 
to the relentless defense of the Russian motherland (Stokesbury, 1980, pp. 150–160). 
German forces attempted another advance in the South to Stalingrad in mid-1942.  
Making heavy use of air power the German military encircled and entered the city but 
never cut off Soviet access via the Volga River.  This access proved essential to the 
Soviet defenders’ ability to resist.  With the onset of another Russian winter, German 
ability to supply and reinforce was again hampered. A subsequent Soviet counter attack 
achieved the double envelopment of the German Sixth Army, which Hitler refused to 
allow to make any attempt to escape.  In early 1943, all German forces caught in the 
envelopment had either surrendered or were destroyed (Stokesbury, 1980, pp. 150–160). 
Germany’s failure to achieve its objectives in the Soviet Union was a major 
turning point in the outcome of World War II.  Germany suffered not only huge material 
and human losses, but sustained a serious blow to the morale and determination of it 
citizens revealed in attempts by German propaganda to de-emphasize the events 
surrounding Stalingrad.  The German public’s optimism about what Germany could and 
would accomplish decreased while pessimism about the results of the war increased 
(Balfour, 1979, p. 290).  The German defeat shattered the myth of German invincibility 
in the field (Arnold-Forster, 1973, p. 142).  Subsequent Russian success would reveal to 
Germany’s adversary’s that a culminating point in German aggression had been reached.  
Germany’s failure to achieve and maintain its objectives with regard to Russia also 
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served to vindicate the British and American strategy of building up their own power 
while Germany expended its own.  
The United States formally entered the war on in December 1941 following the 
Japanese surprise attack at Pearl Harbor.  Less formally however, and despite the official 
status of neutrality, the United States had provided material support to both the United 
Kingdom and the Soviet Union for the first two years of the war. Britain declared war on 
Japan the same day.  Germany declared war on the United States three days later.  
Although Germany had no obligation to declare war against the United States, doing so 
allowed the opening up of rich new hunting grounds for its U-boat fleet.  The 
consequence of doing so was to insure that the United States and the Soviet Union would 
combine their power against Germany.  Something that was previously unlikely.  The 
U.S. and U.S.S.R. were more prone to be adversaries than allies, and following Pearl 
Harbor American sentiment was that the war against Japan belonged to the U.S. while the 
war against Germany was for Europe (Arnold-Forster, 1973, p. 155).  Hitler’s actions 
again pushed a neutrally disposed America into opposition. 
The first major campaign that the British and Americans mounted jointly was the 
invasion of North Africa in late 1942.  The campaign, although meeting stubborn 
resistance from German forces, succeeded in routing Axis forces from Northern Africa 
by May 1943.  Similar to the outcome of the Italian incursion into Greece and Crete, the 
actions in North Africa forced Germany to commit and sacrifice a large amount of 
manpower and resources that might have been otherwise applied to the battle against the 
Soviets.  The British and Americans did not initially agree that North Africa should be 
the focus of the initial involvement of U.S. Forces.  The U.S. military was interested in an 
invasion of France.  President Roosevelt ultimately decided on North Africa partly for 
reasons of political influence believing that American forces should engage the Germans 
at the earliest opportunity and North Africa being the only reasonable option.  This also 
served to appease Russian demands for opening a new front as well as appease the 
American public’s desire for action (Stokesbury, 1980, p. 224).  
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The Allies followed their success in North Africa by seizing the island of Sicily.  
Preparations for this assault were aided greatly by a detailed deception effort.  The 
objective of the deception, Operation Mincemeat, was to convince German intelligence 
that the next Allied move would not be against Sicily, but that the appearance of a 
coming invasion of Sicily was merely a cover for the ‘real’ invasion elsewhere.  The 
Allies gained control of Sicily in August 1943.  The Mincemeat deception resulted in the 
repositioning of German forces to defend Greece, some of which were diverted from 
Sicily (Arnold-Forster, 1973, p. 15).  Additionally, the Mincemeat deception by posing 
the truth (an invasion of Sicily) as a lie, can be argued to have set-up German intelligence 
for the Bodyguard deception for the invasion of France. 
Success in Sicily was followed by an Allied invasion of the Italian mainland.  
Although Italy had formally surrendered by late 1943, there still remained a considerable 
German military presence that seized control of the nation.  The Allies landed at two 
separate points and within one month seized Naples.  German resistance was determined, 
inflicting heavy losses on the Allies.  The German defense of Italy consisted of a series of 
defensive lines stretching east to West across the peninsula.  The first line called the 
Winter Line was established to prevent an Allied advance into Rome.  This line held for 
six months through mid-1944.  After the Allies seized Rome the Germans established the 
Gothic Line across northern Italy which held until early 1945.  The invasion of Italy was 
another source of disagreement between the U.S. and U.K.  The U.S. again had focused 
attention on an invasion of France while the U. K. had argued for Italy as a jumping off 
point for further actions as well as a relatively easier location to achieve more success 
against the axis (Stokesbury, 1980, pp. 291–309). 
The defeat in North Africa, losses in Italy, and reversals on the Eastern Front 
placed Germany firmly on the defensive.  New Soviet offensives in the Ukraine in late 
1943 and the lifting of the siege of Leningrad in early 1944 set the stage materially and 
psychologically for the Soviet summer offensive that pushed the German military back to 
Poland.  The timing of events in the Mediterranean and on the Eastern Front, however 
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accidental, would be coined by the British as “the month that changed the war” (Balfour, 
1979, p. 291). 
In June 1944, the Allies invaded France with Operation Overlord, a series of 
amphibious landings on the Normandy coast.  This operation was preceded and 
accompanied by a deception aimed at creating ambiguity for the German command as to 
where the landings would take place.  Germany, having expected an invasion of Europe 
at some point, established a network of coastal defenses known as the Atlantic Wall. The 
success of the deception effort prevented the German command from committing reserve 
forces early to oppose the landings. The Allies were able to overwhelm the defenders 
locally and secure landing sites on the first day.  A breakout from the landing sites was 
achieved, with difficulty, within two months of the initial landings. 
An additional landing was conducted in Southern France in August and by late 
1944 the Allies controlled the country as well as parts of Belgium.  The Allies could now 
bomb Germany from airfields on the European mainland.  Simultaneously in the East, 
Soviet forces moved into Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. 
Germany was effectively cut off from its external fuel supplies. Internal doubts arose as 
to Hitler’s competence as evidenced by an internal attempt at assassination and military 
coupe in July 1944 (Arnold-Forster, 1973, p. 261). 
Germany conducted its last major offensive of the war in the Ardennes Forest.  In 
December, 1944 under cover of a snowstorm, three German armies pushed into French 
territory and surrounded United States forces at Bastogne.  This counter-offensive 
resulted in the diversion of allied combat power to counter the bulge in allied lines.  Clear 
weather allowed Allied air power in combination with forces moved from Southern 
France to break the German offensive, rescue the besieged forces, and place the German 
military back on the defensive.  The Soviets meanwhile continued to advance steadily 
across Poland and the East (Stokesbury, 1980, pp. 349–363). 
As the various armies advanced on Berlin from all sides Hitler refused to allow 
surrender and issued instructions that all citizens were to defend the city to the last.  
Surrender of German military units was not orderly as some fought bitterly and others 
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gave in.  Following Hitler’s suicide, the formal surrender was made in May 1945 
(Stokesbury, 1980, pp. 361–363). The lines roughly established by the presence of 
Soviet, British, and American forces would solidify into the Iron Curtain and set the stage 
for the Cold War. 
C. DATA 
As stated in the methodology section, we are using a structured/focused 
comparison approach to explore the selected case studies.  Thus data is structured below 
as answers to each of our stated focus questions.  Despite the global nature of the conflict, 
the data will focus primarily on Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States 
(although other theaters of war and countries will be referenced in key points). 
1. Is the Narrative Consistent Over Time (Construct)? 
The U.S. narrative changed over the course of the war. The U.S. narrative began 
as peaceful, neutral and isolationist. In part America was wary of a repeat of the First 
World War were some felt the U.S. was pulled into the war based on a need to ensure 
payment of allied war purchases.  The British had defaulted on those payments in the 
interwar period. The American Congress had therefore passed several acts to prevent the 
sale of arms to belligerents as well as deny any loans to nations that had defaulted on debt 
from the previous war (Ponting, 1993, p. 36).  America’s involvement in the League of 
Nations was crippled by Congress’s desire to avoid the affairs of Europe.  President 
Roosevelt, seeking a third term in office, was also not in a position politically to push for 
increased involvement (Ponting, 1993, p. 36).  Roosevelt appealed to the Italian King 
Victor Emmanuel II to assist in resolving European territorial issues peacefully in August 
1939 (Jacobson & Smith, 1970, p. 23).  With the Declaration of Panama in October 1939 
and the Neutrality Act of November 1939 America sought to further prevent involvement 
in European hostilities (Jacobson & Smith, 1970, p. 32). 
The U.S. narrative shift away from strict neutrality begins around May 1940 with 
President Roosevelt’s message to congress.  Roosevelt described America’s vulnerability 
and prescribed of how America should arm itself for defense as well as allow provision 
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of arms by foreign nations.  By September an agreement was reached for the lease of 
military facilities between the British and the U.S. (Jacobson & Smith, 1970, p. 89).  In 
December 1940 in a radio address Roosevelt shifted the narrative further way from 
neutrality describing the incompatible nature of Nazi government and American 
democracy.  He criticized Germany’s appeasers and proposed that to avoid direct 
involvement in the war America had to ensure that the free nations of Europe did not 
collapse.  This is the inception of the arsenal of democracy and the Lend-Lease Act of 
March 1941 (Jacobson & Smith, 1970, pp. 132–137).  American and British military staff 
met in secret to discuss how U.S. and British forces could be integrated should America 
enter the war (Jacobson & Smith, 1970, p. 126).  The Atlantic Charter further illustrated 
that the American narrative was firmly shifting to that of an adversary of Nazi Germany, 
even if not a party directly involved in the war. 
America required the shock of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in order to 
popularly embrace a narrative for war (Fuller, 1949, p. 133).  Even then, Americans 
viewed the war in Europe as an issue for Europeans.  The war in the Pacific was for 
America.  It required a decision by Germany to declare war on the U.S. to bring America 
into direct military confrontation with Germany (Arnold-Forster, 1973, p. 155). 
In a message to congress in January 1942 Roosevelt laid out the argument that 
was essentially the American narrative for the remainder of the war.  He argued that the 
war is about preserving freedom, democracy, and common decency.  He also established 
the objectives of smashing militarism, liberating subjugated nations, and securing 
freedom in the world.  Additionally Roosevelt made assertions that these objectives 
would not be compromised (Jacobson & Smith, 1970, p. 189). 
The British narrative shifted over time as well.  At the beginning of German 
aggression Britain sought appeasement of Hitler.  A combination of weariness from 
WWI, a difficult economic situation, and misinterpretation of Hitler’s full intentions 
placed Britain in a position where immediate, direct confrontation with Germany was 
infeasible, and also seen as not urgently necessary.  As established by Clive Ponting, 
Britain had “too many commitments and too few resources (Ponting, 1993, p. 23).  
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Confronting Hitler directly would leave other parts of the empire vulnerable.  
Additionally, Britain’s policy was traditionally focused on maintaining the balance of 
power on continental Europe by ensuring the strongest power on the continent had a rival 
(Fuller, 1949, p. 24).  If Hitler’s aims were territorial and limited this did not necessarily 
upset the balance and appeasement was preferable to war.  Even after Hitler’s invasion of 
Poland the British, willing to sacrifice Poland, attempted to seek terms with Germany to 
avoid war (Ponting, 1993, p. 39). 
After being forced to declare war on Germany, based on agreements with Poland, 
Britain saw its narrative shift slightly.  If Germany could not be appeased, it must be 
opposed through strength and deterred into settlement (Ponting, 1993, p. 41).  Opposing 
Hitler did not, however, take priority over preserving the British Empire.  Efforts against 
Germany during the Phoney War were peripheral and designed at weakening Germany 
into settlement rather than defeating it (Ponting, 1993, pp. 44–45).  The British sacrificed 
as little as possible in the defense of Belgium and France in order to preserve the 
resources deemed necessary to protect the British homeland.  The battle for France was 
not viewed as crucial.  Maintaining the ability to defend Britain and negotiate with 
Germany from some position of strength was (Ponting, 1993, p. 85). 
After the fall of France, the general British narrative of perseverance until victory 
was well established through the speeches of Winston Churchill throughout 1940.  The 
internal narrative of the government is more complex.  Throughout 1940 the British 
government was undecided about what course to pursue.  The crux of the debate was 
whether to settle on whatever terms Germany offered to achieve peace, or to fight on in 
the hope that Germany would weaken or at least limit its objectives and accept a 
settlement more favorable to Britain.  Basically it was a discussion about how much must 
be sacrificed to achieve peace while preserving Britain.  The argument for continuing the 
fight to achieve a more favorable position won out (Ponting, 1993, p. 119).  This decision 
would necessitate a continued narrative to the public of victory through perseverance. 
The British policy and propaganda response to Hitler’s invasion of Russia 
remained consistent with the narrative of perseverance from the Battle of Britain yet 
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inconsistent with previous views of the Soviet Union.  The Ministry of Information, MOI, 
focused on three primary objectives regarding this.  First, “to disabuse the public of the 
idea that the invasion was a sign of desperation on Germany’s part” (Balfour, 1979, p. 
229).  This was seen as necessary to maintain the people’s conviction, established during 
the Battle of Britain and the Blitz, that the war would be a long and difficult endeavor and 
to undercut the notion that Germany was weak and therefore approachable for a peace 
settlement.  Second, “to bring home the idea that it was a deliberate move, part of a wide 
scheme for world domination” (Balfour, 1979, p. 229).  This is consistent with the 
narrative that Hitler and the Nazi regime were set on the domination of Europe and the 
Western world as is explained further in question 4.  Third, “to discourage the idea that it 
was good for Britain. While it might lead to great trouble for Germany, it was just as 
likely to bring a vast access of resources and strength” (Balfour, 1979, p. 229).  Again 
this is consistent with the policy of avoiding anything that might create the perception 
that a peace settlement with Germany would be possible.  The narrative was inconsistent 
as it began to portray the Soviet Union, out of practical necessity, as an ally rather than a 
threat.  The British had opposed the Soviet invasion of Finland.  Chamberlain had 
described Soviet Communism as the greatest danger and even alluded in the past about 
uniting with Germany against it. Now the narrative would seek to rationalize the Soviet 
Union as an ally. 
The German narrative remained philosophically consistent over the entire war.  
From the beginning it was about correcting the injustices of the Treaty of Versailles as 
noted by Fuller (1949).  It was also heavily influenced by the concept of Lebensraum, 
that Germany needed space to grow and assume its rightful place as a dominant power in 
Europe.  This did not change over the course of the war.  Germany’s objective remained 
gaining territory and influence and then maintaining it.  Germany’s policies and 
propaganda however would flip-flop several times between swift domination of Europe 
vs. a many year struggle against old European powers.  A solid example of this is the 
effect of the hope placed in Blitzkrieg doctrine.  Initial victories in Eastern Europe and 
France established the expectation that victory for Germany would come swiftly once an 
enemy was engaged.  This narrative was forced to change over time beginning with the 
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failure to knock Britain out of the war early and again with the fall of Stalingrad and the 
encirclement of an entire German army in the East. 
Hitler’s decision to attack Russia provides an example of problems coding the 
consistency of the German narrative over time.  Germany had viewed Bolshevism as a 
threat since 1920’s and Lebensraum was primarily viewed as expansion against the 
Russians.  However, Germany’s primary foe up to this point in the war had been painted 
as Britain.  Indeed it was largely the British ultimatum regarding Poland that was used by 
German propaganda to justify the idea that Germany had had war forced upon it rather 
than by choice.  Now the majority of Germany’s resources were to be abruptly shifted 
against a renewed emphasis on the Communist menace, a menace that was firmly 
established as a major theme of German propaganda since 1924, but downplayed during 
the initial stages of the war (Welch, 1993, p. 99).  Balfour (1979) notes that:  
The idea of war with Russia was familiar enough after so many years of 
anti-Communist propaganda, yet the ordinary man had not expected it to 
break out when it did. If the news did not exactly depress people, it made 
them draw a deep breath…But many people complained that, instead of 
finishing off England, Germany was taking on a major new enemy.  
Voices were heard saying that Russia was a large place, while others 
wondered how Germany was going to keep so many non-Germans under 
control. (p. 226) 
Another shift in the propaganda narrative is evidenced by Goebbels’s response to 
a statement made by British Air Marshal Harris explaining the purpose of British air raids 
on Germany.  Initially German propaganda attempted to cover up the extent of damage 
caused by the air raids and to minimize the perception of devastation by the German 
populace (Balfour, 1979, p. 266).  Goebbels eventually concluded that a change in policy 
was desirable.   
He admitted in public that Germany must to some extent stand on the 
defensive in the West as long as her main energies had to be concentrated 
on Russia…Instead of trying to minimize the effects of raids or pretending 
that the English were getting as good as they gave, the line adopted by the 
English during the ‘Blitz’ should be copied…and everything done to 
impress the rest of Germany with the severity of their ordeal. (Balfour, 
1979, p. 268) 
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2. Is the Narrative Logically Consistent (Internal)? 
The Allied narrative was intentionally vague to avoid internal conflict and rarely 
contradictory.  “The MOI came more and more to the conclusion that the best way of 
sustaining morale was to provide plenty of factual information and guidance.  
Propaganda had to be regarded as the natural accompaniment of individual political or 
administrative policies, not as something operating on its own” (Balfour, 1979, p. 70). 
The British’ German Service news was aware that German listeners would be 
listening to British home broadcasts and thus kept inconsistencies between the German 
Service and the Home Service a minimum.  Throughout Balfour’s (1979) study of 
propaganda in WW II, it appears that the British government was keenly unified in its 
wartime narrative.  There was effectively a truce between Britain’s political parties that 
deterred any political activity that was not oriented towards winning the war.  While this 
may have kept some serious political questions from being addressed until the war was 
over, it assisted in keeping the British narrative internally consistent. 
The German narrative could be viewed as inconsistent between what was 
presented to the people and what was presented to the outside as well as inconsistent 
within itself.  A split in German press and propaganda control illustrates this 
inconsistency.   
There are thus good grounds for saying that from at least 1942 until the 
closing months of the war Goebbels had lost control over Nazi policy 
towards the Press and over the handling of news in general…a number of 
important decisions in these fields were taken by Hitler and executed by 
Dietrich [head of the Nazi party Press Department] with little or no 
reference to the Minister [Goebbels] nominally responsible, who 
often…thought them misguided. (Balfour, 1979, p. 109) 
Public opinion reports as referenced by Welch (1993) suggest that Nazi 
propaganda was not able to adequately cover the perceived inconsistency of German anti-
communism with the signing of the non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union.  
Although, German propaganda at this time shifted the focus away from the Soviet Union 
as a potential enemy, the majority of the German public continued to expect war with 
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Russia to occur eventually.  The shift of Russia from adversary to ally to adversary is 
logically inconsistent. 
The narrative used to explain to the German people why war with Russia was 
necessary is well explained by Balfour and also illustrates inconsistency. “The Fuhrer 
claimed to have detected a conspiracy against Germany in which capitalism had been 
allied with Communism and plutocracy with Bolshevism…The plot involved stabbing 
Germany in the back while she was in the middle of her fight for existence by forcing her 
to keep strong forces in the East, thus making an attack on England impossible…the 
quickest route to London lay through Moscow” (Balfour, 1979, p. 227).  Hitler described 
this as the work of the Jews.  Interestingly enough Hitler was correct; an alliance was 
being created between Britain and Russia, but as a response to German aggression rather 
than prior to it.  It is inconsistent to equate capitalism to communism or plutocracy to 
Bolshevism and the common denominator of the Jew is hardly enough to cover this. 
Additionally Balfour (1979) notes “This line of argument…may have 
simplified…the problem of showing how National Socialism differed from both. But it 
ruled out any open suggestion that Germany’s object in Russia was to obtain the raw 
materials and foodstuffs which she…needed to withstand the pressure of the Sea Powers. 
For that would have meant admitting that Germany had attacked Russia, whereas the 
whole emphasis was that the new war was one of self-defence, not of conquest” (p. 227). 
There is internal inconsistency in the narrative regarding Germany’s motives.  Welch also 
makes note of the inconsistency of German propaganda messages during the Russian 
campaign stating “Nazi anti-Bolshevik propaganda was inconsistent and 
unconvincing…the German people had not been prepared for a drawn-out war in 
Russia…Goebbels was unable to reconcile regime’s ideological position that the 
Bolshevik system was reactionary and bankrupt with the failure of the Wehrmacht to 
defeat the Red Army (Welch, 1993, p. 105). 
Goebbels, as Germany’s lead propagandist, was often pre-empted by or at odds 
with Dietrich, the Reich Press Chief.  The latter, often at the urging of Hitler, promoted a 
highly optimistic and offensive oriented narrative that regularly put the claim of victory 
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ahead of the proof of victory, while Goebbels regularly urged caution in pronouncements 
of success and more and more became convinced that the German public needed to hear 
the difficult truth in order to guard itself against failures and setbacks (Balfour, 1979, p. 
282).  This inconsistency existed through most of the war so long as Hitler himself and 
Dietrich as his press secretary were capable of issuing statements of unmitigated 
optimism.  
3. Is the Narrative Consistent Between Words and Deeds (External)? 
Except in cases of deception allied narrative largely presented an honest 
representation of what people witnessed in the physical realm. During the Battle of 
Britain, the MOI Home Planning Committee recognized that “‘the morale of the majority 
of the public who are not in a position to know the truth for themselves depends on the 
amount of confidence which they are prepared to put in official statements and this in 
turn depends on the extent to which the man in the street, when in a position to place any 
check on official statements, finds them unreliable’” (Balfour, 1979, p. 202). 
British German Service news output possessed one primary characteristic.  “The 
view was taken that people who were listening through jamming and at the risk of their 
lives did not want entertainment or speculation…‘our main task at present in 
broadcasting to Germany is to provide not statements of policy, appeals or discussions of 
a post-war world but accurate and interesting information’” (Balfour, 1979, p. 95). 
Political Warfare Executive regional directors innately recognized the need for 
deeds to remain in line with actions in their response to a 1942 plan for a campaign of 
operational propaganda in German occupied areas when they “complained that as long as 
‘we were sitting at home and not doing anything active in the way of fighting’, advice 
and instructions from Britain to workers in occupied countries would do more harm than 
good” (Balfour, 1979, p. 215).  They realized that calling for subversion without also 
providing real support to those involved would have negative results. 
The German narrative regularly and deliberately did not depict what people both 
foreign and domestic were experiencing in their lives.  Balfour (1979) noted that: 
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Announcing victories is…so straightforward that they [German 
government] did not go very wrong while the Wehrmacht was being 
successful…But as soon as mishaps began to make discretion advisable 
they signally failed to display it, as in the claim on 8 October 1941 that the 
war against Russia had been decided, the assurance a year later that 
Stalingrad was going to be captured, the failure to admit that the Sixth 
Army had been surrounded, the claim that the Allies were being driven 
back into the Sea at Salerno, the excessive optimism about the V 1s and 
the broadcast on 21 July 1944 [playing down of assassination/coupe 
attempt].  (p. 121) 
Essentially two major errors in external consistency were repeated again and again.  The 
first regarded premature claims of victory.  The second regarded hushing-up of bad news.  
Both, once realized by the audience, result in frustration and doubt. 
During the Battle of Britain German expectations, promoted by propaganda, did 
not meet reality.  “German Air Intelligence estimated the number of British fighters at the 
start of the battle…they grossly overestimated British losses and underestimated the rate 
of replacement. They also failed to appreciate the extent to which radar and ‘Ultra’ were 
giving the RAF foreknowledge…They were therefore too optimistic about their prospects 
in the air and as a result misled the propagandists” (Balfour, 1979, p. 197).  Additionally 
the press had problems expressing the difficulties involved in a cross channel invasion 
across a distance of a mere thirty-five kilometers. “They therefore failed to see that the 
campaign against Britain was bound to be very different from that against France” 
(Balfour, 1979, p. 197).  This established a false expectation, promoted by propaganda 
and policy, that the fall of Britain and subsequent victory of Germany was inevitable.  As 
evidence counter to this outcome failed to materialize the inconsistency between words 
and deeds increased.  “The German public began to divide into those who doubted their 
leadership and those who took its apparent confidence at face value…The degree of unity 
which had been achieved after the fall of France was lost” (Balfour, 1979, p. 199). 
One solid example from German efforts on the Eastern front where words and 
deeds were misaligned and not reflective of reality occurred during Operation Typhoon.  
Hitler in a speech in Berlin made the bold assertion that Russia was virtually defeated and 
the Soviet Government would have to flee from Moscow.  He further had the following 
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statement made in the German press, “With the smashing of Timoshenko’s army the 
campaign in the east is decided. With these final mighty blows dealt by us, the Soviet 
Union is finished as a military power. The English aim of a war on two fronts will never 
be more than a dream” (Balfour, 1979, p. 239).  Balfour points out that “the presumption 
was naturally created that the war was for all practical purposes over” (Balfour, 1979, p. 
239).  This, of course, was blatantly not true as would become immediately obvious.  
Goebbels himself attempted to defend against this type of inconsistency. 
The German narrative during the Battle of the Atlantic would prove inconsistent 
with actual events as well.  “German claims were always higher than the reality and one 
wonders how far this may have misled them in their general appreciation of the relative 
positions” (Balfour, 1979, p. 272).  In this instance the result of inconsistency may have 
well been not only to discredit themselves to outside audiences but to cause doubt in their 
own ability to estimate the situation in the Atlantic. 
Hitler himself made four open commitments that would be proved false within a 
year.  First, that wherever the Allies chose to land next, following the raid on Dieppe, that 
they would not remain ashore more than nine hours.  Second, that Stalingrad would be 
captured and that the German army never driven out.  Third, that breaking the alliance 
between Germany and Italy was impossible.  Fourth, that the German people had already 
persevered through the toughest part of the war, it would not get worse.  None of these 
statements would be affirmed by physical reality. 
4. Is the Narrative Morally Legitimate? 
The Allies were able to claim legitimacy generally by responding to aggression, 
seeking to liberate occupied peoples, and being on the side of freedom and democracy. 
Chamberlain’s initial appeasement of Hitler ultimately played into the overall legitimacy 
of the Allied narrative. “For the people whom the Government needed to carry with it in 
declaring war were those who would have remained reluctant to face the price of fighting 
until the price of not fighting had been demonstrated” (Balfour, 1979, p. 153). 
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The change in policy regarding Germany that accompanied the replacement of 
Chamberlain by Churchill might be construed as inconsistency over time in the British 
narrative.  However, it may have been absolutely necessary to the legitimacy of the 
narrative for it to have occurred in that manner.  As Balfour notes, “Britain changed 
horses just soon enough to give the nation in its darkest days a leader in whom they could 
feel confidence” and “Churchill, by never underrating what lay before the nation, had 
been building up an ideological ‘fall-back’ position which he consolidated by his 
reference to blood, toil, tears and sweat” (Balfour, 1979, p. 185). 
A document distributed within the MOI as working guidance as to what tone 
propaganda should take stated “‘No peace can be justified which does not secure release 
for Germany’s victims: the right for men to live, vote, talk and worship as they wish; a 
new world which is Christian, not satanic, spiritual not material’” (Balfour, 1979, p. 169).  
This combined with Hitler’s naked aggression and duplicity appears to have resulted in 
firmly establishing the moral legitimacy of the narrative.  Balfour (1979) further 
concludes that “(British) consensus was never seriously impaired. In June 1941, 46 per 
cent of those questioned by BIPO (British Institute of Public Opinion) said that they were 
fighting for freedom, liberty and democracy; 14 per cent to stop Fascism, Hitlerism and 
aggression; 8 per cent because ‘it’s Britain or Germany, them or us’, 5 per cent for our 
existence…Acceptance of the war as necessary generally carried with it the belief that the 
cause was just” (p. 76). 
Goebbels provided evidence of the moral confidence the British possessed in their 
cause through his acknowledgement 1942 that “‘The English show fantastic national 
discipline, especially in war-time. Anything they want to keep to themselves simply 
doesn’t get out’” and “‘A moral breakdown such as we experienced in 1918 can be 
brought about in England only with great difficulty, if at all’” (Balfour, 1979, p. 252). 
The moral legitimacy of the German narrative largely rested on claims to be 
addressing injustices of WW I such as the Treaty of Versailles as mention previously. 
“The German people were reminded…of all the scores which had to be settled” (Balfour, 
1979, p. 183).  Fuller (1949) in his section on the immediate causes of the war notes that 
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others in Britain and the U.S. were conscious of the injustices of the treaty as well (pp. 
17–23).  The harshness of the treaty gave some legitimacy in foreign sentiments to 
Germany’s actions. 
Germany intentionally staged its aggression against Poland to appear as though it 
was responding in self-defense.  What was actually a clandestine operation conducted by 
the Head Office for Reich Security is portrayed as a series of raids by the regular Polish 
Army and used as pretext for invasion. It was portrayed as a matter which should not 
have concerned Britain therefore her declaration of war was an act of aggression.  War 
had been forced on Germany. 
Additional claims of legitimacy were made based on a philosophy of racial and 
political superiority.  Two observations made by Balfour (1979) point out the difficulty 
this presented to claims of moral legitimacy, first:  
democracy on which the Western nations prided themselves was an 
illusion.  The mere right to vote was valueless as long as the rich were in 
control of the government.  The German, by virtue of his ability to 
participate in the Volk community, had much more genuine 
freedom…this…created an inherent dilemma for German propaganda, 
which had as a result to find means of differentiating itself convincingly 
from both liberal democracy and from Communism. The handiest 
argument for doing so was anti-Semitism, which became even more 
important after the 1941 attack on Russia as the common factor linking 
capitalism and Communism. (p. 163) 
Second, “In Germany entry into the war had been the doing of the Government and the 
Party rather than of the public as a whole. Doubts as to whether it was necessary or wise 
were never wholly obliterated and became more widespread when the tide of fortune 
turned” (Balfour, 1979, p. 151). 
 Handling of Polish prisoners and Jewish citizens presented a major obstacle to 
appearance of legitimacy to external audience and to lesser degree internal public.  
Goebbels himself recognized problems with Germany’s claims to a just cause.  Balfour 
comments that Goebbels began to have doubts about how conquered populations in the 
East were treated.  “‘We come as conquerors when we should come as liberators’” 
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(Balfour, 1979, p. 116).  “[H]ow the Germans, if allowed to dominate the Continent, 
could be expected in the light of their record to treat many Europeans” would be a major 
factor effecting perceived legitimacy for the entire war (Balfour, 1979, p. 132).  As more 
evidence would come to light regarding Nazi mass extermination of prisoners, 
particularly Jews, the German cause would steadily lose legitimacy while the Allied 
cause would be bolstered.  German brutality against Slavic peoples in the Ukraine and its 
detrimental effect on the German cause is also noted in Stokesbury’s history of WW II 
(Stokesbury, 1980, pp. 150–160). 
5. Is the Narrative Deriving Legitimacy from Religion, Philosophy, or 
Some Other Source? 
The general overarching narratives on both the Allied and Axis side can be said to 
generally derive their legitimacy from philosophy.  Each participant sought to cast its 
effort as a battle for the future of humanity.  That future would be defined by the political 
philosophy of the victor.  For Britain and the United States it was a struggle of freedom in 
the guise of liberal democracy.  For Germany it was National Socialism, Lebensraum, 
and the superiority of the German race. 
However, each side’s narrative would become much more complex and nuanced 
once Hitler ordered the invasion of the Soviet Union.  Nazism would have to distinguish 
itself from communist totalitarianism and the West would have to come to terms with 
allying with a diametrically opposed political philosophy.  As mentioned before, Hitler 
would attempt to accomplish this by linking a Jewish conspiracy involving communism 
and western plutocracy.  The U.S. and U.K. narrative accepted alliance with the Soviet 
Union on a much more practical and realistic level.  If the Soviets could hold out against 
Germany then Britain’s position would be much improved.  If not, resisting the full might 
of Germany would be difficult (Balfour, 1979). 
There is another layer to the source of legitimacy regardless of political 
philosophy however.  Much of Germany’s motivation to build up its military strength and 
subsequently begin a conquest of Europe was based on the outcome of WW I and the 
terms of the Treaty of Versailles as mentioned previously.  This is very much a narrative 
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of correcting a historical wrong and restoring the rights of the German nation or German 
race.   While this layer of the narrative goes hand in hand with the goals of National 
Socialism, it also helps to define the narrative against Soviet Communism.  A system 
with much in common to National Socialism, but which involved a supposedly ‘inferior’ 
race in the Slavic peoples.  The superiority of National Socialism was not alone the 
motivating narrative. It also required a sense of a historical injustice that needed 
correcting along with a belief in German exceptionalism. 
The underlying layer to the narrative of the U.S. and U.K. was very much one of 
self-preservation and self-defense in the face of unrelenting aggression.  Each Ally was 
slow to respond to early German aggression until it became clear that they too would be 
the eventual target of German expansion.  Their own political philosophy was not enough 
to motivate them to act to counter Germany until a personal threat was perceived.  This is 
still tied to philosophy as it is a characteristic of liberal democracy to postpone conflict 
and seek resolution.  However, the justification of spreading that philosophy by force of 
arms is not established until the U.S. and U.K. conclude that as long as any form of 
German militarism existed, Europe, and perhaps the world, would not be safe.  
6. Is the Organization (Overall) a Network, Hierarchy, or a Hybrid of 
the Two? 
In general German political and military organization was more hierarchical than 
the allies.  Broadly this is the result of the difference between a totalitarian state and 
states more organized as constitutional, liberal democracies.  Militaries reflect the polities 
from which they garner support.  More specifically it is the result of the nature of the 
alliances on each side.   
Coordination and cooperation between Germany and its Axis partners was never 
as effective or intimate as that between the United States and the United Kingdom.  Even 
before Hitler’s violation of the non-aggression pact, the Soviet Union and Germany did 
not coordinate common military objectives or what to do together.  Rather, they 
coordinated merely what not to do to each other and where the lines should be drawn. 
There is little evidence of joint or combined military operations; rather there are 
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operations by each side that were bounded by political settlements regarding Poland and 
the rest of Eastern Europe. Japan and Germany shared virtually no common objectives 
and no political or military cooperation outside of sharing the same enemies although on 
opposite sides of the globe.  Italy embarked on its fateful military ventures with tacit 
political approval from Hitler, but little to no military support or coordination until 
German forces were repositioned to rescue Italian blunders. 
The compartmentalized way in which political and military cooperation took 
place between Germany and the other Axis powers illustrates a tendency towards 
hierarchy. Understanding and decisions reach at the highest levels were translated into 
policy and action, but there is less communication and coordination at lower levels where 
action affects reality.  Hitler and Mussolini may have shared similar goals with respect to 
fascism and its place in the world, but those goals were not translated into tangible 
coordination at lower levels until necessity forced the German military’s hand. 
The manner in which the German General Staff operated during WW II is 
illustrative as well.  Martin Kitchen’s study of the German military provides insight into 
the design and practice of the German high command.  The German military was 
complicit in the rise of Hitler to power in so much as it wanted a highly structured 
authoritarian government and Hitler’s Nazis held military virtues in high esteem 
(Kitchen, 1975, p. 281).  As Hitler’s power increased the German military would 
increasingly be unable to maintain any sense of being non-political.  “An Army can never 
be divorced from the social milieu in which it is embedded, and this is doubly true under 
a totalitarian dictatorship” (Kitchen, 1975, p. 285).  The German military became more 
and more the servant of the Nazi political machine as key positions were assigned based 
on faithfulness to the regime.  Members of the Wehrmacht swore an oath to obey Adolf 
Hitler unconditionally, making him effectively overall commander of the armed forces 
(Kitchen, 1975, p. 293).  This should not be taken lightly by those who are accustomed to 
civilian control of the military in a constitutional democracy.  Hitler was not effectively 
limited by a constitutional rule of law.  The oath sworn to Hitler prevented the Army 
from formally resisting Hitler’s authority on the grounds of serving Germany.  The oath 
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insured that they served him, although some eventually rejected this oath during the latter 
part of the war when they conspired to kill Hitler. 
In 1935, the post of war minister was created and along with other changes in 
organization placed the military directly under Hitler and with no further responsibility to 
answer to the Reichstag (Kitchen, 1975, p. 295).  In 1936, a successful Gestapo plot 
removed Blomberg as war minister and resulted in Hitler assuming the duties himself, 
becoming even more directly in supreme command of Germany’s military (Kitchen, 
1975, p. 298). In 1938 a final reorganization of the high command would result in the 
establishment of the OKW (armed forces high command) and the OKH (army high 
command).  The head of each possessed the equivalent status of a Reich minister 
(Kitchen, 1975, p. 298).  Hitler insured that these posts were held by individuals loyal to 
the regime. This structure remained through WW II and provides some evidence of top 
down, hierarchical control and is depicted in Figure 5.  
  
Figure 5.   German Leadership, 1939–1945 (From Jacobson & Smith, 1970) 
Upon Hitler’s determination to annex Austria and occupy Czechoslovakia, the 
general staff chief, Beck, submitted a report warning that such action would have grave 
consequences for Germany.  The OKW and OKH heads deliberately diminished the 
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impact of the report as it was not in line with Hitler’s vision (Kitchen, 1975, p. 300).  
Beck was forced to resign (Kitchen, 1975, p. 302).  “[Beck] believed that the army should 
participate in decision-making on vital matters of state such as war and peace. This was 
intolerable to Hitler” (Kitchen, 1975, p. 302).  Any further contradiction to Hitler’s vision 
would be muted by Keitel as head of the OKW (Kitchen, 1975, p. 303). 
With the formal outbreak of war following the invasion of Poland the Armed 
Forces Office of the OKW under Jodl became responsible for the conduct of war and 
providing information to Hitler for decisions. “Jodl had complete faith in Hitler’s genius, 
and rarely took advice from other officers…The result was that there was a serious lack 
of co-ordination and agreement at the top of the armed forces throughout the war 
which…allowed Hitler to exercise even more power” (Kitchen, 1975, p. 307).  Hitler was 
additionally able to bully generals concerned that 1939 was too soon for an invasion of 
Western Europe into compliance (Kitchen, 1975, p. 309).  Indeed, “As supreme 
commander of the Wehrmacht Hitler kept a close watch on the army and frequently 
interfered in its operational planning” (Kitchen, 1975, p. 310). 
Through the invasion of the Soviet Union Hitler’s hierarchical control of the 
military effort increased.  Hitler through the OKW overrode the OKH’s estimate that the 
decisive battle of the campaign should be for Moscow.  Forces would be diverted from 
the center axis of advance to the south on Hitler’s personal direction (Kitchen, 1975, p. 
317).  Likewise, as the German offensive was halted and the Soviet counter-offensive 
proved effective, Hitler again overrode the recommendations of his generals that a 
withdrawal to establish a defense was required (Kitchen, 1975, p. 319).  Hitler again 
countermanded his general in North Africa, Rommel, by not allowing withdrawal of 
forces, first from Alamein, later from Tunisia (Kitchen, 1975, p. 322).  A final example 
of the hierarchical control of the military is the ease with which the OKW was able to 
countermand the orders of the Operation Valkyrie conspirators and the subsequent arrests 
and executions (Kitchen, 1975, p. 327).  This is evidence is provided not to judge the 
rightness or wrongness of the military decisions, but to illustrate the firm top down 
hierarchical manner in which decisions were made.  The German system was hierarchical 
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in form with Hitler as the ultimate authority over all arms as well as in function where 
influence was wielded from the top to the bottom. 
As a result of the nature of their political systems, coordination and cooperation 
on the allied side was not nearly as hierarchical as that of Germany.  The United States 
and the United Kingdom both adhered to some form of constitutional democracy where 
various branches of government serve to balance the power of others and the rule of law 
constrains the arbitrary exercise of authority. This in contrast to a totalitarian system such 
as fascism is inherently less hierarchical and does not require elaboration.  Additionally 
opposing political parties were not actively oppressed or eliminated by the ruling party. 
The Allied military organization was less hierarchical than the German military 
organization.  The United States and the United Kingdom combined their military staffs 
over time in an unprecedented manner to achieve the coordination necessary to prosecute 
the war against Germany (Pogue, 1996, p. xii). The structure became more hierarchical 
over time as the U.S. entered the war and the problems of combining their strength with 
the U.K.’s were overcome, but it never reached the level of hierarchy of the German 
structure. The following illustration depicts the leadership structure of the British and 




Figure 6.   Leadership of U.S. and Great Britain, 1944 (From Jacobson & Smith, 1970) 
The manner in which coalition command and the Combined Chiefs of Staff were 
formed and operated is illustrative of this. Overall the “hierarchy of command...included 
the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the heads of 
executive departments which dealt with military matters, and an organization of British 
and U.S. armed services leaders known as the Combined Chiefs of Staff” (Pogue, 1996, 
p. 36).  “The decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff reflected the views of the heads 
of the British and United States governments who…determined major national policies 
and strategy” (Pogue, 1996, p. 36). The President, who attended Allied conferences and 
made decisions regarding general policy, was generally satisfied with recommending to 
the Congress and other Allies the military details as determined by the U.S. Chiefs of 
Staff (Pogue, 1996, p. 36).  The Prime Minister, due to his dual position as Minister of 
Defense, was more directly responsible to the British Parliament regarding the conduct of 
the war.  Thus, was more intimately involved in the workings of the British Chiefs of 
Staff (Pogue, 1996, p. 37). 
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The Combined Chiefs of Staff were responsible for “policies and plans relating to 
the strategic conduct of the war” (Pogue, 1996, p. 37) and consisted of the U.S. Chiefs of 
Staff and the British Chiefs of Staff.  Decisions were typically made in meetings attended 
by representatives of both staffs where proposals from each group could be presented and 
discussed.  Differences were often worked out ahead of time through more informal 
means based on personal relationships (Pogue, 1996, p. 39).  At times the doctrinal chain 
was circumvented by the British Chiefs submitting proposals to Eisenhower as Supreme 
Commander directly believing them more likely to be adopted by the U.S. Chiefs that 
way (Pogue, 1996, p. 40).  Additionally, Eisenhower frequently had lunch with the Prime 
Minister and attended British staff meetings, thus providing additional influence from the 
British side (Pogue, 1996, p. 41).  This was countered somewhat by the command 
relationship between the Supreme Commander and the Combined Chiefs of Staff which 
directly linked Eisenhower to Marshall (Pogue, 1996, p. 40). 
This system was in effect one of strategic command by consensus.  This is well 
illustrated by the proposal and counter-proposal battle between the U.S. Chiefs of Staff 
and the British Chiefs of Staff regarding the scope of the command authority that the 
Supreme Commander would have over air, land, and sea forces for the invasion of 
Europe and the subsequent conduct of the effort against Germany.  The U.S. largely 
proposed a system based on unity of command where the Supreme Commander had 
ultimate authority and responsibility of all forces.  The British generally proposed some 
separation at the operational level between air, land, and sea forces.  Ultimately the 
Supreme Commander would be granted authority over operational forces.  Strategic 
decisions would continue to be made in a less hierarchical manner through consensus 
seeking on the combined Chiefs of Staff (Pogue, 1996, pp. 53–55). 
“The real blame for the blunders [of news and propaganda] lay however not with 
the OKW, but with Hitler.  For it was he who frequently insisted on making his own 
amendments, sometimes changing whole passages on the ground that they were too 
uninformative and literal, sometimes refusing to allow admissions of failure” (Balfour, 
1979, p. 122). 
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7. Is the Part of the Organization Responsible for Achieving Influence a 
Network, Hierarchy, or Hybrid? 
The following chart depicts the structure of state and party organizations 
controlling German propaganda (Welch, 1993): 
 
Figure 7.   German propaganda organization in WWII (From Welch, 1993) 
The Ministry of People’s Enlightenment and Propaganda (RMVP) was 
established on 12 March 1933 and headed by Goebbels (Balfour, 1979, p. 12).  It 
consisted of several subordinate bodies the most prominent being the Reich Chamber of 
Culture (RKK) which was intended to perform the administrative function of keeping a 
register of persons active within its sphere by referencing ancestry and issuing permits. 
The RKK consisted of sub-chambers for press, broadcasting, film, writing, theatre, 
music, and graphic arts (Balfour, 1979, pp. 15–17). 
The senior division of the RMVP was the Propaganda Division.  This division 
was charged with managing the Nazi Party’s propaganda campaigns and had the power to 
coordinate the Ministry’s other divisions for this purpose.  In addition it also prepared 
reports on public opinion.  The Broadcasting Division supervised the Reich Broadcasting 
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Company (RRG) in which the German government had 51% ownership.  This body 
eventually obtained control over the content of all nine regional German broadcasting 
companies (Balfour, 1979, p. 18). 
The Press Division was responsible for managing the daily release of news which 
functionally made it, rather than the Propaganda Division, the issuer of short-term 
publicity policy.  This Division however did not possess a monopoly on the news press 
within Germany.  The Nazi party’s Press Department headed by Otto Dietrich, who also 
served as Hitler’s personal press officer, was responsible for issuing all non-local news 
about party activities as well as supervising the contents of all party papers.  The 
distinction between the ministry and the party department was established down the 
bureaucratic chain to the local office level (Balfour, 1979, p. 21).  Despite this distinction 
that did at times result in rivalry, both entities were arms of the Nazi regime.  The Nazis 
controlled, at least indirectly, all of the German press (Zeman, 1964, p. 43). 
Control over what was printed was affected in several ways.  Negative bans on 
certain materials were established through emergency decrees under the guise of 
protecting security and order (Balfour, 1979, p. 23).  Control was also exercised through 
press conferences held by the RMVP where only trusted journalists with official passes 
would be admitted.  Information designed to produce impressions on the public would be 
issued at a conference and required to be transmitted to editors and others deemed 
necessary.  This information was regarded as secret, was limited in distribution to 
approved persons only, and was required to be destroyed after an established interval.  
These controls along with legal measures allowed the government to effectively “regulate 
their (journalist’s) work in accordance with the National Socialist philosophy of life and 
to keep out of the paper everything calculated to impair the strength of the Reich at home 
or abroad, the resolution of the community, the national capacity for self-defense or the 
religious convictions of others, as well as everything ‘offensive to the honor or dignity of 
a German’” (Balfour, 1979, p. 25).  The overall effect was to bring nearly all non-Nazi 
Party papers under the control of party representatives.  Hitler’s vision of the function of 
the press was as a body that would indoctrinate the German people to National Socialist 
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thinking.  Goebbels “aimed at making the Press ‘monoform in will but polyform in the 
trappings of that will’” by allowing local press some freedom in the way local public 
events (Balfour, 1979, p. 34).  This establishment of Nazi influence over the German 
press is confirmed by Zeman’s account of the state and propaganda (Zeman, 1964, pp. 
43–46). 
The RMVP Film Division gained de facto control over the German film industry 
first by taking over that part of the Ministry of Interior previously responsible for 
censorship.  Additionally, RMVP administrators were placed in key positions and the 
Reich Cinema Law (RLG) introduced as a means to exercise further control.  For 
instance, the RLG required all film scripts to be submitted to the RMVP for approval 
before filming could begin (Balfour, 1979, pp. 38–39).  The film division acquired a 
monopoly on movie production in Germany and eventually the elimination of foreign 
competition (Zeman, 1964, p. 49).  The RMVP’s Foreign Division was never effectively 
in central control of German propaganda abroad.  Rather, the Foreign Organization of the 
Nazi Party under the authority of Hess was more influential.  As a result foreign 
journalists in Berlin received information from two sources sometimes at odds with one 
another (Balfour, 1979, p. 36). 
The Division for Wehrmacht Propaganda (WPr) as part of the Supreme Command 
of the Defense Forces (OKW) was never subject to the control of the RMVP.  The WPr 
was responsible for military censorship, battlefield eyewitness reports and photos, as well 
as directing propaganda against friendly and enemy troops.  The most important function 
of the WPr, and subsequently the one that most directly contradicted the RMVP’s control 
of the press, was the collection and issuing of the daily Wehrmacht communiqué to the 
German national press.  This document was forwarded directly to Hitler’s Headquarters 
for approval and once approved could not be altered before release.  This effectively 
prevented the RMVP from coordinating or controlling much of the military related press 
(Balfour, 1979, p. 104). 
In 1935 the British parliament considered the issues of censorship in war-time, 
issuing of news, and control of news. The subsequent report recommended a Ministry be 
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created consisting of five Divisions: Administrative, News, Control, Publicity, and 
Collecting.  The Ministry function would be to collect and distribute information 
regarding the war and to present the national case at home and abroad (Balfour, 1979, p. 
53).  The resulting Ministry of Information (MOI), after reorganization due to 
bureaucratic resistance from existing departments as well as trial and error, consisted of 
five major sections. These were Administration (finance, personnel), News and 
Censorship (news, censorship, photos), Home (home audience, home intelligence), 
Overseas (allied and neutral), and Production (campaigns, publications).  
No large effort was made to bring the press in Britain under government 
ownership as was exercised in Germany.  Additionally governmental departments 
maintained individual responsibility for issuing announcements within their sphere and 
maintaining their own public relations offices.  In effect, with the exception of foreign 
dispatches, “submission to censorship was voluntary. Any correspondent was free to 
write, and any editor to print, any story they got hold of” (Balfour, 1979, p. 59).  
Censorship as well was split between that imposed by the MOI as well as the military 
service departments.  “The censorship system was thus based on bluff, goodwill…and the 
realization that, if it broke down, a much more vexatious compulsory scheme would have 
to be substituted” (Balfour, 1979, p. 60).  Indeed, “The kind of general publicity which 
the MOI had at the outset regarded as its task was realized to be misconceived and 
unnecessary” (Balfour, 1979, p. 80).  Films were considered a specialized subject and 
remained separate.  British film production remained under private ownership although 
the Ministry of Information exercised influence through the control of resources and 
exemptions from military service. 
Broadcasting as well remained a separate section apart from News and 
Censorship due to the unique relationship that was established between the MOI and the 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC).  No formal control was ever established by the 
MOI over the BBC.  
 The Government, through the MOI, had complete power but chose not to 
exercise it…The corollary was that the key people in the BBC…knew 
what the Government’s aims were, sympathized with them in principle 
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and could therefore be trusted to see that the Corporation furthered them. 
The Government for their part were ready to leave considerable scope in 
the way those aims were realized. (Balfour, 1979, pp. 85–86)   
Considerably more censorship authority was wielded with respect to the release of 
dispatches abroad containing information considered of military value. 
“War-time plans…put the control of all forms of propaganda to enemy countries 
into the charge of a department responsible to the Ministry of Information but distinct 
from the rest of his realm” (Balfour, 1979, p 89).  This department was financed in secret 
and given the moniker of Electra House.  However, the Foreign Office (completely 
separate from the MOI) also managed some foreign news services and never fully 
controlled the BBC’s foreign output.  Additionally, a Minister of Special Operations 
(MSO) was established from part of the Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW) with a 
branch responsible for black propaganda and leaflet distribution.  In order to unify 
foreign efforts at foreign influence and mitigate problems arising from competition and 
lack of coordination the Political Warfare Executive (PWE) was eventually established to 
“conduct all forms of such warfare against enemy, satellite and occupied countries” 
(Balfour, 1979, p. 91).  In effect however the new PWE remained jointly managed by 
three separate ministers with the result that administration was handled by the MOI, 
propaganda by MSO, and subversion by MEW. 
Much like its formal entry into the war the United States would formally establish 
its apparatus years later than Germany and Britain.  Laurie (1996) states that the initial 
response to Nazi propaganda was made by the private sector within the United States and 
largely remained as such from 1939 to 1941.  The Institute for Propaganda Analysis took 
an analytical approach to counter-propaganda and adopted a strategy of educating the 
public in order to protect it against enemy influence.  Academics became involved as 
well with projects such as the Princeton Listening Center that documented and recorded 
foreign broadcasts that reached Americans as well as studied American listening habits 
(Laurie, 1996, p. 32). 
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Laurie (1996) discusses how two competing philosophies arose regarding the 
appropriate role for government in relation to propaganda.  One was cautious about 
government control and felt that properly educated and organized citizens could 
adequately guard against Nazi propaganda.   The other determined that a propaganda 
offensive was necessary to meet the foreign menace and that only the federal government 
could operate internationally and on a large enough scale to be effective.  The latter 
opinion would become dominant partly because it influenced President Roosevelt and 
partly because a deliberate effort was made by its proponents to convince Americans that 
intervention was necessary to counter the Nazi threat.  Roosevelt however remained 
reluctant to establish a propaganda agency based on negative experiences related to the 
CPI during World War I.  The Committee on National Morale, a non-government body, 
would continue to work domestically on counter-propaganda and promote the idea of a 
propaganda counter-offensive. 
In 1941 the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) and Office of the Coordinator of 
Information (COI) were created effectively separating domestic and foreign propaganda 
(Laurie, 1996, p. 63).  It was recognized that “an agency on the Nazi model would not be 
possible…because it would require government direction of privately owned media” 
(Laurie, 1996, p. 62).  The Foreign Information Service (FIS) was the specific department 
within the COI responsible for propaganda abroad.  It included departments that worked 
on print, radio, and film media. 
From its creation until its dismantling in 1942, the COI under William Donovan 
would find itself engaged in struggles to define its role and the proper strategy to pursue 
that role both internally and externally.  Internal differences of opinion between the FIS 
director and the COI chief regarding the nature of effective and ethically legitimate 
propaganda strategy divided the agency.  Externally other departments of the executive 
branch such as the FBI, Department of State, and the War Department would criticize the 
overlap in role and function of the COI with some of their own responsibilities. As a 
result the Office of War Information (OWI) was created in June 1942.  The function of 
the FIS would now be the responsibility of the OWI.  The remainder of the COI would 
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become the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) as a supporting agency to the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff for espionage and subversion (Laurie, 1996).   
The OWI was responsible for both domestic and foreign information activities 
and would organize itself between home and overseas branches, with regional offices, 
with bureaus aligned by media type (film, radio, publications, and news).  The OWI was 
plagued by the scope of its responsibilities as well as by internal divisions regarding 
policy and practice.  The goals of the overseas branch would at times not match the goals 
of the OWI director (Laurie, 1996, p. 113). 
The OSS in its new role would find its way back into propaganda under the guise 
of the OSS Morale Operations Branch (OSS MO).  This branch engaged primarily in 
black and subversive propaganda aimed attacking the morale and political unity of the 
enemy.  OSS MO worked closely with the U.S. Army Psychological Warfare Division as 
well as the British Political Warfare Executive (Laurie, 1996, p. 141). 
Laurie (1996) describes how the U.S. military propaganda apparatus constantly 
evolved throughout the war.  It was organized as the Psychological Warfare Service 
during action in North Africa, became the Psychological Warfare Branch in 1942, and 
formed the Psychological Warfare Division for operations in Europe.  The military 
control of psychological operations would increase and become more coordinated with 
the strategic activities of the OWI and OSS over time.  However, flexibility for tactical 
psychological operations remained under the authority of army group commanders 
(Laurie, 1996, p. 187). 
Overall the United States apparatus for propaganda was less hierarchical than that 
of the British or the Germans.  The creation and re-creation of the various agencies was 
not driven by top down decision so much as by consensus formed after much debate 
between different government bodies and policy philosophies originally voiced in the 
private sector.  Even within the agencies, as evidenced by the differences that developed 
between the OWI overseas branch and the larger OWI, executives didn’t exercise the 
same type of authority as Goebbels over the RMVP. 
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8. Is the Organization (Overall) Speaking with a Single, Overarching 
Voice or with Many Small Voices? 
A means of illustrating the relative number of voices between each side, Axis and 
Allied is to look at the number of major powers in each coalition as well as their 
participation over time. Each partner represents a political voice of the coalition. We will 
see that a transition between the number of voices occurs on both sides. This is 
intentionally kept separate from any idea of multiple narratives that would indicate 
internal inconsistency. 
The Germans entered the war in a firm alliance with Italy and a non-Aggression 
pact with the Soviet Union.   Three is the highest number of voices, based on partner 
nations, Germany consolidated on its behalf.  With the German invasion of the Soviet 
Union, the Soviet voice could no longer be considered as contributing to German 
objectives. With Italy knocked out of the war in 1943, this would become one voice for 
the remainder of the war in Europe. 
The U.S. and U.K. in contrast ultimately gained voices over time. With the onset 
of aggression against Poland by Germany in 1939, Britain, France, and Poland 
maintained a mutual defense pact. Canada would quickly declare war on Germany setting 
the initial number of Allied voices as four. The same aggression against the Soviet Union 
that removed their voice from any support of German objectives added it to the Allied 
cause.  Italy’s invasion of Greece in 1940 would add that nation to the Allies’ number.  
From this point until the entry formal entry of the United States into the war the voices 
generally supporting Allied objectives is six.  The United States even while officially 
neutral could possibly be added as early as the invasion of Western Europe by Germany.  
However for this purpose it will not be counted until the formal declaration of war in 
1941.  Following the Japanese attack on Hawaii the United States officially entered the 
war raising the number of major powers to seven. 
The number of Allied voices was consistently higher than the number of Axis 
voices based on this perspective.  Also of importance is how “in synch” the voices of 
each side were with one another.  The nature of the Axis partnership as noted in the 
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background section at the beginning of this chapter was based largely on identification of 
a common enemy rather than recognition of common objectives or philosophy.  The 
Allies, particularly the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Canada, definitely 
shared a common enemy but also something more.  The political philosophies underlying 
their systems of government were more in tune with one another.  As evidenced by the 
manner in which the Allied command structure was created in the previous paragraphs 
under question 6, the allies were committed to coordinating at a level that was not 
reached by the Axis powers to achieve common objectives. 
9. Is the Part of the Organization Responsible for Influence Speaking 
with a Single, Overarching Voice or with Many Small Voices? 
It is evident from the description of the organizational structures for question 7 
that the Allied apparatus responsible for influence included many small voices under a 
decentralized control.  However, based on the manner in which they operated and their 
tendency to adhere to a single narrative as discussed previously those voices were all 
generally aligned.  That did not mean that opposing views were absent on minor issues of 
how to proceed towards established objectives.  Balfour (1979) states that: 
The BBC in war-time had a monopoly and secure finances, but that did 
not remove the desirability of its representing, within the bounds set by the 
national will to win, a plurality of views.  Had it ever ceased to do so, it 
would have been giving its listeners inadequate reasons for the things it 
wished them to believe…Indeed freedom to differ, and the confidence so 
engendered in the reliability of the publicity media, were important for 
morale and even impressed the enemy who took it as a sign of strength. (p. 
88) 
The German apparatus was much less fragmented and became more and more centralized 
over time.  It was always ultimately dominated by Hitler and the Nazi party, and utilizes 
fewer channels than the allies both at home and abroad.  Some of this was due to a 
similar effect as described in question 8.  Just the combination of the British and 
American propaganda agencies alone established more voices that what remained to 
Germany as the war progressed. 
 149 
 
10. Is the Overall Density of the Organization High, Low, or Medium? 
Germany, as Hitler came to power and over the conduct of the war became more 
dense over time to the point of achieving a relatively high density.  This is to say that the 
number of ties between the various branches of the German government and military 
increased.  The nature in which the Nazi party rose to prominence and the manner in 
which Hitler and other officials maintained control by eliminating opposition and 
appointing loyal party men to prominent positions lead to increasing density. 
Key positions in the German military were given to National Socialists. The 
military became increasingly intertwined with the party and Nazi symbolism and 
indoctrination found its way into Wehrmacht schools (Kitchen, 1975, p. 285).  Hitler 
himself presided over decisions regarding the appointment of generals to key positions or 
the removal of those that were suspect (Kitchen, 1975, p. 286). 
Hitler conducted purges of his opposition.  In 1934, the SS with the support of the 
army executed roughly 200 people labeled as subversives (Kitchen, 1975, p. 292).  
Tactics such as this increased the density of the inner circles of leadership.  The 
imprisonment of millions of German citizens may be said to have generally increased the 
density (uniformity of political ties) of the populace.  This tendency continued throughout 
the war.  As the German military encountered difficulties Hitler continually replaced 
generals whose opinions did not match his own with those that did (Kitchen, 1975, p. 
324).  The Operation Valkyrie coup attempt in 1944 was met with yet another purge of 
the officer corps (Kitchen, 1975, p. 327).  In general the need for Nazi party domination 
of the political/military system lead to cronyism where those closest to Hitler and the 
party elite gained position and power. 
The Allied side poses a similar difficulty to the Axis, in that the relationship 
between the Soviet Union and the other allied powers was much more attenuated than 
that between the rest such as the United States and United Kingdom.  Additionally all the 
allied powers would remain on the same side as the war ended.  The U.S. and U.K. 
possessed common ties beyond just a common enemy.  The English-speaking nations of 
the alliance shared common language, history, and culture to a large extent as well as 
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similar political philosophy.  This, despite the disconnected nature of the Soviet Union to 
the other, places the Allies at firm medium density at the alliance level. 
At individual levels the Americans and British were medium dense as well, with 
the American less dense than the British.  Both nations observed multi-party systems of 
government with government deliberately compartmentalized to balance power and 
function.  There were not purges or removal of opposition conducted as in Germany. 
At the propaganda apparatus level, the British again were more dense than the 
Americans.  As described in question 7, the manner in which the British effort was 
organized around the MOI is less compartmentalized than the system the United States 
would adopt with the OWI, OSS, and PWD.  These organizations as described in 
question 7 would become more dense over time as the British and American agency’s 
efforts were better coordinated the war in Europe progressed.  The allied propaganda 
apparatus’ density in total would begin medium and approach high.  Due to political 
systems, the total number of member nations, and the organization of their propaganda 
systems, the Allies are considered of medium density. 
11. What was the Political Goal (End)?  Was it Achieved? 
The final result for Germany, is that it did not achieve its political or military 
goals.  It gained the territory it desired only for a limited time and those gains were 
largely made through political maneuvering rather than military force.  It did not maintain 
dominance in Europe.  In fact it ceased to exist in its previous form.  However, it is 
important to note that for a time it did achieve and come close to maintaining some goals 
and that goals may change.  Hitler was successful in Austria and Czechoslovakia.  He 
largely succeeded in his objectives in Poland although war with Britain was not initially 
desired.  France was defeated quickly.  The Battle of Britain and inability to invade the 
isles marked the end of Germany’s ability to achieve its political goals. 
The Allies did not achieve an initial goal of appeasement; however they did 
achieve the goal of unconditional surrender and de-Nazification of Germany.  Any other 
goals, were quickly overcome by the friction between the Soviet Union and the western 
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allies over the future shape of Europe.  Arrangements short of armed conflict were 
determined.  The result, much like the manner in which the Treaty of Versailles set the 
stage for the war, would lay the foundations of the Cold War.  
12. What Other Capabilities (Means) Were Used?  Relative Importance 
of the Other Capabilities in Achieving the End? 
Important to note is the relative balance of resources and materials available to 
each side.  Germany sought to gain the resources of the Soviet Union partly because they 
were viewed as necessary to succeed in the effort against Britain.  Indeed once the Soviet 
Union averted defeat and the United States entered the war, the balance of resources and 
material was firmly in the favor of the Allies.  As the war proceeded Germany would be 
increasingly strangled from its access to the resources necessary to continue.  The 
overwhelming advantage in resources and capacity to mobilize those resources that the 
Allies attained was critical to the ultimate outcome. 
Another important factor is the role that air power played.  A role not present in 
previous conflicts.  Germany in the initiation of its campaigns against Poland, France, 
and the Soviet Union sought to destroy as much as possible of the opponent’s air power 
on the ground as soon as possible in order to give the ground forces the advantages 
provided by local air superiority.  Indeed a connection can be drawn between the success 
of the German Army and the status of the German Air Force.  The Luftwaffe was 
significantly weakened by the Battle of Britain and then stretched to the point of 
ineffectiveness during the invasion of the Soviet Union.  The German Army began to 
sustain successive defeats on land as the German Air Force was unable to remain as 
effective.  While this is not strong enough to regard it as an ultimate cause of defeat, it 
suggests some correlation.  Likewise Allied armies in Africa, Italy, and Europe would 
enjoy almost constant air dominance. 
A third factor to consider is the effect of Allied code breaking.  At several points 
in the war crucial information regarding German intentions and their subsequent 
understanding of Allied intentions allowed the Allies to effectively exploit German plans.  
As an example, Churchill was able to provide Stalin some warning regarding Operation 
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Barbarossa as well as to provide continued intelligence based on German transmissions 
(SparkNotes Editors, p. 21).  Signal intercepts played a role in the Battle of Britain and 
the Battle of the Atlantic as well. 
Lastly, the emergence of radar technologies affected the battle in the air and at 
sea.  The Allies were generally able to remain ahead of the Germans in the advancement 
of radar.  This impacted operations from the fight against submarines in the Atlantic, to 
the Battle of Britain, to the strategic bombing of Germany. 
D. RESULTS 
Based upon above evaluations, below is a short response as to how we code the 
influence strategy in WW II based upon our structured questions: 
1)  Is the narrative consistent over time (construct)?  Germany – mostly yes 
(however, there was minor inconsistent nuances over the course of the war, 
especially regarding the “primary enemy”); U.S. /U.K. – no. 
2)  Is the narrative logically consistent (internal)?  Germany – no; U.S. /U.K. – 
no, difficulty in including Russia as an ally, but more consistent as the alliance 
solidified. 
3)  Is the narrative consistent between words and deeds (external)? Germany – 
no; U.S. /U.K. – yes, with the exception of black PWE and OSS efforts.  The relative 
balance being that Germany was much less consistent than the U.S. /U.K. 
4)  Is the narrative morally legitimate? Germany – internally yes, externally no. 
U.S. /U.K. – yes.  
5)  Is the narrative deriving legitimacy from religion, philosophy, or some other 
source? Germany – from Nazi philosophy as well as historical grievance from Treaty 
of Versailles. U.S. /U.K. – from philosophy associated with constitutional democracy 
but initially motivated by appeasement and self-defense. 
6)  Is the organization (overall) a network, hierarchy, or a hybrid of the two? 
Germany – Hierarchy. U.S. /U.K. – Hierarchy but more hybridized due to nature of 
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allied governmental systems.  Formal hierarchies existed, but top down control not 
exercised as strongly.   
7)  Is the part of the organization responsible for achieving influence a network, 
hierarchy, or hybrid? Germany – Hierarchy; U.S. /U.K. – Hybrid due to the manner 
in which the efforts of the agencies were coordinated. 
8)  Is the organization (overall) speaking with a single, overarching voice or with 
many small voices?  Germany – Single voice, Nazi Party; Allies – many voices. 
9)  Is the part of the organization responsible for influence speaking with a single, 
overarching voice or with many small voices?  Germany – Not a single voice, RMVP 
distinct form Party Press; U.S. /U.K. – many voices that would become more aligned 
with time. 
10)  Is the overall density of the organization high, low, or medium? Axis – low, 
Germany itself – high; Allies – medium.  
11)  What was the political goal (end)?  Was it achieved?  Germany –achieved 
initially, but lost by war’s end; Allies – Achieved so far as unconditional surrender. 
12)  What other capabilities (means) were used?  Relative importance of the other 
capabilities in achieving the end?   Relative balance of resources – significant 
importance; Air power – moderate as related to tactical maneuver; Radar – 
moderate and connected to air power; Code breaking – significant. 
The relationship between the construct consistency of the narratives of the two 
sides is important.  The narratives of both sides shifted over time, but it is the timing of 
these shifts, their magnitude, and their relationship to legitimacy that is interesting.  The 
overarching German narrative based on Versailles, Lebensraum, and German superiority 
shifted little over the course of the war and when it did the shift was more about strategy 
than a change in justification.  Relative to the change in narratives that the U.S. and U.K. 
experienced this is minor. The basic legitimacy of the narrative allowed Germany to 
pursue its objectives to a fault.  The U.S. and U.K. on some level recognized the 
Versailles portion of the narrative, but Germany’s aggressive pursuit of Lebensraum 
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would effectively cross a line that may be said to have caused the shift in the British and 
American narratives.  It appears that the relative consistency of the German narrative 
over time was counter-productive, indicating that the ability to adapt or respond to the 
adversaries shifting narrative may be important. 
The British and American narratives shifted dramatically from neutrality and 
appeasement respectively to a shared narrative focused on the defeat of Germany.  Of 
interest here is that the shifts were predicated by Germany’s relentless pursuit of its own 
narrative.  The shifts were reactive and the legitimacy of the U.S. and U.K. narratives was 
dependent upon Germany’s actions to a certain degree.  The U.S. and U.K. could not 
have successfully established the narrative they ended the war with without first seeing 
the neutrality and appeasement narratives fail in the face of aggression. 
An additional observation is that legitimacy is a sort of capital that can be earned 
and spent.  The legitimacy of German actions was exhausted over time through its 
continued aggression with the invasion of France as well as its treatment of Jewish and 
Slavic peoples.  Legitimacy for the U.S. and U.K. was built up over time as seemingly all 
efforts at appeasing Hitler and restoring peace were exhausted and betrayed. 
The relationship between hierarchy and density is interesting as well.  Germany 
started and ended the war relatively more hierarchical and more dense than the U.S. and 
U.K.  However, Germany was initially successful but later defeated.  This may illustrate 
the idea that there is a sweet spot between no hierarchy and strict hierarchy as well as 
between single channel and all channel density.  When conflict began the Germans were 
at a point of hierarchy and density that facilitated success against adversaries that 
possessed too little hierarchy and not enough density to compete.  As the war progressed, 
both sides continued to increase hierarchy and density.  At some point the balance shifted 
when the U.S. and U.K. became hierarchical and dense enough to compete with and then 





IX. COMPARATIVE STUDY 4: THE COLD WAR 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Cold War was the longest major conflict of the twentieth century.  It was also 
the most unique as the primary super-power belligerents, the United States and the Soviet 
Union, never directly confronted one another militarily. The conflict played out more in 
the form of political, irregular, and economic warfare.  Historians generally concur that 
the Cold War began in 1946/7 and ended in 1991 with the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union. 
The origins of the Cold War rest in a combination of the situation in Europe and 
Asia following World War II and the dynamics of opposition of the vastly different 
political/economic systems in the United States and the Soviet Union.  The conferences 
held in Yalta and Potsdam in 1945 placed the U.S. and U.S.S.R. at odds with one another 
regarding the future of Germany as well as Japan (Gaddis, 1997, p. 56).  Both nations 
were highly suspicious of each other and the future design of Europe.  The competition 
for dominant influence affected nearly every nation on the planet. 
The data presented in this study is designed to present a picture of the general 
trends over the forty plus years of the Cold War.  However, exceptions are made to 
address key pieces of specific detail that illustrate changes in the essential status or 
character of narrative and organization as related in the structured questions.  Exploring 
every facet of every corner of the Cold War is beyond the scope of this study. 
B. DATA 
As stated in the methodology section, we are using a structured/focused 
comparison approach to explore the selected case studies.  Thus data is structured below 
as answers to each of our stated focus questions.  Despite the global nature of the conflict, 
the data will focus primarily on the United States and Soviet Union (although other 
theaters of war and countries will be referenced in key points). 
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1. Is the Narrative Consistent Over Time (Construct)? 
The overarching American narrative of the Cold War was that Soviet communism 
was a direct and aggressive threat to capitalism and therefore the western way of life.  It 
originated in a combination of two primary factors, the situation at the end of World War 
II and the political philosophy that the United States was founded on.  The United States 
had just fought a war to defeat German totalitarianism through an alliance of necessity 
with another totalitarian nation, the Soviet Union.  America was uncertain how post-war 
relations were to proceed and Soviet behavior caused concern (Whitcomb, 1998, p. 66).   
The United States still adhered to the political philosophies of individual rights, private 
property, representative government, the rule of law, and a free press that were at the 
heart of the American Revolution and the Constitution of the United States.  Soviet 
communism appeared to be counter to these ideals. 
By 1947, Soviet behavior convinced the Truman administration that the Soviet 
Union was a direct threat to stability and peace in Europe.  This was reinforced by 
George Kennan’s “long telegram” and The Sources of Soviet Conduct.  Kennan’s 
description of the nature of the Soviet Union rested on five major assumptions.  First, that 
the Soviet Union perceived itself as being in perpetual conflict with capitalism.  Second, 
that other competing social democratic movements posed threats to Soviet communism.  
Third, that proponents of Marxism in capitalist states could be used to internally weaken 
capitalist adversaries.  Fourth, that Soviet policy was not necessarily aligned with the 
reality of the communist economy or the views of its citizens.  Fifth, that the structure of 
the Soviet government is what prevented it from achieving an objective understanding of 
itself or its adversaries (Jensen, 1993, p. 17).  Additionally, the perceived failure of 
attempts to appease Hitler prior to WWII by many in U.S. policy circles suppressed 
development of more cooperative strategies (Whitcomb, 1998, p. 73). 
These factors converged and prompted the adoption of the Truman Doctrine to 
support free peoples who resisted attempts at subjugation by militant minorities or 
outside powers.  Kennan’s telegram influenced the Truman Doctrine and was the origin 
of containment, a policy to deny the spread of communism and increase American 
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influence in the world.  National Security Council Report 68 reveals how aggressive the 
United States perceived the Soviet threat to be and put containment fully into practice 
(United States, 1950).  Containment shaped American policy towards the Soviet Union 
for the next forty years until the Reagan Administration. (Warren, 1996, p. 46). 
Historians point out that U.S. policy towards the Soviet Union varied by 
administration between détente and roll-back. The United States engaged communist 
aggression North Korea and pursued the defeat (roll-back) of communism through the 
unification of Korea but failed due to Chinese intervention.  The Korean War ended as a 
success for containment (Ball, 1998, p. 80).  Eisenhower pursued containment during the 
Hungarian uprising in 1956 choosing not to support the insurgents (Warren, 1996, p. 
123–125).  Kennedy with respect to Cuba engaged in both an attempt at containment with 
the support of Batista and roll-back in the failed Bay of Pigs landings (Crockatt, 1995, p. 
194–197).  Johnson pursued containment during the Vietnam War, not seeking to unify 
the country, but to firmly establish a non-communist government in the South (Ball, 
1998, p. 130).  Nixon implemented a policy known as détente based more on political 
realism but still with the intent to contain communism when national interest demanded 
it.  The Vietnam War ended as a victory for communism.  Nixon normalized relations 
with communist China as a balance to Soviet influence (Ball, 1998, p. 135).  Carter 
pursued containment following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (Crockatt, 1995, p. 
288).  Reagan promoted roll back through policies in South America, Africa, and 
Afghanistan.  He also issued National Security Decision Directives 45 and 77, both 
aimed at reducing Soviet influence via information activities. 
The shifts in policy from 1947 to 1991 described in the preceding paragraph were 
not shifts in the fundamental narrative.  They were shifts based on internal debate as 
regards to what strategy to pursue to protect the interests of the free world while 
defeating communism either actively or passively.  American policy adapted to reflect 
what was realistically possible at given points of time, but never accepted communism. 
The overarching Soviet narrative of the Cold War was that American capitalism 
was a direct and aggressive threat to communism and therefore the Soviet way of life.  
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This is almost a mirror image of the U.S. narrative.  The Soviet narrative, not unlike that 
of the United States, originated from a combination of the situation at the end of World 
War II and the political philosophy that the Soviet Union was founded on. The Soviets 
had just fought a war to defeat German imperialism through an alliance of necessity with 
an imperialist nation, Great Britain.  Soviet ideology was firmly rooted in the political 
philosophy of Marx and Engel’s Communist Manifesto of class struggle, the exploitative 
nature of the bourgeois (capitalists), and state control (in the name of the proletariat) of 
property, communications, and transportation that were at the heart of the revolution and 
the founding of the Soviet Union.  American capitalism/imperialism appeared in direct 
opposition to these ideals. 
In the years following World War II, the Soviets saw both threat and opportunity 
in the behavior of the United States.  Stalin perceived an inevitable struggle with 
capitalism and believed it important to solidify Soviet strength in Eastern Europe and 
take measures to prevent Western Europe from doing the same (Ball, 1998, p. 12).  This 
was reinforced by a communication from Nikolai Novikov known as “The Novikov 
Telegram”.  The telegram described an ambitious, imperialist United States that 
abandoned the cooperation of World War II, was building up its military power to expand 
its influence across the world, and could not be reasoned with (Jensen, 1993, p. 3). 
American policies such as the Marshall Plan further intensified the perception that the 
United States sought imperial expansion through capitalism in Europe (Ball, 1993, p. 14). 
Soviet policy towards the United States varied with the tenure of different Soviet 
leaders much as U.S. policy had.  Khrushchev implemented de-Stalinization aimed at 
denouncing Stalin’s terror, ending the “cult of personality”, shifting the economy towards 
consumer rather than industrial goods, rehabilitating former opponents of Stalinism, and 
allowing more autonomy for Eastern Bloc nations (Crockatt, p. 188).  He did not perceive 
military confrontation as inevitable and recognized other means could promote 
communism in the West (Ball, 1998, p.70).  Brezhnev instituted the “Brezhnev doctrine”, 
a policy to prevent weakening of socialist governments by capitalist interventions, 
intervening in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and engaged in a complicated balance of 
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accepting Nixon’s détente while suppressing dissidence in Eastern Europe and building 
the Soviet military (Dunbabin, 1994, p. 20).  The Soviet détente faltered during the Ford  
presidency and ended with the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.  Andropov continued the 
Afghan war, and by 1983 allowed arms negotiations with the United States to end.  
Chernenko, like Andropov, did not stray significantly from the legacy of Breshnev’s 
policies.  The Soviet narrative was consistent up to this point.  It fluctuated with respect 
to about how best to serve the interests of the Soviet Union, but those interests remained 
the advancement of communism and resistance of western imperialism. 
The policies of Mikhail Gorbachev resulted in a shift in the fundamental Soviet 
narrative.  He recognized that the single minded dominance of the communist party and 
the structure of the Soviet government were significantly flawed and could not continue 
to compete with western capitalism (Warren, 1996, p. 225).   A series of policy foreign 
policy disasters (Afghanistan, mismanagement of Poland, Israeli success against the 
Soviet-backed Palestinian Liberation Organization) as well as economic stagnation likely 
contributed to Gorbachev’s view Gaddis,1990, p. 321).  He introduced perestroika 
(literally restructuring) as a concept for reorganizing the Soviet political and economic 
systems to become competitive.  He also introduced glasnost (openness) a policy 
designed to bring improved accountability and transparency into the Soviet system that 
he believed would serve to eliminate corruption. 
It is important to note that glasnost and perestroika were not intended to be 
fundamental shifts away from the traditional Soviet narrative.  Gorbachev viewed them 
as a means to save communist socialism.  Any opening of information or restructuring of 
the system was not an admission of communisms failure.  It was recognition that the 
system had not adequately provided feedback regarding the reality of the Soviet situation 
and that freeing up information was the cure (Shane, 1994, p. 66).  While a narrative shift 
was not the intent, it was the result.  The loosening of information and societal controls 
developed a momentum of its own and shifted the perceptions of the Soviets about their 
own system and world view. 
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2. Is the Narrative Logically Consistent (Internal)? 
The rigid enforcement of communist party doctrine by the KGB revealed a sort of 
logical inconsistency in the dilemmas of conscience that it forced on people in positions 
of responsibility within Soviet society.  Shane (1994) relates the account of Andrei 
Mironov who was brought before psychiatrists to evaluate his mental health in light of his 
habitual association with foreign students.  Diagnosis of “sluggish schizophrenia” was 
often used by the KGB as a means to persecute dissidents.  The enforcement of the 
communist system, a system presented as the inevitable and proper future for humanity 
pressured the psychiatrists to make evaluations counter to the truth (Shane, 1994, p. 24). 
Another example of logical inconsistency is Shane’s account of the ideas of 
Vaclav Havel in describing Soviet thought.  Havel is quoted as saying 
“‘conventionalized, pseudo-ideological thinking…without our noticing it, separated 
thought from its immediate contact with reality…a ritualization of language.  From being 
a means of signifying reality, and of enabling us to come to an understanding of it, 
language seems to have become an end in itself….has gained a kind of occult power to 
transform one reality into another’” (Shane, 1994, p. 53). 
Glasnost contained an element of logical inconsistency as well.  Shane quotes 
Gorbachev as saying “‘Publish everything. There must be plurality of opinions.  But 
plurality aimed at defending and strengthening the line of perestroika and the cause of 
socialism….We are not talking about any kind of limits on glasnost or democracy. What 
limits? Glasnost in the interest of the people and of socialism should be without limits.  I 
repeat—in the interests of the people and of socialism’” (Shane, 1994, p. 66).  So 
glasnost is not limited yet is constrained to the goal of strengthening socialism. 
Glasnost was logically inconsistent in another respect.  The Soviet system and 
freedom of information could not coexist.  The system was maintained by controlling 
perceptions of reality through the control of information.  Removing the controls on 
information undermined the foundations of the Soviet illusion.  Glasnost and Soviet 
communism were logical contradictions (Shane, 1994, p. 72). 
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Some logical inconsistency in the U.S. narrative is found in American support for 
anti-communist authoritarian regimes.  In Cuba the United States tolerated the 
dictatorship of the Batista regime based on commercial interests.  In Iran the United 
States installed and supported Shah Pahlavi, another anti-communist autocratic ruler. 
Enthusiasm for countering communism was at times at odds with the political 
philosophies of individual rights, private property, representative government, the rule of 
law, and a free press. 
3. Is the Narrative Consistent Between Words and Deeds (External)? 
Official Soviet history was riddled with myths, lies, and omissions.  As 
Gorbachev’s reforms allowed for more freedom in publication, Soviet citizens came to 
understand how big the lie had been.  “By mid-1988 so much had been published that 
contradicted the textbooks, that school history exams for the year had to be canceled” 
(Shane, 1994, p. 123).  The media industry sprang to life with articles, books, poems, 
films, and plays revealing the truth about the Soviet Union’s past.  The deeds of Stalin 
and others had been covered in words.  Many people had no understanding of the Stalin 
years, and those that did by virtue of experience saw it varnished over by Soviet 
propaganda.  The Soviets were exceptionally good at distorting the reality of for its 
citizens, convincing them that they lived in a land of freedom and prosperity when the 
reality was much more dismal (Snyder, 1995, p. 96). 
Soviet dealings with the west contained inconsistency as well.  Hook, Bukovsky, 
and Hollander make the case that the Soviet Union repeatedly used peace as a political 
weapon.  The Soviets chastised the United States with respect to the treatment of 
communist movements within America while at the same time suppressing any 
independent, non-government movements within their own borders even when agitating 
for similar reforms (Hook, Bukovsky, & Hollander, 1987, p. 6). 
The Soviet conception of democratic elections is also an example of a mismatch 
between words and deeds.  The communist party held a monopoly and no opposition 
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parties were tolerated.  Only one candidate per position was nominated, and the 
nomination was determined by the party.  This was claimed as democracy. 
Another example of inconsistency between words and deeds is Gorbachev’s 
declaration to the USIA Director Charles Z. Wick that there would be no more 
disinformation. Despite this promise, Soviet active measures continued.  The Soviets 
engaged in an information campaign claiming that U.S. scientists had developed the 
AIDS virus as a weapon to weaken societies in Africa.  In Latin America the Soviets 
engaged in the “baby parts” campaign alleging that children in South America were 
kidnapped in order to use their body parts in transplants for rich Americans.  A campaign 
of document forgery also occurred to attribute questionable activities to the Central 
Intelligence Agency (United States, 1989, p. viii).  The Soviets also published several 
books containing false information designed to discredit the United States (Radvanyi, 
1990, p. 53). 
Inconsistency in the words and deeds of the U.S. narrative existed in the form of 
disinformation, denial, and deception campaigns.  The American information campaign 
surrounding the destruction of Korean Airlines Flight 007 by Soviet air defenses is an 
example of disinformation by omission of information where the portrayal of what 
occurred by the United States did not match what actually happened (Snyder, 1995, ch. 
4).  The information campaign around the Strategic Defense Initiative promoted by 
President Reagan is an example of disinformation through exaggeration of capability by 
the United States.  Reagan sought to convince the Soviets that the United States was 
pursuing technology that could protect the West from ballistic missile attack.  By 
exaggerating the true extent of the development of this capability, the United States 
hoped to force the Soviets into expending additional economic resources (Snyder, 1995, 
p. 120). 
The Vietnam War and the division it caused at home presented a picture of 
America that was at times at odds with the presentation of the United States as a promoter 
and role model of the free world (Snyder, 1995, p. 19).  The North Vietnamese combined 
nationalism with communism in order to expel French colonialism.  American desire to 
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confront the spread of communism put it at odds with the self-determination of Vietnam.  
The protest against the war that emerged inside the United States also portrayed a picture 
of America at odds with its own values prompting Vice President Humphrey to comment 
that the image of America was of “bombs dropping, riots taking place, crime and 
corruption” (Snyder, 1995, p. 19). 
4. Is the Narrative Morally Legitimate? 
Soviet treatment of its own citizens accused of subverting the system is a primary 
obstacle to the moral legitimacy of the communist narrative.  Shane’s (1994) account of 
the arrest and trial of Andrei Mironov illustrates this on a personal level.  Mironov’s 
friends and family were threatened with arrest and personal violence if they failed to 
cooperate.  Through terror, Mironov’s associates were pressured to denounce his actions.  
The inhumane conditions of his confinement, including physical torture, were designed to 
incapacitate him and prevent him from defending himself in the trial.  Cellmates were 
pressured to provide testimony against Andrei as well.  This occurred in 1986, a year 
after Gorbachev came to power (Shane, 1994, p. 34). 
The conduct of the KGB in general does not contribute to the legitimacy of the 
Soviet narrative. Soviet citizens lived in perpetual fear of the KGB.  Countless 
individuals disappeared at the hands of the KGB or at a minimum were hostilely detained 
and intimidated without legitimate cause.  The accounts of writers such as Alexander 
Solzhenitsyn’s The Gulag Archipelago and One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich firmly 
established the inhumane treatment of Soviet citizens, particularly during Stalin’s rule.  
The KGB also suppressed religion through the monitoring, harassment, and infiltration of 
religious groups (Shane, 1994, ch. 4). 
To outsiders the employment of information control by the Soviet Union served to 
foster perceptions of a lack of moral legitimacy.  The banning of books, monitoring of 
communications, travel restrictions, and treatment of Soviet prisoners provided direct 
evidence.  Indirectly the lag in the fruits of information technology available to Soviet 
citizen called into question the efficacy of the communist system relative to the west.  
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Gorbachev recognized this as well as he eased controls on the access to information in an 
attempt make the Soviet economy competitive in an information economy as well as 
shore up the legitimacy the communist façade.  Gorbachev’s reforms aimed at rescuing 
the Soviet system place it in an irrecoverable dilemma.  The Soviet system experienced 
legitimacy issues based in its internal brutality and strict control of information.  
“Opening” Soviet society through glasnost was a means to recover legitimacy, but it also 
revealed just how illegitimate the system had been by revealing previous suppressed 
information regarding brutality (Shane, 1994, p. 45–46). 
Economic corruption was another problem for Soviet moral legitimacy.  The 
account of an investigation into bribery and corruption in Uzbekistan provided by Shane 
suggests that corruption was an integral part of the Soviet system.  Bureaucratic control 
of prices was at the root of the corruption.  “Bureaucrats who are given the ability to 
control prices exercise so much economic power that their own offices become a 
desirable market commodity, and they themselves end up being bought and sold” (Shane, 
1994, p. 95). 
5. Is the Narrative Deriving Legitimacy from Religion, Philosophy, or 
Some Other Source? 
The Soviet narrative derived its legitimacy from philosophy and historical 
tradition.  A key piece of the Soviet narrative was of Marxist-Leninist thought as a 
science.  It was a science that brought rationality to human social behavior and predicted 
the future of social progress.  A required course at Soviet universities was titled Scientific 
Communism (Shane, 1994, p. 54).  Additionally, the Soviet system suppressed religion.  
Despite the revolution Soviet thought was not free of the influence of Russian history.  
Russia was historically threatened by armies from Western Europe and this history 
played a significant role in the legitimacy of Soviet suspicion and aggression towards its 
neighbors.  The framing of WW II as The Great Patriotic War also provided legitimacy to 
the Soviet narrative. 
The American narrative derived its legitimacy from philosophy and history as 
well.  However, religion played a part too.  Many American leaders viewed America’s 
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role as that of defending Western Civilization, a civilization rooted deeply in Christian 
tradition (Kurth, 2003, p. 5).  Political philosophy rooted in self-determination and liberty 
was the history of the United States since its independence from Great Britain.  
Americans had engaged in a civil war where both sides fought for their interpretation of 
that philosophy.  For the Confederacy, it was the rights of states to determine their own 
future.  For the Union it was the freedom of the individual.  Religion played an integral 
role in that history and philosophy as well.  Many who immigrated from Europe had 
sought religious freedom.  American law protected that freedom and much of the 
philosophy of individual rights referenced divine origins. 
6. Is the Organization (Overall) a Network, Hierarchy, or a Hybrid of 
the Two? 
Russia, even before the Soviet Union, had a long tradition of centralized 
hierarchic rule involving strict information control.  Even the Russian tsars had strictly 
controlled publishing.  Russian society did not parallel the Western erosion of censorship.  
The Soviet regime shared the tsarist regime’s fear of the threat posed by information and 
the technologies that spread it.  However, it can be argued that the Soviets took 
information control to a higher level.  The Soviets, in addition to censoring and banning 
certain items, developed a system for engaging the sources that produced information to 
produce what the state wants (Shane, 1994, p. 49).  The United States in contrast had a 
distinct separation between the press and the government.  The government did not 
tightly control the sources of information gathering, reproduction, and dissemination in 
the same hierarchic manner as the Soviets. 
The hierarchic nature of the Soviet government is seen in the account by Shane of 
Gorbachev as young member of the Politburo seeking information regarding defense 
spending and the Soviet economy.  He, the Chief of the Central Committees economic 
department, and the Politburo’s head of heavy industry, who were all members of the 
Kremlin’s inner circle, were refused budget information by the General Secretary 
Andropov.  Information was tightly controlled in a hierarchic manner from the top down 
Shane, 1994, p. 44).  Again in contrast the United States government observed strict 
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separation of powers between different functions of government designed to prevent too 
much centralized control.  Through a distinct separation of powers between three 
branches of government that were required by statute to provide information to each 
other.  Additionally, the existence of a multi-party political system is less hierarchical 
than the Soviet one-party system. 
The Soviet economic system in general gave ample evidence of an overall 
hierarchical system.  The manner in which supply and demand were met is illustrated by 
Shane (1994).  Pricing and production were not determined by demand from below, but 
by mandate from above.  Production was not connected to consumption via pricing 
information (feedback).  Therefore items such as shoes might be produced in over-
abundance, but the sizes were wrong and the styles not desired.  Production of everything 
was set in the Economic Plan by the State Planning Committee.  Prices were established 
by the State Price Committee.  Distribution was handled by the State Supply Committee.  
There was not interconnection between pricing, supply, and demand as found in the west 
(Shane, p. 1994, p. 78).  “It was an economy designed not to generate the stream of 
information necessary for self-regulation but to respond to orders from the regime” 
(Shane, 1994, p. 90).  Again in contrast the economic system of the United States was not 
centrally controlled.  Individual entities were relatively free to associate and conduct 
business in whatever manner was most conducive to economic success.  This is distinctly 
less hierarchical. 
7. Is the Part of the Organization Responsible for Achieving Influence a 
Network, Hierarchy, or Hybrid? 
The Chief Administration for Safeguarding State Secrets in Print provided strict 
guidance regarding what was allowed to be published.  Nothing could be published 
without an index number provided by this agency (Shane, 1994, p. 58).  This is evidence 
of top down, hierarchical control of print media. 
The KGB possessed enormous control over information within the Soviet Union 
and its satellite countries as well.  The KGB’s access allowed it to influence all other 
institutions of the Soviet system.  It was able to a high degree to influence what parts of 
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the government had access to what pieces of information.  It provided information to 
local as well as national leaders.  It could determine what to omit or emphasize.  The 
KGB was self-aware regarding the influence it wielded based on the information control 
systems it administered. It was able to compare the information it collected domestically 
to the information it collected abroad.  The recognition of the need for the reforms of the 
1980s originated in the KGB likely because of their unique position of understanding 
(Shane, 1994, p. 104).  The KGB also played a significant role in the appointment and 
removal of Soviet leadership (p. 119). 
 




Figure 9.   U.S. Information Agency in Relation to the Executive Branch (From 
Henderson, 1969). 
Figures 8 and 9 depict the formal information apparatus of both the Soviet Union 
and the United States.  Both are typical bureaucratic hierarchies.  The figures do not 
depict either side’s state diplomatic service.  However, both sides engaged in traditional 
official state diplomacy.  The role of the United States Central Intelligence Agency in 
relation to the Information Agency is of note.  It is a distinct and separate agency without 
formal authority over the Information agency.  The KGB in the Soviet system is of note 
as it played a central role, through the exercise of internal policing powers, in the 
oversight of Soviet “active measures.”  The Soviet apparatus was more hierarchical in the 
sense of firm centralized control, while the American apparatus exhibited its hierarchy in 
the compartmentalization of functions and authorities between state diplomacy, public 
diplomacy, and the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency.  The nature of the 
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Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the function of the KGB decreased the 
compartmentalization of function and authority in the Soviet Union.  Another illustration 
of the central control versus compartmentalization difference between the Soviet Union 
and the United States is the strict separation between internal and external information 
activities in the American System.  This separation was established by the U.S. 
Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948. 
The implementation of information technologies made the U. S. system distinctly 
more networked than the Soviet System.  The United States Information Agency 
implemented a system known as Worldnet.  Worldnet was a world-wide television and 
information system that established a near instantaneous global network through which 
U.S. information activities could be synchronized.  It was one of the chief weapons of the 
Reagan presidency’s public diplomacy (Snyder, 1995, p. 91). 
8. Is the Organization (Overall) Speaking with a Single, Overarching 
Voice or with Many Small Voices? 
Through the control of the CPSU Politburo, the Soviet Union maintained a single 
monolithic voice to the outside world.  Contacts between non-government voices and the 
West were suppressed.  The Soviets engaged in immense radio broadcast and print media 
campaigns to the outside world through multiple state controlled broadcast stations and 
press outlets.  There were many channels, but one voice (Snyder, 1995, p. 101). 
The Soviet government sought to maintain tight control over voices within the 
U.S.S.R. as well.  It exercised a virtual monopoly on “truth”, and went to great lengths to 
insure that it, not the people, decided what could be read, written, or said.  One example 
of this exercise of control is the distribution by the state publishing house of instructions 
to cut out pages of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia and replace them with a provided 
insert.  The changes removed the history of Stalin’s secret police chief Lavrenty Beria. A 
Second is the suppression of information regarding an explosion involving nuclear waste 
in 1957.  Soviet citizens were largely unaware of in incident at all until reforms under 
Gorbachev permitted the press the freedom to write about it (Shane, 1994, pp. 11–20).  A 
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third example is the implementation of Soviet cable television where signals were tightly 
controlled by government receiving stations (Snyder, 1995, p. 91). 
With the relaxation of control over information sources that occurred under 
Gorbachev new internal voices arose to compete with the previously tightly controlled 
monolithic voices of the CPSU (Shane, 1994, p. 11).  The Soviet human rights movement 
of the 1980s is an example of this phenomenon.  As the pressure of the movement forced 
some relaxation of information controls it opened up more voices not necessarily in line 
with the official one.  These voices in turn placed more pressure for the freedom of 
information allowing for more voices to be heard (Shane, 1994, p. 25). 
The increasing education and urbanization in the 1960s of the Soviet population 
also contributed to the increase in dissenting voices within the Soviet Union.  As people 
became more literate, the audience for samizdat (underground publishing) grew and 
increased its demand.  Likewise urbanization of the population allowed for wider 
circulation of the underground documents also increasing demand.  Increased demand led 
to increased supply effectively increasing the number of voices, in the form of samizdat 
(Shane, 1994, 26).  That Soviet officials recognized the threat posed by the additional 
voices and resulting loss of information control is evidenced by the KGB’s focus on 
arresting producers and consumers of samizdat rather than arresting known public 
dissidents (Shane, 1994, p. 29). 
Economic black-marketeers also added internal voices of dissent.  They were 
dissidents.  They challenged the states monopoly on the economy in the same way 
samizdat publisher challenged the monopoly on ideology.  Soviet communist ideology so 
tightly tied politics to economics that engaging in the underground free market was 
synonymous to engaging in free speech (Shane, 1994, p. 92). 
In contrast, the United States voice to the outside world was always fragmented 
and pluralistic.  The government never controlled the domestic institutions that created, 
reproduced, and disseminated information such as universities and media outlets.  These 
constituted numerous voices that distributed information both at home and abroad.   
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9. Is the Part of the Organization Responsible for Influence Speaking 
with a Single, Overarching Voice or with Many Small Voices? 
In 1987, the Soviet Union employed no fewer than 2.5 million propagandists.  
These propagandists were credited by Gorbachev with conquering the hearts and minds 
of the people for the communist party.  In this respect the Soviet apparatus had many 
voices, but they all focused on the same overarching objective (Shane, 1994, p. 54).  As 
described in the organizational structure of the influence apparatus the Soviets 
maintained tight central control.  While there were many voices, they were all singly 
focused and orchestrated.  The lack of separation between domestic and foreign 
information campaigns allowed the internal and external information activities to overlap 
and blur. 
The reforms of Gorbachev had a similar effect on the Soviet influence apparatus 
as was experienced by the Soviet system as a whole.  State media outlets were less 
controlled and therefore became competing voices over time.  These voices became less 
unified over the last decade of the Cold War. 
The United States influence apparatus was not as tightly coupled as the Soviet.  
The United States Information Agency maintained close ties to the Department of State 
for policy guidance but was not controlled by it.  The Central Intelligence Agency’s 
information activities were often completely obscured from either the Department of 
State or U.S. Information Agency as a whole.  This limited the United States’ ability to 
achieve as monolithic a voice as the Soviet Union. 
Under the Reagan administration the voice became more singular.  Reagan made 
the U.S. Information Agency a key player in national security affairs and promoted an 
increase of capability based heavily on satellite television and increased radio broadcast 
stations.  The net effect of implementing new information technologies was to network 
the information campaigns of the United States in an unprecedented manner.  This 
unified the voice of the American influence apparatus to a greater degree than any other 
time in the Cold War. 
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10. Is the Overall Density of the Organization High, Low, or Medium? 
One way of evaluating the density of the Soviet Union relative to the United 
States is to look at its economic system with respect to information technology.  Soviet 
control of information required suppression of technologies designed to facilitate the free 
flow of information.  Something as simple as a Xerox machine was tightly controlled by 
the KGB.  The various parts of the Soviet economy could not become nearly as dense 
(interconnected) as the American economy simply due to the failure to implement 
technologies that speed up the exchange and duplication of information (Shane, p. 64).  
This same effect based on information technologies that connect various parts of society 
had similar effects upon the organization of each side’s societal institutions.  The net 
result is that the United States as a whole, both publicly and privately, was more dense 
than the Soviet Union. 
11. What was the Political Goal (End)?  Was it Achieved? 
In the early years of the Cold War the Soviet Union succeeded in solidifying the 
Eastern Bloc under communist control.  However, it did not succeed in denying Berlin to 
the West or in preventing the unification of the occupied zones into West Germany.  It 
was also unable to prevent the industrial and economic rehabilitation of free Europe 
under the Marshall Plan. 
The United States was able to stem the rise of communism in Western Europe by 
revitalizing the economy, but it was unable to ensure the self-determination of those 
nations it had earlier sought to free from Nazi domination as they fell to communist 
domination.  West Germany was combined and established as a strong point against 
Soviet expansion. 
The Korean conflict ended in stalemate.  The domain of communism was not 
expanded, but this was not necessarily a Soviet goal.  It may be viewed as a success for 
the United States’ objective of containment, but the attempt to roll back communism and 
unify Korea failed. 
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The Vietnam War ended in failure for the United States and was an indirect, but 
significant, victory for the Soviet Union.  Other indirect conflicts across the third world 
ended in mixed results for both sides.  The Soviets were defeated in Afghanistan, an 
indirect victory for the United States. 
In 1991 the Soviet Union ceased to exist. This was a clear Cold War victory for 
the United States.  The original U.S. objectives of the Cold War were formed in National 
Security Council Report 20/4 and were re-affirmed in National Security Council Report 
68.  Through the forty plus years of the Cold War these objectives were obtained with 
varying degrees of success.  With the dissolution of the Soviet Union all were achieved or 
made unnecessary. 
12. What Other Capabilities (Means) Were Used?  Relative Importance 
of the Other Capabilities in Achieving the End? 
Nuclear deterrence played a defining role in the Cold War.  Through the adoption 
of a doctrine of mutually assured destruction the United States and Soviet Union locked 
the Cold War into almost perpetual stalemate.  This theory of deterrence prevented either 
side from initiating direct armed conflict, but it also ensured that neither side could 
pursue unilateral disarmament.  It also pushed each side towards pursuing irregular 
warfare.  These irregular wars were played out through the major crisis of the Cold War 
and characterize the “hot” portion of the Cold War.  The Vietnam and Afghanistan wars 
caused internal dissent in the United States and Soviet Union respectively causing 
internal publics to question the basic narratives of each nation. 
The rapid advance of technology also played an integral role in the Cold War.  
This is most evident in the space race and arms race that the United States and Soviet 
Union engaged in.  The early lead of the Soviet Union in the space race with the launch 
of Sputnik prompted the United States to fast forward its own space program.  This 
yielded additional advances in technology for the United States that were applied across 
society.  It also yielded technology integral to the pursuit of anti-ballistic missile 
capability.  The Soviet Union would spend disproportionate resources attempting to 
compensate for this perceived technology gap. The net result was that the Soviet Union in 
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the 1980’s found itself distinctly behind in the adaptation of technology and particularly 
information technology that was increasing the productivity and quality of life of the 
United States. 
C. RESULTS 
Based upon above evaluations, below is a short response as to how we code the 
influence strategy in the Cold War based upon our structured questions: 
1)  Is the narrative consistent over time (construct)? Soviet Union – yes 
(although they lost control of the narrative with Gorbachev’s reforms); United 
States – yes (however, the element of plurality and liberalism in the narrative 
allowed it to be more inclusive than the Soviet). 
2)  Is the narrative logically consistent (internal)? Soviet Union – no; United 
States – yes (support for totalitarian regimes does not completely override validity 
of anti-communism).  
3)  Is the narrative consistent between words and deeds (external)? Soviet Union 
– no; United States – qualified yes ( there was some inconsistency due to U.S. 
support of authoritarian leaders, this was required to maintain consistency in our 
messaging and support of anti-communist regimes). 
4)  Is the narrative morally legitimate? Soviet Union – no (legitimacy with 
internal public was maintained by coercion until Gorbachev reforms); United States 
– yes (Vietnam was low-point of legitimacy, but did not override overall legitimacy). 
5)  Is the narrative deriving legitimacy from religion, philosophy, or some other 
source? Soviet Union – philosophy, history; United States – philosophy, history (with 
religious undertone). 
6)  Is the organization (overall) a network, hierarchy, or a hybrid of the two? 
Soviet Union – hybrid leaning towards hierarchy based on authoritarian control; 




7) Is the part of the organization responsible for achieving influence a network, 
hierarchy, or hybrid? Soviet Union – hierarchy under CPSU control; United States – 
hierarchy in form, but more networked in practice due to the use of information 
technologies. 
8)  Is the organization (overall) speaking with a single, overarching voice or with 
many small voices? Soviet Union – single voice until Gorbachev reforms; United 
States – many voices due to nature of open society. 
9)  Is the part of the organization responsible for influence speaking with a single, 
overarching voice or with many small voices? Soviet Union – single voice; United 
States – more than one voice whose message became more unified under the Reagan 
administration. 
10)  Is the overall density of the organization high, low, or medium? Soviet 
Union less dense than the United States based on character of economic and social 
systems and implementation of information technology. 
11)  What was the political goal (end)?  Was it achieved? Soviet Union – no; 
United States – yes. 
12)  What other capabilities (means) were used?  Relative importance of the other 
capabilities in achieving the end?  Nuclear deterrence – significant; Information 
technology – significant. 
The internal and external inconsistency of the Soviet narrative was overcome 
during most of the Cold War by the tight central control placed on information inside the 
country.  Construct consistency was necessary to suppress the negative effect on 
legitimacy of the mismatch between Soviet words and reality as well as the logical 
absurdity of the Soviet system.  The same consistency over time that maintained control 
of Soviet internal legitimacy was also integral to the rapid decentralization of information 
that occurred under Gorbachev and the subsequent loss of control of the narrative by the 
Soviets.  So much had been disguised for so long that when the cracks in the construct 
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were revealed there was no space left for minor adjustments that could maintain the 
legitimacy of the narrative. 
In contrast, the relative internal and external consistency of the United States 
narrative played a part in maintaining construct consistency.  As a more open and 
decentralized organization the United States allowed critical voices to be heard and 
become a reinforcing part of the overall narrative rather than a destructive force.  The 
pressure of inconsistencies was vented and the fact that venting was allowed turned into 
evidence of the legitimacy of the overall narrative. 
Each side dealt with low points in their legitimacy.  For the United States it was 
the Vietnam War.  For the Soviets it was the war in Afghanistan.  The timing of these 
with respect to information technology is of interest.  During the Vietnam War video 
recording technology had a significant impact on perceptions of the war and therefore 
legitimacy, although the nature of the content was also important.  The Soviets 
experienced a similar effect in their war in Afghanistan.  However, by the 1980s the 
portability and reproducibility of video was greatly advanced and capitalized on by the 
United States in its information campaigns. 
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X. CASE STUDY 5: U.S. VERSUS TRANS-NATIONAL JIHADI 
TERRORISTS 
A. BACKGROUND 
Transitioning from the Cold War to the war against trans-national jihadi terrorists, 
we should note immediately that one of the lasting legacies of the Cold War was the 
development of nuclear weapons.  The technology of nuclear weapons had a major 
impact upon the political end-state of the Cold War, but not because of the technology 
itself.  The sheer destructiveness of nuclear weapons did not allow either side to use them 
militarily to achieve their desired end-states; thus, nuclear deterrence forced the conflict 
to be fought primarily through the other elements of national power, especially the 
information component and the competing narratives.  This is significant for future 
analyses as the continued existence of nuclear weapons will serve primarily to constrain 
all future conflicts below a certain technological level indicating that the narrative will 
continue to gain in importance during the information age.  This factor is apparent in the 
current case study.  As cited earlier, the “QDR acknowledges that victory…depends on 
information, perception, and how and what we communicate as much as application of 
kinetic effects” (United States, 2006b, p. 230).  This realization is key in the strategy by 
trans-national jihadis as exemplified in the oft used quote by Ayman al-Zawahiri: “We 
are in the midst of war, and more than half of that struggle takes place on an information 
battlefield; we are in an information war for the hearts and minds of all Muslims” (as 
quoted by Robinson, 2007, p. 86).  Robinson (2007) continues to state that the “austere 
and puritanical ideal society, ruled by authoritarian means has no appeal for the vast 
majority of Muslims…The relative success they have enjoyed despite the unpopularity of 
their view…can be attributed largely to their innovative and nimble information strategy” 
(p. 86).   
First, we must define what we mean by the term ‘trans-national jihadi terrorists’.  
As discussed by Hegghammer (2009), ‘jihadism’ or ‘jihadi’ are the most widely-used 
words used today to describe radical Islamism and are used primarily to distinguish 
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violent actors from nonviolent, democratic, or progressive Islamists.  However, 
Hegghammer also acknowledges the problem with associating the word Jihad with 
violence and terrorist action, namely: the widespread belief within the Muslim 
community that Jihad represents a noble religious struggle, not illegitimate violence.  
1For this reason, Muslims refer to militant Islamists as either terrorists, irhabiyyun; 
Kharijites, khawarij; deviants, munharifun; or the Misled Sect, al-fi'a al-dhalla 
(Hegghammer, 2009).  Additionally, different and opposing trends in modern Islamic 
thought, Islamism, fundamentalism, Salafism, neo-Salafism, Wahhabism, jihadism, 
political Islam, Islamic radicalism and others, are often mistakenly lumped together 
(Moussalli, 2009).  However, there are several strands of Islamic thought which 
differentiate groups in their connotations, discourses, and actions.  The discontented 
either look to reform Islam or look to revert back to the way things were with the 1st 
generation of Muslims (al-salaf) including stricter interpretations of religious law and 
how it fits with society.  Even so, only a small proportion of these individuals from either 
the reformers/islamists or the Salafi/Wahhabi are “jihadi.”  (See Figure 10, note: the 
figure is a notional construct based upon our own interpretation of Moussalli (2009)).  
 
Figure 10.   Strands of Islamic thought 
                                                 
1 Note, we will always capitalize the authentic, religious interpretation of Jihad to differentiate it from the use of 




For the purposes of this chapter, we will follow the precedent set by Lia (2009) 
who adopts the definition provided by Abu Mus’ab al-Suri (a key, outspoken, and 
articulate writer within jihadi thought, as well as an al-Qaeda theorist and strategist), 
namely:  
It comprises organisations, groups assemblies, scholars, intellectuals, 
symbolic figures, and the individuals who have adopted the ideology of 
armed jihad against the existing regimes in the Arab-Islamic world on the 
basis that these are apostate regimes ruling not by what Allah said…, by 
legislating without Allah, and by giving their loyalty and assistance to the 
various infidel enemies of the Islamic Nation.  The Jihadi current has also 
adopted the program of armed jihad against the colonialist forces which 
attack Muslim lands on the basis that those regimes are allies fighting 
Islam and Muslims. (pp. 281–282)  
By doing so, we avoid conflating the jihadi current with specific categories, sects of 
Islam, and other arbitrary categorizations such as Sunni, Shi’a, Wahhabi, Salafi, 
moderates, radicals, takfirs, etc.  We also avoid conflating the jihadi current with specific 
terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda who have expanded the jihadi concept into a trans-
national phenomenon.  Of the jihadis, an even smaller proportion are trans-national jihadi 
terrorists like al-Qaeda.  Robinson (2007) categorizes jihadis into four distinct categories 
based upon two variables; first, if the focus of ideology is national or trans-national in 
scope and second, whether the locus of violence is national or trans-national in scope.  
Based upon this, he differentiates between four categories: traditional jihadi groups (e.g. 
GIA, Syrian Muslim Brethren); nationalist jihadi groups (e.g. Hamas, Chechnya, Iraq); 
transnational groups (e.g., al-Qaeda); and al-Qaeda franchise groups, which have a 
transnational focus of ideology, but who focus the locus of their violence nationally.  For 
the purposes of our analysis we focus primarily on al-Qaeda, which is trans-national in 
both focus of ideology and locus of violence, but do not exclude al-Qaeda franchise 
groups, which share the same trans-national focus of ideology, but are constrained in 




As stated in the methodology section, we are using a structured/focused 
comparison approach to explore the selected case studies.  Thus data is structured below 
as answers to each of our stated focus questions. 
1. Is the Narrative Consistent Over Time (Construct)? 
Some academics have explored the inconsistencies between the narratives of the 
past versus the present, for instance, Bonner explores the central theme of Jihad as it has 
evolved or morphed throughout time focusing on the origins prior to Muhammad through 
to modern history.  In his examination, it is clear that the evolution or morphing is not 
consistent.  “Most of the jihad’s basic elements are already present in the Quran, 
including the doctrine on martyrdom, the divine reward, and exhortations to take up arms 
for the sake of religion and God” (Bonner, 2006, p. 104).  However, we “now see that 
there was disagreement among the major intellectual centers of the early Islamic world 
over the jihad” (p.106).  The “doctrine of jihad, including the distinction between 
individual and collective obligation; the insistence on religiously correct intention on the 
part of the person performing jihad; the insistence on the supervision of the imam or his 
representative, especially in offensive warfare…many of the underlying tensions were 
never completely resolved” (p. 169).  “Are these jihadists of today the direct heirs of the 
raiders and ghazis of the Abbasid, Ottoman, and other premodern Islamic empires and 
states?  For a number of reason, the answer seems to be ‘no’” (p. 171).  “Yet the most 
urgent question for the radical jihadists and, beyond them, for fundamentalists of all 
kinds…is how to create a link with an authentic Islamic past and recover an authentic 
Islamic practice” (p. 172).  Based upon Bonner, the construct consistency has morphed 
and evolved over time partly to suit the needs of the community, justify political/military 
action, or in response to intellectual and theological discourse.   
While the concept of Jihad has evolved over time, the “formulation of jihadi 
ideology is of recent origin” with the ideological founder of Sunni Arab jihadism, Sayyid 
Qutb (Robinson, 2007, p. 87).  Robinson notes that Qutb started a process of ideological 
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innovation where instead “of creating new vocabularies, jihadists radically reinterpret 
existing, and culturally authentic, concepts and institutions” (p. 88).  There are many such 
examples, but two that we will highlight, from Robinson (2007), is Jihad and Jahiliyya.  
Jahiliyya traditional refers to the historical time prior the prophet Muhammad which is 
viewed as a period of ignorance and barbarism prior to the revelation by God’s final 
prophet.  This was reinterpreted by Qutb to refer, not only to the chronological period, 
but also to any modern states or institutions that are characterized by immoral and 
licentious behavior or governments based upon secular governments vice sharia law.  
Similarly Jihad, which primarily refers to either a personal, religious struggle to resist 
temptation, “greater Jihad”, or a defensive “holy war”, lesser Jihad”, has been 
transformed to raise the status of Jihad “to that of the five traditional pillars of Islam (the 
testament of faith, prayer, fasting, charity, and pilgrimage)…situated at the center of 
Islam” (Robinson, 2007, p. 89).  The ideological innovation also rejects the strict 
interpretation of Jihad as a defensive struggle and states that it is obligatory for every 
individual Muslim (highlighted by bin Laden’s fatwa for every Muslim to kill Americans 
and Jews).  This process of ideological innovation amplifies the changing construct of the 
narrative over time in an attempt to justify, and legitimize, the jihadi narrative. 
There have been multiple reasons given as to why the U.S. is involved in the fight 
against trans-national jihadi terrorists, specifically in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq, 
many of which have shifted over time.  The initial narrative is that Afghanistan was a 
safe haven for the terrorist organization that had perpetuated the September 11 terrorist 
attack against the U.S.  However, in 2003, the narrative shifted with the U.S. invasion in 
Iraq.  Although some interpreted the underlying narrative as U.S. desire for control over 
oil or as unfinished business for the Bush family after the Gulf War, Deputy of Defense 
Secretary Paul Wolfowitz described the U.S. narrative against trans-national jihadi 
terrorism, specifically the decision to invade Iraq by stating:  
The truth is that for reasons that have a lot to do with the U.S. government 
bureaucracy we settled on the one issue that everyone could agree on 
which was weapons of mass destruction as the core reason, but [...] there 
have always been three fundamental concerns. One is weapons of mass 
destruction, the second is support for terrorism, the third is the criminal 
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treatment of the Iraqi people. Actually I guess you could say there's a 
fourth overriding one which is the connection between the first two. (U.S. 
Department of Defense: News Transcript, 2003) 
But UN inspections revealed no weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq and 
no clear ties between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda.  At that point the narrative shifted 
again to one of democracy and freeing the people of Iraq and Afghanistan from 
oppressive regimes.  The narrative specifically in Afghanistan shifted from destruction of 
the al Qaeda network and bin Laden to a narrative of democracy and freedom for the 
oppressed Afghanis (including women) from the authoritarian regime of the Taliban who 
had regained control of much of Afghanistan.  So the U.S. construct consistency has 
shifted over time.  Although the latter shift appears to hold greater moral authority at face 
value, it has actually created problems with internal and external consistency in the U.S. 
narrative, thereby undermining the force of moral legitimacy as will be explored in the 
following sections.  Ultimately, the U.S. needs to understand and rely on staying “on a 
path most consistent with American grand strategy since the dawn of the republic…‘not a 
crusade for democracy…[but rather]…the fundamental liberties which the world has 
established’” (Arquilla, 2009, p. 58). 
2. Is the Narrative Logically Consistent (Internal)? 
Qutb articulated the essential characteristics of the Islamic vision in his writings.  
One of these essential characteristics is constancy (thabat) which serves as a bulwark 
against Westernization and “both guarantees the integration and harmony of Muslim life 
with that of the order of the universe” (Haddad, 1983, p. 75).  Needless to say, for Qutb, 
God is the only true source of constancy.  In conjunction with this is the principle of 
comprehensiveness (shurmul).  Since the Islamic vision is comprehensive, it “rejects 
every foreign element” which may corrupt it (p. 76).  This is the other side of the 
consistency coin.  Brooke (2008) explores how Islamists and jihadis were “fractured” 
based upon how they defined and applied the concepts of Takfir, or the importance of 
focusing on the “near” enemy versus the “far” enemy.  These debates show that there 
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were “serious and sustained conflicts over strategy inside the jihadist 
movement…[which]…illustrates the diversity of the movement” (p. 219).   
Additionally, the decision by bin Laden and Zawahiri to focus on and attack the 
US created new divisions and amplified existing ones.  “Not all jihadis thought alike and 
acted in unison…jihadis were deeply splintered and segmented along charismatic 
personalities and regional affiliations.  There existed considerable competition and rivalry 
among various jihadi factions, whereby each set up its own shop and guest houses and 
tried to recruit more men and expand further” (Gerges, 2009, p. 99).  “Differences and 
divisions existed not only among jihadis but also between the jihadis and mainstream 
traditional Islamists” (p. 109)  “Bin Laden reportedly argued that internal strife alienated 
the ummah, whose support was urgently needed…On this score, bin Laden was more 
consistent than Zawahiri and other religious nationalists who subsequently changed 
camps” (p. 144).  Hani al-Sibai criticizes al-Jama’a for vacillating like a pendulum from 
one extreme to the other and states “How do we trust a group that overnight changes its 
color from black to white and then white to black?  How are we to take its revisions 
seriously” (p. 214)?  Another critic claims that this collective repentance by the al-Jama’a 
group undermines the credibility of the historical leadership.  “Like other jihadis’ 
critiques of Al Qaeda, Zayat’s reinforces the existence of deep fault lines among their 
ranks…The critical question is…whether [Zayat’s]…narrative is credible and 
consistent…his critique tallies with those of other jihadis and is historically consistent” 
(p. 223). 
Lia (2009) observes that broadly “speaking one may identify two tendencies 
within the Jihadi current…This divide…is…better described as a spectrum, or a 
continuum, of positions, defined by two extreme positions. On the one extreme were the 
Salafi purists for whom doctrinal purity was of quintessential importance, even if it meant 
fighting side-battles, alienating allies, and shattering any semblance of a common 
front…At the other extreme were semi-independent thinkers and strategists like al Suri, 
whose main preoccupation was strategy, i.e. the ways in which [the] Jihadi current can 
fight its enemy most effectively” (p. 282).  Here we have a basic example of 
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inconsistency within the jihadi narrative in the form of disagreement between pure 
religious fundamentalists and more practical “fighting” jihadis.  Lia presents two cases 
where friction between jihadis in the form of ideological dispute causes more division 
than unity which “suggest that the spread of purist Salafi doctrines in the jihadi current, 
rather than being a source of strength and renewal, has instead constituted a considerable 
obstacle to jihadi mobilization, and has more often than not served to handicap and 
cripple Jihadi groups by embroiling them in schisms and internal conflicts” (p. 283).  
Additionally, “the Jihadi movement did not have a well-established and unified 
ideological foundation, separate from the Salafi school; its ideological character was 
multifaceted, evolving, and open for new influences.” (Lia, 2009, p. 285).  A quote from 
al-Suri reveals the schisms in the internal narrative: “one of the most intractable 
contentious issues…because at the end of the day, it will constitute an entry point for 
divisiveness, partyism, and intolerant jurisprudence, which in turn breeds fanaticism in 
the domain of political ideology as well as in organisational terms within the Jihadi 
movement itself” (Lia, 2009, p. 288).  Al-Suri’s opposition to the ideological rhetoric of 
Abu Qutada further points to inconsistency within the jihadi narrative as he accuses the 
Salafi cleric of alienating virtually all other schools of Islamic thought. Lia’s illustration 
of the controversy over the Taliban’s legitimacy as experienced by al-Suri is likely one of 
the most damning examples of the physically negative effects that result from internal 
disputes over ideology (narrative).  “There were significant differences in religious 
observance and practices between the Arab volunteer fighters…and the Afghan 
resistance…[jihadis] soon became embroiled in tense ideological disputes over whether 
the Taliban regime should be considered an Islamic Emirate for which it was worth 
fighting and to which emigration was obligatory.” (p. 294).  “Despite their rhetorical 
pronouncements of solidarity and unity…Arabs looked with contempt and shock at the 
localized ‘primitive’ and ‘diluted’ religious practices of the Afghanis…At the heart of 
these differences lay a bigger moral clash between Afghanis’ homegrown, nuanced 
traditions…and fundamentalist interpretation” (Gerges, 2009, p. 83).  
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Finally, the “Salafi problem was not simply a disturbing factor in the Arab-
Afghan community’s relationship with the Taliban. It also threatened al-Qaeda’s 
legitimacy as bin Laden moved to solidify his alliance with Mullah ‘Umar.” (Lia, 209, p. 
297). “Al-Suri and those Arab-Afghans who wished to make the Taliban a pillar of their 
jihadi project had clearly failed, not only because they fought an uphill battle against the 
Taliban’s external enemies, but perhaps even more so because of the sizeable anti-
Taliban opposition within the Jihadi currents themselves, let alone the general 
condescending Arab attitude towards the Islamic Emirate.” (p. 298).  “Interestingly, jihad 
is supposed to remedy the problems of discord and chaos, or fitna, both at the individual 
and societal levels.  Yet, jihadists have used the concept of jihad in a way that has 
enhanced internal discord within the Muslim community” (Robinson, 2007, p. 90) 
The U.S. narrative also suffered heavily from an inconsistency in its internal 
logic.  One such example in Afghanistan was “our close association with the Northern 
Alliance—seen by many as brutal Russian proxies in the Afghan civil war [which] made 
it hard to portray the campaign as a straight liberation.  This point was only reinforced 
when some members of the Northern Alliance…were perceived to behave in corrupt 
ways and to resort to violence to consolidate their positions” (Arquilla, 2009, p. 23).  Our 
“association with leaders long perceived to be corrupt in their wielding of power has 
made democracy a hard ‘brand’ to sell to the Afghan people” (Arquilla, 2009, p. 25).  
This logical inconsistency exists throughout our narrative to the Muslim world as the 
U.S. continues to proclaim democracy while ostensibly supporting autocratic regimes (a 
point which falls both within internal inconsistency and external inconsistency, and will 
be expounded upon further in the following section). 
3. Is the Narrative Consistent Between Words and Deeds (External)? 
 “According to the Gallup Poll, 7% of respondents think that the 9/11 attacks were 
‘completely’ justified and view the United States unfavorably.  Among those who believe 
that the 9/11 attacks were not justified, whom we’ll call ‘moderates,’ 40% are pro-United 
States, but 60% view the United States unfavorably” which suggests that even those who 
may generally agree with jihadi extremism’s antagonism to the United States view the 
 186 
 
attack on civilians perpetrated on 9/11 to be unacceptable and inconsistent with the 
mainstream view of Jihad and justice in war (Esposito & Mogahed, 2007, p. 69).  
Additionally, only 13% of the politically radicalized 7% above considered the attacks as 
“completely justified” again indicating that even among those that agree to the notion of 
violent jihad they don’t view the deed of attacking civilians as consistent with their 
ideology (p. 70). 
Not “a single respondent in Indonesia who condones the attacks of 9/11 cites the 
Quran for justification.  Instead this group’s responses are markedly secular and worldly” 
(Esposito & Mogahed, 2007, p. 73).  Those who do believe that jihadi extremist acts are 
justified must rely on political rather than religious support for the act which seems 
peculiar in light of the jihadist’s need for solid religious cover for jihadi ideology and 
suggest that they themselves recognize the precarious footing of such deeds with respect 
to their own words. 
Clearly mainstream Islamic jurisprudence does not accept attacks on civilian 
targets as legitimate acts of Jihad.  Esposito and Mogahed (2007) deliberately state that 
the “Islamic war ethic prohibits attacking civilians” (p. 28).  Al Qaeda in particular has 
received much criticism for targeting of “innocents.”  Initially, bin Laden was willing to 
support al Qaeda affiliate Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in his attempt to start a civil war in Iraq 
between the Sunni and Shi’a in 2004.  However, even the radical jihadist Ayman al-
Zawahiri (2005) recognized the negative effect that would occur due to the inconsistency 
of Zarqawi’s brutally violent attacks on Muslim civilians with a jihadi ideology that 
claims the status of defending the Ummah (community/nation).  Zawahiri rightly 
recognized the difficulties that Zarqawi’s strategy of attempting to incite a civil war 
would cause in Muslim public opinion with regard to Al Qaeda’s goals stating that  “the 
strongest weapon which the mujahedeen enjoy … is popular support from the Muslim 
masses in Iraq, and the surrounding Muslim countries” (p. 4).  Additionally, he comments 
“[t]herefore, the mujahed movement must avoid any action that the masses do not 
understand or approve … lest the people should say that Muhammad used to kill his 
Companions” (p. 5). 
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Suicide operations, sometimes known as martyrdom operations, also appear to be 
inconsistent with jihadi adherence to Islamic law.  In The Middle East Quarterly, Malka 
(2003) cites Sheikh Muhammad Sa’id Tantawi, head of Egypt’s Al-Azhar mosque, who 
declared that “shari'a (Islamic law) ‘rejects all attempts on human life, and in the name of 
the shari'a, we condemn all attacks on civilians, whatever their community or state 
responsible for such an attack’” (p. 1).  Providing further evidence, Malka points out that 
“Islamic legal arguments against the operations relied upon three principles of Islamic 
law: the prohibition against killing civilians, the prohibition against suicide, and the 
protected status of Jews and Christians” (p. 1). 
 By “the mid-1990s, jihadis had fallen into a trap set for them by the regime by 
waging a tribal vendetta against officials, police officers, and intellectuals, thus further 
alienating the public” (Gerges, 2009, p. 153).  There are multiple examples that the 
tactics used by jihadis back-fired: in 1993, during an attempt to kill the Egyptian prime 
minister, a 12-year-old school girl was unintentionally killed which “led to a precipitous 
drop in already poor levels of public support” (Brooke, 2008, p. 212).  Subsequently, the 
public outcry after the 1999 Luxor massacre in Egypt forced jihadis in Egypt to declare a 
ceasefire. “Egyptian and Algerian jihadis had lost the battle for Muslims’ hearts and 
minds long before they lost the military fight against local authorities” (Gerges, 2009, p. 
153).  The jihadis “have isolated themselves from society, have contempt for its laws, and 
consider themselves morally superior to other Muslims…[but]…jihadis’ violent actions 
speak much louder than any public relations campaign…as long as jihadis kill in the 
name of Islam, Muslims will suffer” (Gerges, 2009, pp. 242–243).  Most of the casualties 
in Riyadh from an al Qaeda 2003 triple suicide bombing “and the subsequent bombings 
in Turkey, Morocco, and Egypt were Muslims, not foreigners.  Far from endearing al 
Qaeda and its affiliates to Arabs and Muslims, these attacks on soft targets were 
universally condemned by opinion makers and Islamists” (p. 249).  Arquilla (2009) 
highlights that a major shift occurred in Iraq which “was made possible by al Qaeda’s 
missteps at the narrative level.  Their ‘brand’ had changed from freedom fighters against 
the American occupation forces to oppressors of the indigenous insurgents” (p. 18).   
 188 
 
Surveys indicate that Muslims view the U.S. as highly inconsistent (Esposito & 
Mogahed, 2007) with our hypocrisy regarding democracy as well as other inconsistencies 
between words and deeds.  Ties between Islamist insurgents “were reinforced by a 
common narrative based on resistance to American occupation, a story that grew in 
strength with the outing of abuses such as those at Abu Ghraib, and the increasing toll of 
collateral damage on the Iraqi people” (Arquilla, 2009, p.13).  “‘Collateral damage’ may 
be a convenient euphemism, but the real-world effect of killing the wrong people is to 
spark blood feuds, energize enemy recruitment and…raise the risk of setting off a social 
revolution in Pakistan” (Arquilla, 2009, p. 25).  The “democracy project overall is 
pursued in highly inconsistent ways…The United States strives to spread democracy in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, but is content to deal with authoritarian rulers in Saudi Arabia, 
Egypt and elsewhere throughout the 44 Muslim countries of the world.  Such 
contradictory behavior is poison for the narrative aspect of netwar” (Arquilla, 2009, pp. 
25–26).  In the end,  
the United States…has a record of actions taken over the past eight years 
that leaves much room for enemy exploitation.  For example, the divisive 
debates about the invasion of Iraq, disputes that rocked the world, the 
scandals arising from maltreatment of detainees, and the collateral damage 
that accompanied American applications of air power have all conspired to 
undermine the counter-terror narrative. (Arquilla, 2009, p. 36) 
4. Is the Narrative Morally Legitimate? 
“For the most part, the Muslim jurists do not make the ‘justice’ of any instance of 
jihad the term of their discussion…for them any authentic instance of jihad was 
necessarily both holy and just” (Bonner, 2006, p. 5).  Sayyid Qutb’s life, death and 
writings is a “perfect illustration of…[how]…the human being becomes part of the 
revolutionary movement aimed at changing the world and bringing in a new ethical, 
moral order based on freedom, brotherhood, and justice for all” (Haddad, 1983, p. 67).  
For Qutb, in “order to have a moral society, the ideology must be grounded in the Qur’an 
and follow the design of God for humanity” (Haddad, 1983, p. 71).  “Reform was no 
longer sufficient since it did not deal with the root of the evil that permeates society” (p. 
78).  As discussed with the concept of ideological innovation, the “concept of jahiliyyah 
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as developed by Qutb projects a Manichaean view of the world…a constant 
struggle…between faith and disbelief…an ideological conflict” between essential good 
versus evil, the morally just and the unjust  (p. 86).  Therefore, those “who seek to 
propagate Islam in the world must aspire to purity and constancy” (p. 94).  Similarly, 
Khomeini was convinced that “the Muslim world is confronted with a crisis of 
fundamental identity, a pervasive alienation in which is rooted…[among other 
things]…moral debilitation” (Rose, 1985, p. 167).  “These young militants sought the 
freedom to engage in open religious discussion…over questions of ethics and morals” (p. 
21).  For jihadis, at the moral root of the conflict, a central theme is idolatry, “the 
principle of moral orientation that competes with God” (Goldberg, 1991, p. 12).  Yet, the 
near enemy, the “apostate” regimes, are “nominal Muslims who manifestly betray the 
community…[and]…commit the most heinous ethical and moral delinquency 
imaginable” (p. 23).  Unlike “Islamism, the salafists argue that politics is a manifestation 
of polytheism” (Moussalli, 2009, p. 15).  Similarly the far enemy, the west, may best be 
seen “as a metaphor for antagonism to the ‘world’…in which believers are tempted…and 
duped by error and idolatry…a symbol for the place in which idolatry has reached its 
logical extreme” (Goldberg, 1991, p. 25).   
It is not just the society as a whole who uses this worldview to justify the jihad as 
a Manichaean struggle; some individuals may be more predisposed to view life through a 
lens of good versus evil as well.  Gambetta and Hertog (1970) found that engineers are 
overrepresented among violent Islamic radicals by two to four times the size normally 
expected by chance.  One part of the explanation that they propose for this phenomenon 
is that engineers have a specific mindset that attracts them more to Islamism.  One feature 
of this specific mindset is the tendency to see history “as shaped by the clash between 
good and evil, and conspiratorially ascribing the forces of evil to one identifiable foe” (p. 
49).  Additionally, engineers turn out to be the most religious group of all academics.  
“Individuals with above-average skills selected on merit are…particularly exposed to the 
frustration and sense of injustice that comes from finding their professional future 
hampered by lack of opportunities” (p. 61).  Confronted by corrupt, state-driven job 
allocation, and an erosion of the link between merit and reward, “graduates tried to 
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restore their dignity by declaring their adherence to anti-materialistic Islamic morality” 
(Hoffman 1995, p. 208, as cited by Gambetta & Hertog, 1970, p. 64).  This collective 
frustration and deprivation leads to cognitive dissonance.  The envy, resentment, anger 
and hatred “are more likely to trigger action-responses…a desire to destroy the object of 
hatred, the West and its impure social mores, and a passionate embrace of traditional 
religious values” (Gambetta & Hertog, 1970, p. 69).  In the above, we can see that the 
Jihad itself is morally legitimate; however is the trans-national jihadi current authentic 
Jihad?  “Bin Laden and Zawahiri faced a difficult battle in their efforts to incite a large 
pool of recruits to come to their defense because they lacked legitimacy and a credible 
religious cover” (Gerges, 2009, p. 189).  If the current strand of trans-national jihadis are 
having trouble justifying their actions from a religious standpoint, then what source are 
they using to justify their cause?   
The U.S. narrative is a little more difficult to code only because of the changing 
narrative over time and problems of external consistency.  The theme of retribution for 
the September 11 terrorist attacks against unarmed civilians was generally viewed as 
morally legitimate throughout much of the world.  (Although there is unofficial anecdotal 
evidence that many people in Afghanistan were unaware of the terrorist attacks and the 
link to al Qaeda and the Taliban even ten years after the attacks, which could serve to 
undermine the U.S. narrative).  However, the U.S. had some moral legitimacy (much like 
capital) that it could spend in its efforts in Afghanistan.  However, much like our analysis 
of Germany in WWII; the U.S. quickly outran any stock of moral legitimacy it may have 
had when the decision was made to invade Iraq under dubious analysis that there was a 
connection between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda (with the inherent dangers that Iraq 
could provide al Qaeda with WMD material).  This lack of moral legitimacy was clearly 
apparent from the beginning when the U.S. was unable to establish a coalition of nations 
with support from other Muslim countries.  Any remaining shred of perceived moral 
legitimacy was wiped out by the failure to establish any link between Saddam and al 
Qaeda, the lack of WMD material, and problems of external inconsistency (i.e., abuses of 
detainees, collateral damage, etc.). 
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5. Is the Narrative Deriving Legitimacy from Religion, Philosophy, or 
Some Other Source? 
“Al-Qaeda’s struggle against the United States and its European and Arab allies, 
Saudi-Arabia in particular, has always depended on a minimum of political-religious 
legitimation, which explains why there is far more literature on Jihadi websites dealing 
with the question “why jihad?” rather than “how jihad?” (Lia, 2009, p. 283).  According 
to “Gallup Polls in 2001 and 2005–2007, of countries with substantial or predominantly 
Muslim populations, majorities in many countries (several in the 90% range) say that 
religion is an important part of their daily lives” (Esposito & Mogahed, 2007, p. 5).  
However, what is the mainstream Islamic stance on the moral legitimacy of jihadi 
extremist acts?  “Many mainstream Muslim theologians have asserted that radicals who 
encourage a “jihad against the infidels” employ a faulty reading of the Quran, and they 
point to verses that teach that an all-powerful God could certainly eliminate disbelief if he 
wanted. Therefore, it is not up to any Muslim to eliminate it for him by force” (p. 20).  
“The multiple meanings of jihad were captured in a 2001 Gallup Poll in which…the most 
frequent descriptions of jihad were ‘duty toward God’, a ‘divine duty’, or a ‘worship of 
God’—with no reference to warfare. However, in three non-Arab countries (Pakistan, 
Iran, and Turkey), significant minorities mentioned ‘sacrificing one’s life for the sake of 
Islam/God/a just cause’ or ‘fighting against the opponents of Islam.’ An outright majority 
mentioned these in non-Arab Indonesia” (p. 20).  This highlights the effect of the 
resultant shift in the construct of Jihad via the process of ideological innovation as 
presented by Robinson (2007),  Esposito and Mogahed conclude that most Muslims 
therefore reject the acts and rhetoric of jihadi extremists.  They point out that it is 
important to note that for Muslims, whether Jihad means a struggle of the soul or one of 
the sword, it is in both cases a just and ethical struggle.  The authors imply that what the 
jihadi extremists are doing would not actually be considered true Jihad by most 
mainstream Muslims until others in the West label it as such.  As we have seen earlier, 
the word Jihad has only positive connotations and is inherently morally legitimate.  Yet, 
many Muslims don’t view the “jihad” espoused by trans-national jihadis as legitimate.  
So how do trans-national jihadis derive their legitimacy?   
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Here we must elaborate on the common attitude of Muslims toward perceived 
Western policy.  “Muslim attitudes toward the United States have been affected by what 
is perceived as America’s—and to a great extent Europe’s—‘double standard’ in 
promoting democracy: its long track record of supporting authoritarian regimes and 
failure to promote democracy in the Muslim world as it did in other areas and countries 
after the fall of the Soviet Union” (Esposito & Mogahed, 2007, p. 58).  The authors quote 
Salameh  Nematt, a Jordanian analyst and writer for the Arabic newspaper al-Hayat: “It’s 
a success story for al-Qaeda, a success story for autocratic Arab regimes that made 
democracy look ugly in their people’s eyes. They can say to their people: ‘Look at the 
democracy that the American’s want to bring to you. Democracy is trouble. You may as 
well forget about what the American’s promise you. They promise you death’” (p. 59).  
Some of the most common answers from Muslims to the question of what could be done 
by the United States to improve the conditions of Muslims were “stop interfering in the 
internal affairs of Arab/Islamic states,” “stop imposing your beliefs and policies,” 
“respect our political rights and stop controlling us,” and “give us our own freedom.”  
While the inconsistent and aggressive policies of the West may not be a direct or root 
cause of jihadi extremism, it is not a far stretch to conclude how the general 
dissatisfaction of the majority of Muslims with the perceived treatment of Islam by the 
west may contribute to the passive approval of some jihadi extremist acts.  Esposito & 
Mogahed note that only small percentages (5% to 10%) “believe that the United States is 
trustworthy, friendly, or treats other countries respectfully” (p. 62). 
As we can see, trans-national jihadis use Western policies against the U.S. to re-
frame the struggle as a legitimate Jihad.  “Across the Muslim world from Morocco to 
Mindanao, the ‘war against Islam and Muslims’ has become a popular belief and slogan.  
Substantial majorities in a 2007 WorldPublicOpinion.org survey of residents in Morocco, 
Indonesia, Egypt, and Pakistan said the goal of the United States is to ‘weaken and divide 
the Islamic world’” (Esposito & Mogahed, 2007, p. 87).  While not condoning extremist 
acts or choosing to participate themselves, the average Muslim grants a sort of passive 
approval to jihadi extremism in so much as it does not affect them personally.  
Ultimately, the “heightened sense of the West’s threat to political freedom and to Islamic 
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identity has likely reinforced the desire for Sharia.  Recourse to Sharia, the blueprint for 
an Islamic society, provides a centuries-old paradigm.  Thus, however different and 
diverse Muslim populations may be, for many, Sharia is central to faith and identity” 
(Esposito & Mogahed, 2007, p. 92).  As the majority of the Muslim world perceives 
things, “[f]or you, America, to go against your own values and how you would treat your 
own people and to abuse Muslims in this way means you must really despise us and our 
faith” (p. 165).  Added to this problem, the U.S. is viewed as either non-religious, 
polytheistic, or simply morally corrupt.  The perceived lack of moral legitimacy is an 
aspect the U.S. must fix quickly and maintain as “it is the perceived justice of our cause 
that will determine ‘whose story wins’” (Arquilla, 2009, p. 58). 
6. Is the Organization (Overall) a Network, Hierarchy, or a Hybrid of 
the Two? 
Originally, many authors and scholars argued that al Qaeda was a hierarchy with 
bin Laden and a central staff as the head of the organization and training camps spread 
throughout Afghanistan (although several scholars identified al Qaeda as a network even 
prior to September 11, 2001; c.f. Arquilla).  However, the hierarchical organization was 
largely dismantled by U.S. and Coalition attacks following September 11.  Consequently, 
al Qaeda and several loosely associated militant Islamist groups started to be conceived 
as “‘more important as an ideology than an organization, network than a hierarchy, and a 
movement than a group.  It is increasingly amorphous, though initially it seemed tightly 
formed’” (Ronfeldt, 2005, p. 1 as cited by Milward & Raab, 2006).  However, Milward 
and Raab (2006) contend that it may not even make sense to talk about al Qaeda (much 
less all jihadi trans-national terrorist groups as “one unified dark network…it may make 
more sense to talk about it as a network of networks” (Milward & Raab, 2006).  The 
authors continue to cite the differing organizational definitions and characterizations 
present in the literature including: a foundation that funds terror, project teams, more like 
a social movement than a network, only an inspiration, a franchise, or four separate 
clumps consisting of a network hub, two scale-free networks, and a hierarchical network 
that are all loosely connected.  The authors describe the organization more as “a very 
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decentralized network…[where]…integration is quite low…a strategy of decentralizing 
to the maximum…cells should be self-supporting with doctrinal guidance from 
above…Hence, the global jihadist movement should discourage any direct organizational 
bonds between the leadership and the operative units…[In summary] Al Qaeda seems to 
have become a metaphor for a very decentralized network of cells operating 
independently” (Milward & Raab, 2006, pp. 11–13).   
Al Qaeda as an example of the jihadi trans-national movement had evolved from 
a hierarchy to a network, but then devolved under continued pressure to a very 
decentralized cluster of cells that are integrated only ideologically via cognitive-cultural 
mechanisms which can be achieved only through shared beliefs and the orientation to a 
common goal (Milward & Raab, 2006).   The authors conclude that if we can sever these 
cognitive-cultural mechanisms, then the lack of any existing structural organization based 
upon actors’ linkages will result in complete fragmentation.  In the final analysis, we 
would conclude that the trans-national jihadi movement began as a hierarchy, transitioned 
to a network, then became even more decentralized where it is neither a hierarchy, a 
network, or a hybrid of either; but rather a very-loosely connected group of cells whose 
only connection is an ideology, which may call for a new classification level (network-
minus). 
The U.S. organization is, again, much more difficult to code on this dimension 
due to the multiple approaches the U.S. has taken towards fighting terrorism in different 
theaters of conflict.  In Iraq, the U.S. began as a hierarchical structure, but “after years of 
floundering against…networks, American-led forces built networks of their own—a 
physical infrastructure of distributed small nodes (i.e., platoon-sized combat outposts)” 
(Arquilla, 2009, p. 6).  These outposts “improved response time and enabled us to swarm 
better at the doctrinal level, but it was the social networking phenomenon…that improved 
intelligence coming into our system” (Arquilla, 2009, p. 15).  Another example of this 
shift to networking was seen in the “widespread lateral sharing of information about best 
practices at light speed” through “‘Companycommand.com’, where U.S. Army 
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commanders could share tactics that worked against the terrorists” (Arquilla, 2009, p. 
13). 
By contrast, the U.S. began operations in Afghanistan as a networked 
organization: “just 11 Special Forces A-teams—about 200 soldiers…Since then…the 
international security assistance force (ISAF) has become more and more hierarchical in 
its approach” (Arquilla, 2009, p.6).  “The nimble network of A-teams and other light 
forces gave way to a much larger, heavier footprint.  Instead of emphasizing the creation 
of a large number of small outposts, a few bases became quite large…[which] made us 
slower to respond to fleeting targets and much less able to achieve surprise” (Arquilla, 
2009, p. 23).  Although we have focused primarily on the U.S. military in this chapter, it 
is important to remember that we are just one nation among “allied forces in 
Afghanistan—long hampered in their ability to cooperate by balky, hierarchical, too-
separate organizational structures—to coordinate their campaign efforts far better, and to 
seize the initiative from the enemy” (Arquilla, 2009, p. 27).  To add to the hierarchy and 
too-separateness, “within nations the ability of their various departments of 
government—military, law enforcement, intelligence, and diplomatic—to engage in the 
broad sharing of information…is generally impeded by a social ethos that defines 
individuals’ identities in terms of their parent organizations” (Arquilla, 2009, p. 5).  For 
this reason, we would classify the U.S. efforts overall as hierarchy. 
7. Is the Part of the Organization Responsible for Achieving Influence a 
Network, Hierarchy, or Hybrid? 
“[T]errorist networks, are relatively open systems…they are comprised of myriad 
independent, or at least semi-autonomous nodes and cells…a multitude of actors who can 
speak with some authority for their part of the network” (Arquilla, 2009, p. 55).  In a 
report by the US Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental affairs 
(2008), the influence of Islamist extremism is best characterized as a hybrid between 
hierarchical and networked.  The 2008 Report states that the internet is a key medium for 
the distribution of propaganda to legitimize terrorist actions and recruiting followers.  
“Some material is produced by organized groups…while other material is produced by 
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self-starting individuals” (p. 5).  For instance, “al-Qaeda manages a multi-tiered online 
media operation…This sophisticated structure” includes: a number of production units, a 
media committee, and product clearinghouses to “ensure a message’s authenticity…and 
helps maintain message discipline” (pp. 5–6).  The resulting messages are posted to 
thousands of well-known websites, some of which are simply mirrors or bulletin boards 
to provide a built-in redundancy and resilience from attack.  Meanwhile, Awan (2010) 
notes that “much of this ‘official’ jihadist media activity had been hierarchically 
organized and strictly regulated.  Yet the advent of Web 2.0 platforms…have facilitated a 
far more diffuse dissemination of autonomous user-generated media content outside the 
‘official’ jihadist spaces” (p. 10).   
Once again we find that the U.S. is difficult to code on this question.  In the fight 
against trans-national jihadi terrorism, the U.S. appears to be hierarchical, but fragmented 
losing any benefits that typically may be gained from hierarchical structure.  As an 
example of the hierarchical nature, any broad, over-arching MISO (PSYOP) themes or 
messages must be approved at the highest levels in the government: “Prior to conducting 
PSYOP…CCDRs must have their PSYOP program or plan approved…coordinated with 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) staff and interagency, and then forwarded 
for USD(P) review and approval” (FM 3-05.301, August 2007, p. 1–2).  Then any 
specific products (leaflets, radio ads, posters) generated from these over-arching themes 
must be passed back up the chain for approval all the way to the USD(P) unless these 
authorities are specifically granted to a lower echelon of authority: “USD(P) is the 
primary PSYOP approval authority for PSYOP products, but, ordinarily, this authority is 
subdelegated to levels that are situation dependent” (p. 1–3).  “The SecDef normally 
delegates PSYOP approval authority to the supported GCC…[who] retains PSYOP 
approval authority following the approval of the PSYOP plan by the president and/or 
SecDef” (FM 3-05.301, August 2007, p. 1–3).  At face value, the U.S. policy and practice 
is, again, pretty hierarchical; however, there are multiple hierarchies and organizations 
involved in the strategic influence business.  Although a CCDR (presumably CENTCOM 
in this case) may have specific authorities for operations (including influence) within a 
region, any strategic influence against trans-national jihadi terrorism falls under the 
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authority of SOCOM.  Both COCOMs are within the military hierarchy which is separate 
from any DoS attempts at influence and messaging whether by the Secretary of State or 
the Ambassador and his/her staff.  Finally, there is strategic messaging by prominent 
public figures (i.e., the President, Senators, and other political figures).  So although the 
official organizations responsible for influence in the U.S. are hierarchical with all the 
inherent bureaucratic hindrances often associated with hierarchies, there is no benefit 
from overarching unity of effort, since as noted above: “the ability of their various 
departments of government—military, law enforcement, intelligence, and diplomatic—to 
engage in the broad sharing of information…is generally impeded by a social ethos that 
defines individuals’ identities in terms of their parent organizations” (Arquilla, 2009, p. 
5).  For this reason, we would actually modify the original descriptors to classify the U.S. 
as a hierarchy-minus (indicating that it operates hierarchically, but with multiple 
hierarchies diluting the potential benefits of a hierarchical organization). 
8. Is the Organization (Overall) Speaking with a Single, Overarching 
Voice or with Many Small Voices? 
Although the question states “speaking”, the question is primarily designed to 
understand the doctrinal position of the organization, which is critical for understanding 
how members of an organization are enabled to operate both strategically and tactically.  
For the trans-national jihadi terrorists, “In terms of doctrine, the swarm characterized 
both the tactical level—e.g., in coordinated attacks on truck convoys—and the 
operational level, with the orchestration of a drumbeat of simultaneous strikes all over 
Anbar province, and even reaching out elsewhere in Iraq” (Arquilla, 2009, p. 13).  Since 
they operate as a network, each part of the organization is enabled and empowered to 
‘speak’ for itself on many matters of operations from the tactical level all the way to the 
strategic level.  Often there is no higher coordination or need for approval as each 
separate cluster plans its own actions and the core of al Qaeda is left in a position of 
being able to accept or deny affiliation with certain clusters.   
There is a potential downfall or risk to this approach in that the overall 
organization risks splintering due to the internal consistencies of the narrative as each 
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sub-group attempts to take the organization in different directions.  Again, as stated 
earlier, Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) propose that the key to the performance of networks 
depends “on the existence of shared principles and practices that span all nodes and to 
which the members subscribe in a deep way” (p. 333).  It is the strength of the narrative 
that keeps individuals bound and committed to the organization.  Thus far, al Qaeda is 
able to speak with many, small voices because all members are bound together with a 
strong narrative that provides for unity of focus and action without excessive, 
overarching control.  By contrast, the U.S. is extremely hierarchical (as is best typified 
through the example of the influence organization in the preceding section above).  All 
operations must be approved through higher echelons of command, but there are multiple 
echelons of command competing against each other.  Although hierarchical, there is not 
one big, overarching voice, but few, competing, big overarching voices often heading in 
different directions.  Consistent with the coding above, we would modify the original 
descriptors to classify the U.S. as a hierarchy-minus. 
9. Is the Part of the Organization Responsible for Influence Speaking 
with a Single, Overarching Voice or with Many Small Voices? 
As seen above, the influence network for trans-national jihadism is a hybrid of 
hierarchy and network.  But the key lies in the dissemination of the message: “Instead of 
relying on a few large conduits, [al Qaeda’s] leadership relied on the power of the 
narrative…to guide others…[and] has ended up with thousands of conduits of its 
message—few that are controlled, but almost all ‘on message’” (Arquilla, 2009, pp. 54–
55).  In fact, it may be the small voices of the masses that may be of greater concern to 
the U.S. in its attempts to combat the spread of terrorist ideology.  Marc Sageman (2008) 
“observed that while websites have been instrumental for distributing documents and 
other materials, it is through the interactive forums that relationships are built, bonding 
takes place, and beliefs are hardened…‘People change their minds through discussions 
with friends, not simply reading impersonal stories’” (p. 116, as cited by Denning, 2009, 
p. 13).  This results in a group of “self-appointed amplifiers of the violent Islamist 
message [who] may not be part of a known terrorist organization, but they choose to 
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advance the cause, not necessarily with guns but with propaganda” (Senate Committee 
Staff Report, 2008, p. 5). Ultimately, “at this level of…analysis, our terrorist enemies 
appear far more willing to allow the message to be crafted and spread by the masses” 
(Arquilla, 2009, p. 54).   
Again, in the example provided earlier, we see that the organizations responsible 
for influence in the U.S. are speaking with a few, big voices as opposed to one, big voice 
or many, small voices.  The U.S. influence efforts are constrained by all the pitfalls of 
hierarchy without deriving the one presumed benefit of hierarchy, namely: unity of 
direction and focus.  One potential solution would be the “creation of an organizational 
network designed to create the kind of information edge that the Allies in World War II 
had against the Axis powers…Today, no analog to this information advantage exists; but 
it should be a high priority to seek to recreate such a winning capability” (Arquilla, 2009, 
p. 47).  Such a solution would not require a concentration of resources, but rather a 
concentration of effort; thus no need to create additional institutional hierarchies, but 
rather moving to become more networked (Arquilla, 2009).  “In the United States…there 
is a great reluctance to allow for anything other than very tight central control over the 
development and dissemination of our message” (Arquilla, 2009, p. 54).  The U.S. has 
“relied upon building radio and television broadcasting capabilities of our own.  This 
belief in the primacy of a few-to-many approach in a networked era of many-to-many 
communications has hopelessly slowed our efforts.  And…cast doubt on the credibility of 
our content…[what is required is] a willingness to relinquish much control over those 
who would spread our story” (Arquilla, 2009, p. 64). 
One may think that an influence organization that is less hierarchical and more 
networked may have an issue with maintaining a consistency of narrative.  This may be a 
potential risk; however, it can be greatly offset by selecting a single compelling narrative 
at the core, which is universal in its moral legitimacy and truthful (which would indicate 
that themes like democracy and economic free-trade need to be abandoned in favor of 
more universal themes based on basic human needs and desires such as basic human 
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rights and security).  The ultimate goal is not to control and guide the message, but to let 
the message guide and control our actions.  
10. Is the Overall Density of the Organization High, Low, or Medium? 
The preceding arguments might bias the reader into assuming the trans-national 
jihadi terrorists are high or medium in their density; however, trans-national jihadis have 
been shown to be a loosely connected network, thus low density, as “a large number of 
small affiliates, distributed worldwide, is perforce going to be less connected socially 
than support networks comprised, say, of Iraqi Sunnis or Afghan Pashtuns—both of 
which feature dense webs of kinship-based social interconnection.  Widely distributed 
small cells will no doubt have strong local ties, but these will be a far cry from the 
interlinked masses in the terror network’s core areas of operations” (Arquilla, 2009, p. 
32).  
Similarly, we would classify the overall density of the U.S. as low as there are 
multiple bureaucratic institutions operating in hierarchy, each with its own goals.  
Individuals rarely work with individuals within other organizations and are constrained 
with who they can work with in their own organizations due to the hierarchical nature.  
Therefore, we would classify both sides as low in overall density. 
11. What was the Political Goal (End)?  Was it Achieved? 
Fishman and Moghadam (2010) assert that al-Qaeda (and by inference the larger 
trans-national jihadi movement) is on the decline and has not accomplished any of its 
goals due to internal debates and division.  Their report examines the internal causes that 
have sped up the decline of the jihadi movement.  First, al-Qaeda shows clear signs of 
decline as many key leaders have been lost to arrest or assassination and many al-Qaeda 
franchises have been substantially weakened or defeated (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and 
Algeria).  Although networks have an inherent ability to self-heal given the loss of key 
leaders in networks, it still has minor impacts on organizational efficiency and may lead 
to even greater internal divide as the new leaders vie for influence and control over the 
direction if the network.  Additionally, Fishman and Moghadam (2010) state that al-
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Qaeda has not achieved any of its goals, since the U.S. remains entrenched in the Middle 
East politically, economically, militarily; the Taliban-led Islamic State was ousted from 
power; Iraq is a weakly-functioning democracy; Israel remains in firm existence; and al-
Qaeda has been unable to inspire mass support from Muslims any country (although 
these assumptions will have to be revisited and carefully analyzed in the context of our 
projected withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan).  As stated by the authors, given al-
Qaeda’s operational capability, why can’t it achieve its policy goals?  The answer is that 
internal divisions limit the group’s ability to design or implement a coherent strategy to 
achieve core goals (problems with internal consistency); al-Qaeda’s operational successes 
since 9/11 have come at the expense of Muslims (problems with external consistency); 
and efforts to counter western narratives have been haphazard and rely on denigrating the 
enemy (smear campaigns) rather than solidifying a unified narrative for the future 
(vision).  This latest point highlights the problem with a morally legitimate narrative in 
the absence of perceive western aggression. 
However, has the U.S. achieved its goals?  As this is a current conflict, the 
obvious answer is no, but the bigger question becomes: “What is/was the U.S. 
objective?”  This question ties directly to the question of the narrative and its consistency 
over time.  If the goal is to deny safe havens for terrorists, then the U.S. has made some 
gains as there has not been a major terrorist attack in the U.S. since September 11, 2001.  
However, the trans-national jihadi terrorists are still operating at a high enough level to 
warrant continued U.S. military involvement as al-Qaeda and its affiliates accounted “for 
most of the nearly forty-fold increase in the number of significant terrorist incidents 
around the world from 2001–2008” (Arquilla, 2009, p. 31) .  Is the overall U.S. goal to 
spread democracy in the Middle East.  Iraq and Afghanistan are no longer under 
oppressive rule, the U.S. has made some headway; but many political experts question 
whether it is feasible or even desirable to continue to push for democracy in Iraq or 
Afghanistan over other forms of government and neither government is a full-fledged, 
transparent democracy running with the consent of its people.  Is the overall goal to 
provide basic human rights and security?  Again, the U.S. has made some headway; 
however, not enough headway to consider the conflict as over.  So it would appear as if 
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the U.S. objective (however it is defined) has not been achieved yet, but this section 
raises a bigger issue for the U.S influence strategy and grand strategy.  What is our 
overall objective, how does this fit with our narrative, can we stay consistent, is it morally 
legitimate, and will we still be able to achieve it with the projected force withdrawals in 
Iraq and Afghanistan?   
12. What Other Capabilities (Means) Were Used?  Relative Importance 
of the Other Capabilities in Achieving the End? 
The trans-national jihadi terrorists have made excellent use of the “tremendous 
capacity of cyberspace to act as a spreading device for narrative…‘story’ lies at the heart 
of a network’s ability to attract and sustain members, and to impel…them to 
action…difficulties with our own ability to craft a consistent, compelling narrative…have 
left the field of cyberspace relatively open to terrorists” (Arquilla, 2009, pp. 41–42).  
Almost all experts are willing to concede that the trans-national jihadis have, thus far, 
out-maneuvered us in cyberspace, which is a critical technological capability for them.  
However, it is interesting to note that unlike the prior case studies where other 
capabilities (means) of warfare were analyzed and noted to see how these other 
capabilities competed against influence (as a mean) to see which, if any, had a greater 
impact upon the overall ends of the conflict; in this instance the other means being used 
by the trans-national jihadis are not in competition with influence, but are designed 
specifically to enhance the effects of the narrative and secondarily to use this narrative to 
keep the network “glued” together.   
Of the three major uses of cyberspace, al Qaeda and its affiliates 
have…created their own ‘realm of the mind’, a kind of ‘virtual caliphate’ 
from which to spread their narrative, build social connections and call 
others to the cause…[as well as]…become dependent on the many 
instrumental uses of cyberspace that greatly assist in the daily functioning 
of their networks. (Arquilla, 2009, p. 44)  
C. RESULTS 
Based upon above evaluations, below is a short response as to how we code the 
jihadi influence strategy based upon our structured questions: 
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1)  Is the narrative consistent over time (construct)? jihadi – No; U.S. – No 
2)  Is the narrative logically consistent (internal)? jihadi – No; U.S. – No 
3)  Is the narrative consistent between words and deeds (external)? jihadi – No; 
U.S. – No 
4)  Is the narrative morally legitimate? jihadi – Qualified, yes; U.S. – Qualified, 
yes (Democracy, no; basic human rights and security, yes) 
5)  Is the narrative deriving legitimacy from religion, philosophy, or some other 
source? jihadi – Religion (But, unsuccessful unless reaction to Western policy creates 
appearance of U.S. versus Islam); U.S. – Philosophy  
6)  Is the organization (overall) a network, hierarchy, or a hybrid of the two?  
jihadi – Network-minus; U.S. – Hierarchy 
7) Is the part of the organization responsible for achieving influence a network, 
hierarchy, or hybrid? jihadi – Hybrid; U.S. – Hierarchy-minus 
8)  Is the organization (overall) speaking with a single, overarching voice or with 
many small voices?  jihadi – Many small voices; U.S. – Few, big voices 
9)  Is the part of the organization responsible for influence speaking with a single, 
overarching voice or with many small voices?  jihadi – Many small voices; U.S. – Few, 
big voices 
10)  Is the overall density of the organization high, low, or medium?  jihadi – 
Low; U.S. – Low 
11)  What was the political goal (end)?  Was it achieved? jihadi – End apostate 
regimes and remove Western influence: politically, economically, and militarily; 
U.S. – Unclear (as seen by problems with construct consistency of narrative)  Was it 
achieved? jihadi – No (subject to revision upon U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and 
Afghanistan) ; U.S. – No; additionally the analysis indicates that the U.S. needs to 
consider what is our overall objective, how does this fit with our narrative, can we 
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stay consistent, is it morally legitimate, and will we still be able to achieve it with the 
projected force withdrawals in Iraq and Afghanistan? 
12)  What other capabilities (means) were used?  Relative importance of the other 
capabilities in achieving the end?  jihadi – Cyberspace, extremely important as a tool 
to promulgate the narrative and maintain the network (works synergistically with 
influence strategy) 
As shown in this case study, the jihadi movement’s narrative has suffered from a 
lack of consistency in all three categories (internal, external, and construct).  Although 
there is a high moral legitimacy for conducting Jihad; there is, nonetheless, a disconnect 
between the concept of the authentic Jihad versus the “jihad” that the trans-national jihadi 
terrorist groups espouse.  On the surface, it would seem as if the overall influence 
strategy of jihadism is doomed to failure (as seen in response to question 11 above, 
“Have they achieved their ends?”), since polls “indicate that many of al-Qaida’s potential 
constituents have been deeply repulsed by recent attacks…, publics in many 
predominantly Muslim states increasingly see Islamic extremism as a threat to their own 
countries, express less support for terrorism, have less confidence in bin Laden, and 
reflect a declining belief in the usefulness of suicide attacks”  (Cronin, 2006, p. 45).  If 
this is the case, then why has it been an issue for over a decade?  Because, for many 
Muslims dissatisfied with the state of affairs, there is no other viable alternative.  
Repressive and corrupt regimes fail to live up to their developmental promises leaving 
frustrated elites no alternatives for managing their opposition.  “Other than acquiescence, 
joining radical movements became the only option” (Gambetta & Hertog, 1970, p. 75).   
There no legitimate contender from within the state apparatus and the current U.S. 
strategy has done more to alienate and push Muslims away rather than convince them that 
we are on the same side.  So although the jihadi influence strategy has flaws, the U.S. is 
not providing a viable alternative narrative in either our vision of the future or the 
morality of our cause.  In terms of organizational structure, the U.S. is hierarchical with 
all the inherent bureaucratic hindrances often associated with hierarchies; however, the 
U.S. is not deriving any benefit from the hierarchy regarding overarching unity of effort.  
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For this reason, we would actually modify the original descriptors to classify the U.S. as a 
hierarchy-minus indicating a need to change organizationally.  Additionally, the analysis 
indicates that the U.S. is still unclear regarding our overall objective, how this fits with 
our narrative, whether it is consistent or morally legitimate, and whether we will be able 
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XI. ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS 
In our analysis of findings, we begin by highlighting some of the key concepts 
that arose from our individual case studies as they apply to each of our hypotheses.  We 
will then continue to discuss the evidence as it relates to each hypothesis.  So, how do 
these preliminary results match up to our original six hypotheses developed in Chapter 5 
(and re-stated below)?  We will begin with each sub-hypothesis before analyzing the 
main hypothesis, namely: that the most important level of practice in determining the 
effectiveness of an organization is the narrative (an effective narrative is necessary, but 
not sufficient). 
1. Narrative 
After our review of the literature, we hypothesized that to be most effective, the 
narrative must be both consistent and morally legitimate.  (A narrative may be modestly 
effective if it is either consistent or morally legitimate, but will not be effective if it is 
neither consistent nor morally legitimate).   
In the Boer War, we found that the Boers were consistent over time, particularly 
with respect to nationalism (although we would consider both sides as morally 
questionable today).  British atrocities in the concentration camps and the resulting public 
outrage from press reports resulted in undermining perceived British legitimacy.  
Therefore, the post-war settlement was decidedly pro-Boer, leading to continued white 
supremacy over the native African population throughout the majority of the 20th 
century.  Despite being rated as nearly equal on all measures on narrative, the loss of 
legitimacy by the internal British audience resulted in a relative Boer advantage in this 
category.  Thus in the review of the Boer War, we immediately see that the absolute 
value of the narrative (in terms of consistency and legitimacy) does not appear to be as 
valuable as evaluating the relative value of the narratives of the competitors.  However, 
this does not immediately invalidate the hypothesis (as the more consistent and legitimate 
the narrative; the greater the chance of achieving an advantage over the competitor); yet, 
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it is also important to analyze the relative position of each narrative.  We will keep this 
modification in mind when reviewing the subsequent case studies. 
In WWI, we found that negative deeds (such as unrestricted submarine warfare 
and violations of neutrality) had a major impact on the perceived legitimacy, regardless 
of whether or not the deeds directly conflicted with the stated narrative.  Any action that 
served to undermine the perceived legitimacy of the belligerent had a major impact on the 
course and outcome of the war.  Specifically, in this case study, Germany’s willingness to 
flaunt the neutrality of Belgium was the key factor in the British declaration of war and 
popular public support.  The perceived German atrocities and intent (the execution of 
Nurse Cavell, the sinking of the Lusitania, and the Zimmerman telegram) dragged the 
U.S. into the war despite the struggle by President Wilson to remain neutral.  
Additionally, we found that Germany was confronted with multiple decisions between 
the moral high ground versus an immediate operational or tactical military advantage.  In 
their decisions to violate Belgium neutrality and resume unrestricted submarine warfare, 
Germany chose the military advantage to the detriment of their own narrative. By doing 
so, Germany knowingly sacrificed its informational advantage for material gain when the 
analysis of the narrative seems to imply that more weight should have been given to the 
moral effects over operational military advantage in these calculations.  This case study 
further supports the hypothesis regarding the need for consistency and legitimacy while 
also providing support for our main hypothesis regarding the overarching importance of 
the narrative vice the other levels of organizational analysis. 
In WWII, the relationship between the construct consistency of the narratives of 
the two sides is important.  The narratives of both sides shifted over time, but it is the 
timing of these shifts, their magnitude, and their relationship to legitimacy, that is 
interesting.  The overarching German narrative based on Versailles, Lebensraum, and 
German superiority shifted little over the course of the war.  When it did, the shift was 
more about strategy than a change in justification.  This shift was minor relative to the 
change in narratives that the U.S. and U.K. experienced. The basic legitimacy of the 
narrative allowed Germany to pursue its objectives to a fault.  The U.S. and U.K., on 
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some level, recognized the injustice of the Treaty of Versailles’ portion of the narrative, 
but Germany’s aggressive pursuit of Lebensraum crossed a line that caused the shift in 
the British and American narratives.  It appears that the relative consistency of the 
German narrative over time was counter-productive, indicating that the ability to adapt or 
respond to the adversaries shifting narrative may be important.  Meanwhile, the U.S. and 
U.K. narratives shifted dramatically from neutrality and appeasement to a shared 
narrative to defeat Germany.  Of interest here is that the shifts were predicated by 
Germany’s relentless pursuit of its own narrative.  The shifts of the U.S. and U.K. 
narratives were reactive and their legitimacy was dependent upon Germany’s actions to a 
certain degree.  The U.S. and U.K. could not have successfully established the narrative 
they ended the war with without first seeing the neutrality and appeasement narratives 
fail in the face of aggression.  A final observation is that legitimacy is a sort of capital 
that can be earned and spent.  The legitimacy of the German narrative was exhausted over 
time through its continued aggression with the invasion of France as well as its treatment 
of Jewish and Slavic peoples while legitimacy for the U.S. and U.K. was built up over 
time as efforts at appeasing Hitler and restoring peace were exhausted and betrayed.  
Overall, the analysis of WWII still supports the hypothesis that the consistency and 
legitimacy of the narrative is important, while again raising the issue of a comparative 
relevancy between the two competitors vice an absolute coding.  Germany began with 
higher relative narrative strength to begin the war; but the legitimacy was eventually 
spent; thereby, decreasing its comparative advantage over the Allies’ narrative.  Of 
additional interest is the fact the when the German legitimacy began to decrease, their 
continued consistency of narrative actually became a hindrance.  So although relative 
consistency between the two competitors is important, the narrative also must be 
evaluated in regards to the legitimacy. 
The internal and external inconsistency of the Soviet narrative was overcome 
during the majority of the Cold War by the tight central control placed on information 
inside the country.  Construct consistency was necessary to suppress the negative effect 
on legitimacy of the mismatch between Soviet words and reality as well as the logical 
absurdity of the Soviet system.  The same consistency over time that maintained control 
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of Soviet internal legitimacy was also integral to the rapid decentralization of information 
that occurred under Gorbachev and the subsequent loss of control of the narrative by the 
Soviets.  So much had been disguised for so long, that when the cracks in the construct 
were revealed, there was no space left for minor adjustments that could maintain the 
legitimacy of the narrative.  In contrast, the relative internal and external consistency of 
the United States narrative played a part in maintaining construct consistency.  As a more 
open and decentralized organization, the United States allowed critical voices to be heard 
and become a reinforcing part of the overall narrative rather than a destructive force.  The 
pressure of inconsistencies was vented and turned into evidence of the legitimacy of the 
overall narrative.  The Soviet narrative was relatively less strong than that of the United 
States because it was less legitimate.  The Soviet Union was only able to maintain its 
narrative over the Cold War era because they were able to completely control the 
information environment, fabricating legitimacy through consistency and a lack of a 
competing narrative inside the country.  However, under glastnost, the presence of a 
competing narrative and the inability to maintain consistency with the opening of the 
information flow undermined the perceived legitimacy and ultimately the narrative itself.  
This again supports both the original hypothesis as well as the modification regarding the 
comparative relevance of the narrative as opposed to the competing narratives.  When the 
Soviet Union was able to control the information environment, there was, virtually, no 
competing narrative; therefore, their narrative won (within country).  However, anywhere 
where a competition occurred in an information-free environment, the U.S. narrative had 
the comparative advantage.  One final note is that although one can fabricate legitimacy 
by controlling the message, it appears that the most effective strategy is to always 
maintain the legitimacy advantage, which only serves to strengthen the consistency and is 
less disadvantaged to exposure to competing narratives than a closed society. 
Finally, in the case study of the U.S. versus trans-national jihadi terrorists, the 
jihadi movement’s narrative has suffered from a lack of consistency in all three 
categories (internal, external, and construct).  Although there is a high moral legitimacy 
for conducting Jihad, there is, nonetheless, a disconnect between the concept of the 
authentic Jihad versus the “jihad” that the trans-national jihadi terrorist groups espouse.  
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On the surface, it would seem as if the overall influence strategy of jihadism is doomed to 
failure since many Muslims increasingly see Islamic extremism as a threat to their own 
countries, express less support for terrorism, and reflect a declining belief in the 
usefulness of suicide attacks.  However, the jihadi narrative has often “won” the battle of 
the narratives since, for many Muslims dissatisfied with the state of affairs, there is often 
no other viable alternative.  Repressive and corrupt regimes fail to live up to their 
developmental promises leaving frustrated elites no alternatives for managing their 
opposition so there no legitimate contender from within the state apparatus.  Additionally, 
the current U.S. strategy has done more to alienate and push Muslims away rather than 
convince them that we are on the same side.  So although the jihadi influence strategy has 
flaws, the U.S. is not providing a viable alternative narrative in either our vision of the 
future or the morality of our cause.   
Overall, the above examples from the case studies support the hypothesis that a 
narrative should be both consistent and legitimate (although this may be evaluated by 
comparing the narrative’s strength relative to the competing narratives.  Yet, although a 
particular narrative may be more consistent or legitimate relative to the opponent’s 
narrative, one should still strive to increase or maintain the highest level of consistency 
and legitimacy (ensuring both factors work with each other) since any changes to the 
information environment can change the relative strength of the narratives.  This 
conclusion also appears to be supported by the overall coding in Table 4.  During each 
conflict, the side which has more “yes” than “no” (either in the three measures of 
consistency or in legitimacy) may be understood to possess a relative advantage over its 
competitor.  Those actors which appear to have a relative advantage over the competitor 
achieved their political goals as opposed to their opponent.  The only case in which any 
side was coded as “yes” and enjoyed a significant relative advantage over its competitor 
was the Cold War (which interestingly is the only case in which the desired political end 
was achieved without resort to major, direct, military confrontation between the two 
sides).  Meanwhile, the one conflict where neither side has a relative advantage, the U.S. 
versus trans-national jihadi terrorism, is still in a stalemate perhaps indicating that 
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whichever side can achieve a relative advantage over its opponent in the narrative will be 
more likely to achieve its political end-state. 
2. Social 
Under the social level of organizational analysis, we hypothesized that 
organizations are more effective when the organizational density (as measured by tight 
coupling of connections, levels of clustering, and ratio of strong vs. weak ties) is medium 
(versus low or high) drawing primarily from Everton (2009).  We will discuss the 
combined result in Table 4 after discussing some of the most illustrative examples from 
each of the case studies. 
In our review of the Boer War, it appeared that, despite significant numerical 
disadvantages, the Boers were more successful militarily when the density of the army 
was medium based upon their networked structure.  The Boer army was set up to operate 
in Commandos where local Boers could join, leave, or switch Commandos at their own 
discretion, partially based upon the level of connections they had with other members of 
the Commando (which were, themselves, often heavily based on familial and friendship 
ties as Commandos were primarily formed from the local communities).  Additionally, 
each Commando was free to operate on its own initiatives, which included often 
combining with other Commandos to achieve tactical goals and then disbanding to pursue 
other objectives.  Towards the end of the war, the Boer army became more disjointed 
when individual soldiers no longer felt strong ties to the groups and each Commando 
increasingly operated on its own without coordinating and networking with other 
Commandos.  The data in this case appears to supports the hypothesis that organizations 
whose ties are medium density are more effective overall. 
Meanwhile in WWI, the CPI is a great example of the impact of density on 
influence operations.  The CPI operated in a unique manner wherein members of the 
organization were recruited and organized in a fluid basis based upon prior pre-existing 
relationships among the members; but it never become formally rigid based only upon 
pre-existing ties.  Members were also recruited based upon their accomplishments within 
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their area of expertise (print, radio, etc.).  This fluidity, based upon the medium density of 
the organizational ties, also allowed members to coordinate their work more effectively 
moving projects and ideas from group to group within the organization. 
In WWII, Germany started and ended the war relatively more dense than the U.S. 
and U.K.  However, Germany was initially successful but later defeated.  This illustrates 
the idea that there is a sweet spot between single channel and all channel density.  When 
conflict began, the Germans were at a point of density that facilitated success against 
adversaries that possessed too little density to compete.  As the war progressed, both 
sides continued to increase their density.  At some point, the balance of influence shifted 
when the U.S. and U.K. became dense enough, based on the combination of their joint 
military staffs, to compete with and then overwhelm a German structure that lost 
effectiveness after becoming too dense due to Hitler’s purging of his generals following 
the 1944 coup attempt.  This supports the hypothesis that medium density is preferable to 
extreme low or extreme high density.  This also supports the idea that density may not be 
an absolute value, but (like the narrative) is relative to the position of the opponent.  
However, unlike the narrative, a fluid organization, in terms of density, could be 
considered a benefit whereas a shifting narrative over time would be detrimental. 
The contrast between the Soviet and American economic systems during the Cold 
War supports the hypothesis that medium density is more effective than low density.  The 
state-controlled and compartmentalized Soviet system prevented the formation of ties 
between different parts of the economy.  This resulted in a lack of feedback between the 
entities responsible for production, distribution, and pricing.  The relatively unregulated 
American economy was more dense than the Soviet economy in this respect.  The 
excessive central control prevented the formation of ties between different functions of 
the economy which would have allowed for proper feedback and exchange of 
information.  The net result over the course of the Cold War was that the Soviet 
economic organization could not compete with that of the United States.  This was 
particularly significant with the rapid advance of information technologies, as well as 
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with respect to how the functioning of the economies intertwined with the narratives of 
both sides in the later years of the Cold War. 
Finally, in the struggle of the U.S. versus trans-national jihadi terrorists, we have 
seen that one of the greatest strengths of the terrorist organizations are their ties to one 
another (based on familial relationships, local communities, school or religious ties, or 
joint experience in previous struggles such as the Soviet war in Afghanistan).  However, 
this strength dissipates as the ties become less dense with the spread of the ideology 
between various franchise organizations, each of which operating as separate clusters 
without increasing the ties between these often disparate clusters.  The U.S. is also seen 
as low density with multiple stove-piped organizations often operating based upon their 
own organizational ethos without increasing the ties between the organizations.  This 
problem is compounded with the lack of ties between U.S. forces and the local populace.  
So although both sides are low density in this struggle, the relative advantage often goes 
to local terrorist groups based upon their density of ties to the local population, but the 
strength dissipates when the terrorist groups are operating in foreign areas and do not 
have the ties with the local population (especially in those areas where a concerted effort 
has been made by U.S. forces to form deeper ties with the local population and security 
forces).  
The coding of case studies provided in Table 4 further supports the hypothesis 
that medium density organizations are more effective than either low or high density 
organizations in achieving the desired political end-state. 
3. Organization 
Sub-hypothesis 3 dealt primarily with the organizational structure of either side.  
As mentioned in the literature review, there is some overlap between the organization and 
the social level of analysis; however the specific hypothesis for this level of analysis 
states that organizations that are hybrids of networks and hierarchies are more effective 
overall and more effective at influencing others than either pure networks or pure 
hierarchies.   
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During the Boer War, the British army began the conflict as hierarchical.  
However, despite their significant numerical advantage, the British Army was generally 
unsuccessful at the operational and tactical level until they incorporated more network-
like tendencies (to shift closer to a hybrid) by adopting the blockhouse strategy.  
Meanwhile the Boer army began the conflict as a hybrid organizational with multiple 
interconnected Commandos (based on deep social ties).  However, as the war progressed 
the Boer army shifted to become less hybrid and more heterarchical in nature as Boers 
frequently deserted the Commandos in higher numbers and Commandos began operating 
completely independently.  There were several attempts to regain a more networked 
structure by holding krygsraads, or strategy meeting between the leaders of the various 
Commandos to coordinate operational and tactical goals; however, these often increased 
the rift between Commandos resulting in even less coordination.  As in the previous two 
levels of analysis, we found that coding the two sides can often involve a shift, with the 
relative comparison between the two sides often changing due to these shifts, thereby 
affecting the achievement of the political outcome.  Despite these minor shifts in the Boer 
War, the overall organization of the Boers remained more hybrid-like while the British 
were always hierarchical (despite the minor tactical network-like tendencies).  Thus 
politically, the Boers maintained the relative advantage in this category although they lost 
the military advantage.   
In WWI, both sides (as a whole) were coded as hierarchical and remained 
hierarchical throughout the conflict with neither side achieving a relative advantage over 
the other side.  However the U.S. influence organization, the CPI, was set up in a unique 
fashion which was structured as a hierarchy, but often operated and shifted more as 
network.  There was an undisputed chain of command and a strong leader in Creel, but 
the organization became more fluid in its operational practices resulting in a coding of 
hierarchy/hybrid.  The German influence efforts, by contrast, were much more 
hierarchical (and dysfunctional).  The U.S. influence organization had a relative 
comparative advantage over the Germans and, as can be seen in the case study, were 
much more adept at garnering not only internal support from the population (including 
the ultimate decision by President Wilson to enter the war) but also international support.  
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Germany started and ended WWII as a hierarchy and increased in hierarchy as the 
war progressed.  This was the case for both Hitler and the OKW as well as Goebbels and 
the RMVP, particularly with respect to the top down centralization of authority and 
information.  The U.S. and U.K. began the war as two separate hierarchies that merged to 
form a single hybrid.  When the conflict began, the Germans were at a point of hierarchy 
that facilitated success against adversaries that were hierarchies within themselves, but 
not networked as a whole.  Yet, as the war progressed, the balance shifted when the U.S. 
and U.K. became more networked, even though they retained a basically hierarchical 
structure. This supports the hypothesis that a hybrid organization is more effective than a 
pure hierarchy. 
In the Cold War, both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were largely hierarchical, with 
little evidence of networks or hybrid-like structures.  However, again we find that 
sometimes it is not the strict absolute value of the coding that is important, but rather the 
relative comparison between the two sides.  Although both sides were hierarchies, the 
U.S.S.R. was relatively more hierarchical than the U.S. (as best seen in the lack of 
separation in the powers of government).  Although not directly supportive of the 
hypothesis as stated, in this case study, the side that is comparatively closer to the stated 
hypothesis on this measure seemed to enjoy a relative advantage over its competitor.  
This may also indicate that one should wish to strive to be closer to the ideal, hybrid, vice 
the ends, network or hierarchy, in order to maximize the comparative advantage while 
minimizing the chance of losing that advantage if the opponent changes his own 
organizational form. 
Finally, in the case of the U.S. versus trans-national jihadi terrorists, we found 
that in terms of organizational structure, the U.S. is hierarchical with all the inherent 
bureaucratic hindrances often associated with hierarchies; however, the U.S. is not 
deriving any benefit from the hierarchy regarding overarching unity of effort.  For this 
reason, we would actually modify the original descriptors to classify the U.S. as a 
hierarchy-minus indicating a need to change organizationally.  By comparison, the trans-
national jihadis began organizationally as a semi-hierarchy, but changed over time to 
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become less hierarchical and more networked over time in response to U.S. actions.  
However, the case study indicates that they may have shifted too far to the left and 
become even less networked and more heterarchical in nature hindering the 
organizational efforts.  The question is: which side will move back towards the center of 
the spectrum to gain the comparative advantage over the other side.  Additionally, the 
analysis indicates that the U.S. is still unclear regarding our overall objective, how this 
fits with our narrative, whether it is consistent or morally legitimate, and whether we will 
be able to achieve it with the projected force withdrawals in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
4. Doctrinal 
In our literature review, we developed two hypotheses under the doctrinal level of 
analysis.  First, that organizations where participants are able to self-mobilize into small 
groups to perform actions independently (swarms) are more effective than organizations 
that are completely leaderless or that have a central command; and second, that swarms 
are more effective when there is a strong narrative, while centralized organizations are 
more effective when the narrative is weak. 
In terms of influence during the Boer War, pro-British sentiment was centrally 
directed by a few key proponents while at the same time spontaneously supported and 
disseminated by the public at-large.  Pro-Boer influence was not very effective when it 
was centrally managed for although they gained many supporters, none of the supporters 
provided any physical assistance.  This supports the hypothesis that participants who are 
able to self-mobilize into small groups (British) to perform actions independently 
(swarms) are more effective than organizations that have a central control (Boer 
diplomatic efforts).  Despite the advantage in this category, British influence was 
undermined by the loss of legitimacy due to concentration camps) affecting the final 
achievement of the political goal.  Similarly, we found that the Boer army was more 
effective when it operated as a hybrid organization and coordinated between Commandos 
to swarm the enemy and then dissipate rather than fighting mass on mass.  Again, this 
advantage was lost as the organization became more heterarchical (completely 
leaderless).  By contrast, the British began as a centralized command (although 
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operations in Ladysmith and Mafeking were not coordinated).  Once the British army 
shifted to add more swarm-like capabilities into the operations (attacking from multiple 
angles and coordinated in different theaters) vice direct frontal assaults, then their 
military operations increased in effectiveness.  Finally, despite the overwhelming 
numerical advantage by the British, the Boer army was able to operate more effectively 
as a swarm because each individual Boer was deeply committed to the narrative of self-
governance which sustained those individuals most deeply committed to the cause.  The 
commitment to the narrative remained, despite the military defeat to arise again 
politically; thus, allowing the Boers to eventually achieve their political end-state despite 
the military loss.  By contrast, the British public was deeply committed to the narrative 
during the initial military stages, which allowed for increased military build-up; but the 
lack of a strong narrative (and subsequent undermining of its legitimacy) during the 
guerilla phase of the war eventually undermined the British public support for the war. 
In WWI, the question became more convoluted when analyzing the question “is 
the part of the organization responsible for influence speaking with a single, overarching 
voice or with many small voices?” This was already discussed above, but is important 
enough to bear repetition here.  The question as formulated is vague which is useful in 
allowing the exploration of all the relevant content here, but the analysis above shows 
that the choice between a single, overarching voice versus many, small voices should not 
be viewed solely as a simple dichotomy and in reality the answer has many different 
layers.  A single, overarching voice has been shown to be beneficial in establishing and 
maintaining the overall direction and coherency of the message (i.e., work of the CPI); 
but not beneficial if interpreted as having the message run and constrained by the 
government (i.e., German government stigma on the propaganda or even more narrowly 
defined as only in one’s own native language).  Similarly, many small voices can be 
construed as negative (i.e., the multiple agencies in Germany that were not coordinated in 
their message) or as positive (i.e., the amplification of the message through multiple 
dissemination channels and multiple voices within each channel as exemplified by the 
Four-Minute Men).  The most effective organization appears to be one that has a strong, 
central, well-defined narrative that is broadcast and amplified on multiple channels.   
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In WWII, both sides employed various media in order to wield influence through 
propaganda.  The Allied structure, however, employed more voices in the form of the 
number of separate organizations devoted to propaganda.  The Germans utilized one 
large interconnected propaganda apparatus whereas the U.S. and U.K. each built their 
own independent apparatus.  Additionally, the U.S. apparatus contained entities that 
operated relatively independently at times.  Also important is the change over time that 
occurred.  The German apparatus became more unified as Goebbels gained more control 
and authority, thus reducing the number of separate voices.  The number of entities 
involved in propaganda for the U.S. and U.K. increased over time and remained 
relatively autonomous.  Although none of these entities were necessarily self-mobilizing, 
this example does support the hypothesis that many small groups under the guidance of a 
strong overarching narrative have advantage of a single group under a dominating central 
authority. 
In the Cold War, we coded the Soviet Union as one single, overarching voice as 
opposed to the many, smaller voices of dissent to the communist system that arose from 
the internal populace and black-market system (as well as from the influence efforts of 
the U.S. which provided additional information to the many voices of dissent).  The 
amount of dissent increased with glasnost and the access to even more channels of 
information against the communist system.  Interestingly, although the Soviet Union’s 
narrative was coded as one big overarching voice, the case study also showed that the 
propaganda apparatus was set up to have multiple channels of dissemination.  From 
previous case studies (primarily WWI) we found that the question of big, overarching 
versus many small was a little too ambiguous and that the most effective organization 
seemed to be one that had a strong central narrative that was then picked up by the many 
voices and disseminated by the many voices.  In this respect, the Soviet Union would 
seem to have had the advantage except for the glaring illegitimacy of its narrative, which 
was magnified by the many small voices of the dissenters.  This supports the second part 
of the second sub-hypothesis for this section, that centralized organizations are more 
effective when the narrative is weak.  Additionally, the initiatives of the Reagan 
administration served to unify the many voices of the U.S. propaganda apparatus 
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providing centralized focus without excessive control.  This appears to support both 
aspects of the hypothesis that many small voices possess an advantage over one 
overarching voice primarily because of the strength of a single focusing narrative to unify 
the populace. 
In the case study of trans-national jihadi terrorists, the jihadis began with, and 
maintained, a comparative advantage to the U.S. efforts both militarily, since each part of 
the organization is enabled and empowered to ‘speak’ for itself on many matters of 
operations from the tactical level all the way to the strategic level; as well as in influence, 
since the power of the narrative enables thousands of conduits of its message—few 
controlled, but all retaining the same narrative.  As discussed above, the power of the 
narrative results in many, small voices of the masses who are all self-appointed amplifiers 
of the violent Islamist message without having to be part of a known terrorist 
organization.  They choose to advance the cause, not necessarily with guns but with 
propaganda.  Meanwhile, we found that the U.S. influence efforts are constrained by all 
the pitfalls of hierarchy without deriving the one presumed benefit of hierarchy, namely: 
unity of direction and focus.  Again, this case study supports both hypotheses that 
organizations where participants are able to self-mobilize into small groups to perform 
actions independently (swarms) are more effective than organizations that are completely 
leaderless or that have a central command; and second, that swarms are more effective 
when the there is a strong narrative, while centralized organizations are more effective 
when the narrative is weak.   
Overall, the data in the case studies as displayed in Table 4 tends to support both 
hypotheses; however, we found that the answers to the question of many, small versus 
big, overarching tend to be much more nuanced than previous hypotheses which would 
indicate that this hypothesis may need to be refined in future studies or further broken 
down into smaller components (one single narrative versus many, many voices 
(populace) versus one (government), and number of channels or mediums available to 




Finally, for the technological level of analysis, we hypothesized that technology is 
important, but is the least determining factor in organizational effectiveness.  Again, even 
a preliminary skimming of the case studies would suggest that this hypothesis may need 
to be re-evaluated.  Technology, in and of itself, may indeed be the least determining 
factor; but, it is interesting to note the interaction of technology on the overall influence 
strategy within the various case studies. 
First, in evaluating the impact of technology on the Boer War, both sides were 
similarly equipped and technologically symmetrical forces.  However, the British were 
actually negatively affected by either a reliance on technology (being tied to the rail 
lines), or a failure to modify anachronistic tactics ill-suited to recent developments in 
small arms.  Therefore, technology is important, but is the least determining factor in 
organization effectiveness and can often have a negative impact rather than a positive 
impact.  However, the impact of technology on the dissemination of the narrative actually 
had a greater impact on the war.  Inventions such as cable and Penny Mail had a 
tremendous impact on the ability of the British populace to maintain cognizance of what 
was happening during the war requiring an even greater effort by the British to maintain 
internal support for the war.  Externally, the British relied on technology to garner 
support, which was aided by the fact that they controlled most of the cable lines out of the 
Transvaal and were therefore able to minimize the ability of the Boers to propagate their 
message to the world (although this was partially mitigated by the Boer diplomatic 
efforts).  Interestingly, it was the widespread dissemination of the tragedies of the 
concentration camps via British technology (and dissenting voices) which helped to 
undermine their own legitimacy. 
In WWI, we again found that both sides were similarly equipped throughout the 
war.  Despite several technological innovations (i.e., submarines, aircraft, gas, etc.), both 
sides remained stale-mated in trench warfare throughout much of the war with 
technology having no real impact upon the ending of the conflict (with the exception of 
the tank).  This again supports the hypothesis that technology was the least determining 
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factor in achieving the political end-state.  However, technology did impact the influence 
efforts, namely: the negative impact of the German submarine technology and its use on 
their narrative.  This ultimately resulted in a naval blockade, an economic factor, which 
did have a considerable effect on the outcome of the war.  Also, the German use of 
American diplomatic channels to communicate with Mexico in the Zimmerman Telegram 
(along with British efforts to intercept and break the code) had another huge impact of the 
narrative of both sides and the course of the war.  So the two elements of national power 
which were most critical in WWI were economic and informational vice the technology 
of the military.  
The allies enjoyed two particular technological advantages in WWII in the form 
of radar and code-breaking capabilities.  Both contributed significantly at decisive points 
in the conflict.  Radar provided the RAF an advantage during the Battle of Britain and, 
therefore, affected the German decision not to attempt an amphibious invasion of Great 
Britain.  This in turn allowed the British Isles to be the major staging point of U.S. and 
U.K. war-fighting capability for the rest of the war.  Code-breaking capability allowed 
the U.S. and U.K. to understand German strategy and operations in a manner that the 
Germans did not achieve in contrast.  This allowed the U.S. and U.K. to maintain 
strategic surprise at key moments and prepare for German moves.  This does not directly 
support the hypothesis that technology is the least determining factor, but it also does not 
refute it because the Germans were coded as least effective on the other four measures of 
organizational effectiveness relative to the Allies.  Had the Germans achieved their 
political end-state because of technology despite being rated as relatively less effective in 
the other four levels of organizational analysis, then the hypothesis would have been 
refuted.  Additionally, the two sides generally fielded successive series of similarly 
designed equipment in the form of armor and aircraft in a typical development/counter-
development manner.  It is not clear that a lack of radar or code-breaking on the part of 




In the Cold War, information technology appears to play a more significant role.  
Each side dealt with low points in their legitimacy.  For the United States, it was the 
Vietnam War.  For the Soviets, it was the war in Afghanistan.  The timing of these with 
respect to information technology is of interest.  During the Vietnam War, video 
recording technology had a significant impact on perceptions of the war and therefore 
legitimacy.  The Soviets experienced a similar effect in their war in Afghanistan.  
However by the 1980s, the portability and reproducibility of video was greatly advanced 
and capitalized on by the United States in its information campaigns.  Here we see that 
technology played a part in shaping and amplifying the narratives.  Information 
technology inhibits information control and, therefore, inhibits the ability to tightly 
control a narrative.  This supports an increased importance for the role of technology as it 
interacts with the narrative, while also supporting the hypothesis that technology is less 
important in the factors of organizational analysis as compared to a relatively strong 
narrative.  A weak narrative does not survive the scrutiny of a loss of information control 
(which is why weak narratives are more effective in strong, centralized organizations).  
This is further evidenced by the use of satellite and cable television technologies by the 
United States in the 1980’s as part of government information campaigns.  The victory of 
the U.S. narrative over the Soviet narrative was greatly enhanced by implementation of 
technology as it forced the Soviet narrative to compete internally.  The Soviet narrative 
was too weak to hold up to this competition.   
Finally, we need to discuss the most salient technological factor during the Cold 
War: nuclear weapons.  Undoubtedly the technology of nuclear weapons had a major 
impact upon the political end-state of the Cold War, but not because of the technology 
itself.  Nuclear weapons did not allow either side to use the technology militarily to 
achieve its desired end-state, but rather was significant because it forced the conflict to be 
fought primarily through the other elements of national power, especially the information 
component and the competing narratives.  This is significant for future analyses as the 
continued existence of nuclear weapons will serve primarily to constrain all future 
conflicts below a certain technological level indicating that the narrative will continue to 
gain in importance during the information age as exemplified in the final case study. 
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In the U.S. versus trans-national jihadi terrorists, we again see that technology is 
the least determining variable in organizational effectiveness.  Despite the significant, 
technological advantage the U.S. has over its enemies, the jihadi terrorists have still 
managed to exist and even flourish despite our technology (even using our technology 
against us as so aptly and tragically demonstrated by the attacks of 9/11).  Where we do 
see the impact of technology is in the interaction of technology with the other levels or 
organizational analysis, primarily with the narrative and organizational levels.  Unlike the 
prior case studies where other capabilities (means) of warfare were analyzed and noted to 
see how these other capabilities competed against influence (as a mean) to see which, if 
any, had a greater impact upon the overall ends of the conflict; in this instance the other 
means being used by the trans-national jihadis are not in competition with influence, but 
are designed specifically to enhance the effects of the narrative and secondarily to use 
this narrative to keep the network “glued” together.  Cyberspace has become a tool to 
spread their narrative, build social connections, call others to the cause, and assist in the 
daily functioning of their networks.  
The hardest hypothesis to evaluate was our primary hypothesis that the most 
important level of practice in determining the effectiveness of an organization is the 
narrative (an effective narrative is necessary, but not sufficient).  In all the case studies, 
the narrative was an essential factor, but so were the other levels of organizational 
analysis.  However, the narrative was shown to be critical in maintaining the Boer 
resistance despite the overwhelming disproportion of force ratios and it was the 
undermining of the British narrative which resulted in the Boers achieving their ultimate 
political end-state despite losing the war.  In WWI, the narrative was crucial in 
compelling England and the U.S. to join militarily in the fight against Germany.  In 
WWII, the Allies were not competitive against Germany until their narrative was 
strengthened and until Germany outspent its legitimacy.  The Cold War appears most 
supportive of this hypothesis since technology constrained the battle to one of ideology 
and information versus military confrontation.  There were two strong narratives, the 
Soviet Union was strong in construct consistency, but the U.S. was relatively stronger in 
all other aspects, primarily legitimacy.  Finally, we see that the continued fight by the 
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trans-national jihadi terrorists could be attributed primarily to the fact that they still have 
a strong central narrative that glues them together; and despite all other aspects, the U.S. 
has not yet been able to win the war because we have not presented a compelling enough 
narrative to counter that of the jihadis.  Thus, we believe that this hypothesis is strongly 
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XII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The purpose of this thesis was to explore influence theory and strategy to identify 
what the key components of an effective influence strategy are and how to modify these 
components, when necessary, to increase strategic effectiveness.  The U.S. strategy in the 
current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as with al-Qaeda globally has focused 
predominantly on heavy U.S. military involvement (with a high proportion of kinetic 
operations), while using influence components (media, public diplomacy, CA, MISO, 
and PA), for the most part, in a reactive manner.  There seems to be no grand influence 
strategy by the U.S. to inform U.S. policy and current military operations.   
We began by examining the relationship of influence strategy with grand strategy, 
then progressed to examining several key influence theories as proposed by Cialdini, 
Ellul, Pratkanis and Aronson, Tugwell, McLuhan, and Reilly.  From our review, it 
appeared that there were multiple descriptive formulations of the components of 
influence, but no specific formulations on how to develop an effective influence strategy 
using these principles.  We expanded the five levels of analysis (or practice) as proposed 
by Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001), to assess the design and performance of any 
organization (whether network, nation-state, or non-state actor) in conflict with another 
organization.  Based upon our review of the literature, we proposed six hypotheses 
regarding an effective influence strategy most likely to help achieve the desired political 
end-state, which we tested using comparative studies of five major strategic conflicts of 
the 20th century: the Boer War, WWI, WWII, the Cold War, and U.S. versus trans-
national Jihadi terrorists.   
Our primary hypothesis was that the most important level of practice in 
determining the effectiveness of an organization is the narrative (an effective narrative is 
necessary, but not sufficient).  In all the case studies, the narrative was an essential factor, 
which served to mobilize and galvanize the respective opponents.  This latter statement is 
a slight modification on the original hypothesis in that the strength of the narrative is not 




opponent’s narrative.  Additionally, in all cases where the opponent possessed the 
stronger relative narrative, none of the other levels of organizational analysis were 
sufficient to mitigate this weakness.  The continued fight by the trans-national jihadi 
terrorists could be attributed primarily to the fact that they still have a relatively stronger 
central narrative that glues them together, while the U.S. has not presented a compelling 
enough narrative to counter that of the jihadis.  Thus, we believe that this hypothesis is 
strongly supported by all the case studies. 
Overall, the case studies support the hypothesis that a narrative should be both 
consistent and legitimate (although this may be evaluated by comparing the narrative’s 
strength relative to the competing narratives).  Although a particular narrative may be 
more consistent or legitimate relative to the opponent’s narrative, one should still strive to 
increase or maintain the highest level of consistency and legitimacy (ensuring both 
factors work with each other) since any changes to the information environment can 
change the relative strength of the narratives.  One of the most powerful examples was 
the Cold War, which was the only case in which any side was coded as “yes” on all 
measures of the narrative and enjoyed a significant relative advantage over its competitor.  
As a result, the desired political end was achieved without resort to major, direct, military 
confrontation between the two sides.  Another important finding was the observation that 
legitimacy is a sort of capital that can be earned and spent as exemplified in the case 
study of Germany in WWII and the U.S. in the current conflict versus trans-national 
jihadi terrorists. 
All the case studies tended to support the hypothesis that medium density is 
preferable to extreme low or extreme high density.  However, density may not be an 
absolute value, but (like the narrative) is relative to the position of the opponent.  
However, unlike the narrative, a fluid organization, in terms of density, could be 
considered a benefit whereas a shifting narrative over time would be considered 
detrimental.   
In terms of organizational structure, all case studies again supported the 




than either pure hierarchies or pure networks.  However, like the prior hypotheses, we see 
that this is a relative position vice an absolute coding as best exemplified in the Cold War 
where both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were completely hierarchical with no networks or 
hybrid-like structures.  Although both sides were hierarchies, the U.S.S.R. was relatively 
more hierarchical than the U.S. (as best seen in the lack of separation in the powers of 
government).  This may also indicate that one should wish to strive to be closer to the 
ideal, hybrid, vice the ends, network or hierarchy, in order to maximize the comparative 
advantage while minimizing the chance of losing that advantage if the opponent changes 
his own organizational form. 
In our literature review, we developed two hypotheses under the doctrinal level of 
analysis.  First, that organizations where participants are able to self-mobilize into small 
groups to perform actions independently (swarms) are more effective than organizations 
that are completely leaderless or that have a central command; and second, that swarms 
are more effective when there is a strong narrative, while centralized organizations are 
more effective when the narrative is weak.  After further analysis, the second hypothesis 
could be interpreted in various ways.  The key idea is that swarms are more effective 
when there is a strong narrative (and may actually require a strong narrative to stay 
viable), while centralized organizations are more resistant than swarms to the negative 
effects of a weak narrative and, in some case, may actually benefit from a weak narrative 
versus a centralized organization with a strong narrative in that the weak narrative may be 
more easily controlled and manipulated by the centralized organization whereas a strong 
narrative may develop a life of its own, thereby undermining the organization itself.  
Understanding the full interaction of the narrative and the organizational structure to this 
fidelity may require further research; however, overall, the data in the case studies as 
displayed in Table 4 tends to support both hypotheses; however, we found that the 
answers to the question of many, small versus big, overarching tend to be much more 
nuanced than previous hypotheses which would indicate that this hypothesis may need to 
be refined in future studies or further broken down into smaller components (one single 
narrative versus many), many voices (populace) versus one (government), and number of 




Finally, for the technological level of analysis, we hypothesized that technology is 
important, but is the least determining factor of the five factors we considered in 
organizational effectiveness.  Again, even a preliminary skimming of the case studies 
would suggest that this hypothesis may need to be re-evaluated.  Technology, in and of 
itself, may indeed be the least determining factor; but, it is interesting to note the 
interaction of technology on the overall influence strategy within the various case studies.  
Again, one of the most powerful examples was the impact of technological factors during 
the Cold War, where nuclear weapons were significant because it forced the conflict to be 
fought primarily through the other elements of national power, especially the information 
component and the competing narratives.  This is significant for future analyses as the 
continued existence of nuclear weapons will serve primarily to constrain all future 
conflicts below a certain technological level indicating that the narrative will continue to 
gain in importance during the information age as exemplified in the final case study. 
As is common with any research, there are some potential flaws in the current 
study.  The first is our reliance on data which is based on personal, subjective histories of 
the conflicts, often by authors who may have been, or may be, biased due to their culture 
and interest.  Additionally, these histories were then subjectively coded by the 
researchers, ourselves.  Optimally, future studies should seek to better operationalize the 
constructs and variables under consideration and attempt to increase the objective 
evaluation of each variable.  A second, closely related problem involved the specific area 
of doctrine with respect to coding competitors as one, single overarching voice versus 
many, small voices.  As discussed earlier, this question tends to be much more nuanced 
indicating that this variable may need to be refined in future studies or further broken 
down into smaller components: (one single narrative versus many narratives, many 
voices (populace) versus one (government), and number of channels or mediums 
available to each for dissemination of the message).  A third problem encountered in the 
study was the close overlapping of some of the levels of analysis (primarily social and 
organizational).  For the purposes of the study, it was necessary to split the analysis into 
“distinct levels”, but the interplay between the levels is much more complex than the split 




generalizable to all conflicts, which can only be answered by applying this construct to 
further case studies.  The second question is the constraint of number of variables studied.  
This study focused primarily of the narrative and organization of the nation-state or other 
conflicting actors, but did not take into account how these variables and the narrative 
interacted with the populace (the ultimate center of gravity).  For example, how does a 
consistent, legitimate message change when it is inconsistent with the internal narrative 
of the target audience and how do changes in the populace or narrative impact the 
narratives of the organization?  These interactions could serve as potential sources of 
future study. 
How can the results of this study impact current and future strategic conflicts?  As 
can be seen in the current conflict of the U.S. versus trans-national jihadi terrorism, 
neither side has a relative advantage in the narrative.  The results indicate that whichever 
side can achieve a relative advantage over its opponent in the narrative will be more 
likely to achieve its political end-state.  This can only be achieved by increasing our focus 
on the primary importance of the narrative and the need to develop a narrative (based on 
a well-defined end-state) that is consistent in its construct (stays stable over time), and is 
morally legitimate (by appealing to broad, consistent, and universal values (i.e., human 
rights) vice subjective, cultural values (i.e., democracy).  Additionally, once the narrative 
is developed, all actions must be evaluated to ensure that external consistency remains 
high.  The narrative does not need to constrain all potential actions, but any action should 
be evaluated to understand the impact upon the narrative and the risks judged 
accordingly.  Thus, the narrative should guide and inform actions both at the strategic 
level (support for autocratic regimes) as well as tactically (collateral damage). 
Second, the density of ties both internally and externally is extremely important.  
Internally, the density of ties can be achieved organizationally by moving to a structure, 
both overall and specifically in its influence efforts, to become a hybrid structure of 
hierarchy and networks (a strong overarching narrative can provide for a centralized 
focus, without constraining execution).  Meanwhile, the U.S. is too hierarchical with all 




is not deriving any benefit from the hierarchy regarding overarching unity of effort.  By 
comparison, the trans-national jihadis began organizationally as a semi-hierarchy, but 
changed over time to become less hierarchical and they may have shifted too far to the 
left and become even less networked and more heterarchical in nature hindering the 
organizational efforts.  Whichever side takes the initiative to move back towards the 
center of the spectrum in density will gain a comparative advantage over the other side.  
Externally, the current conflict shows the relative advantage often goes to terrorist groups 
who are either operating locally, or comprised of the indigenous population, based upon 
their density of ties to the local population; but the strength dissipates when the terrorist 
groups are operating in foreign areas and do not have the ties with the local population.  
This fact should be exploited by making a concerted effort to form deeper ties with the 
local population and security forces while highlighting the differences between foreign 
jihadis and the populations that they are impacting. 
Doctrinally, the U.S. must strive to craft a strong narrative, but be willing to 
enable and empower lower echelons and the public to ‘speak’ for itself, thereby gaining 
thousands of conduits for its message, all reinforcing and amplifying the message.  In 
terms of technology, we again see that technology is the least determining variable in 
organizational effectiveness indicating that the U.S. should shift its current focus on 
technological innovations in the kinetic realm towards understanding how technology, 
including cyberspace, can be used to enhance the effects of the narrative and secondarily 
to use this narrative to keep the network “glued” together.  Finally, and most importantly, 
the analysis indicates that the U.S. is still unclear regarding our overall objective, how 
this fits with our narrative, whether it is consistent or morally legitimate, and whether we 
will be able to achieve it with the projected force withdrawals in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Overall, the case studies support the hypothesis that a narrative should be both 
consistent and legitimate (although this may be evaluated by comparing the narratives’ 
strength relative to the competing narratives).  Yet, although a particular narrative may be 
more consistent or relative to the opponent’s narrative, one should still strive to increase 




with each other) since any changes to the information environment can change the 
relative strength of the narratives.  However, all case studies also tend to support the idea 
of selecting a single compelling narrative at the core, which is truthful and universal in its 
moral legitimacy. 
In conclusion, our study supports many important conclusions already suggested 
by notable experts past and present: “The printing press is the greatest weapon in the 
armoury of the modern commander…we had won a province when we had taught the 
civilians in it to die for our ideal of freedom: the presence or absence of the enemy was a 
secondary matter” (Lawrence, 1920, p. 267).  This “suggests the realization that this war 
will be decided at the narrative level, with military operations to some extent moving 
more toward being in a supporting position…the quality of the competing narratives will 
prove of decisive importance” (Arquilla, 2009, p.54).  “The effort to harmonize words 
and actions should be seen as a major step forward in integrating the so-called ‘war of 
ideas’ into the larger context of the conflict…one cannot conduct ideological disputations 
in a manner that is divorced from operational realities” (Arquilla, 2009, p. 53).  
Therefore, 1) the quality of the competing narratives will prove of decisive importance 
and 2) any communication strategy will need to address such inconsistencies to be 
effective.  The ultimate goal is not to control and guide the message, but to let the 
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